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Abstract
This work develops a theory of agent influence and applies it to a coached system of simple reactive 
agents. Our notion of influence is intended to describe agent ability which is contingent on the actions of 
other agents and we view such behaviours as being “nested”. An agent may have the ability to make A  hold 
only if another agent has carried out a particular action. Our analysis of this is based on a combination of 
the observation of the effects of an agent’s actions in a bounded environment and observations on what may 
be changed in that environment and is intended to allow for a logical representation of nested behaviours. 
We build on this notion to develop a theory of influence which we offer as an extension of existing systems 
for representing agency and its effects.
The notion of an agent being able to “see to it” that something is brought about has been a useful 
device for reasoning about agent ability. These so-called s it t  semantics have been developed by a number 
of researchers. Standard s t it  semantics allow statements of the form [or stit: A] which says that agent a  has 
the ability to see to it that A  holds. Although based on the concept of agent action s h t  semantics also allow 
for the representation of concepts involving what may be thought of as inaction. An agent deciding, for 
example, not to execute a particular action may be characterised as seeing to it that it does not see to it that 
A, [a s tit: [a s tit: -A]]. s h t  encourages nesting and although this nesting extends across actions within an 
agent it does not extend easily across agents. So called other agent statements of the form [0 s tit: [a s tit: A]] 
do not make sense in standard s t it  semantics because (3 seeing to it that a  sees to it that A holds implies 
that(3 has some dominion over a  which, in turn, compromises a ’s agency. Although the statement makes no 
sense under standard s t it  it does make sense in an intuitive way and Brian Chellas [31] notes that it would 
be:
“...bizarre to deny that an agent should be able to see to it that another agent sees to something”
This is also mentioned in Belnap et al. [8, page 275]. Chellas is correct and there are numerous settings in 
which other agent s t it  does make sense. These settings, which are captured in various readings of s t it , may 
bring a great deal of system level overhead. In a normative system, for example, /3 may have the option of 
imposing a sanction on a  if a  fails to bring about A  and in this sense may be thought of as seeing to it that 
a  sees to it that A holds. Similarly a deontic reading may place /? in a position where it is able to place an 
obligation on a  to bring about A. These readings allow for sensible interpretation of other agent s t it  but the 
examples above require that agents have sufficient awareness of personal utility be able to manage sanctions 
or that they are able to reason about obligations. These readings offer nothing for simple agents with limited 
resources and abilities.
We offer another reading for the s t it  element, one based on the concept of agent influence and one 
which carries minimal system level overhead. Because influence may be contingent on simultaneous or 
sequential behaviour by a number of agents it is extendible across agents and offers a means of addressing 
other agent statements. We extend the standard s t it  semantics of Horty, Belnap and others with the intro­
duction of “leads to” and “may lead to” operators which allow us to move our analysis into a setting where 
observation provides evidence of influence. We then explore the manifestation of influence in a number of 
scenarios. After exploring how influence manifests itself we then offer a partial logical characterisation of 
the influence operators and discuss its relationship with standard s t it .
Building on these semantics and the partial logical characterisation we then explore the practical use 
of our theory of influence in an agent learning system. We describe experiments with a system specified by 
safety and liveness properties and having two broad classes of agents, actors and coaches. Actor agents will 
manipulate their environment and coaching agents will observe the actor’s behaviour and its effects using 
aggregated observations to generate new behaviours which are then seeded in the environment to modify 
actor behaviour.
We then offer a discussion and evaluation of our theory and its applications indicating where it may be 
further developed and applied.
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Chapter 1
Introduction -  nested other agent ability
The notion of agency is not new, in computational terms, but much of the research on agency has been 
focused on agents rather than systems and societies of agents. This is a natural focus, if one sees an agent 
metaphorically as an individual. This metaphor is evident in many of the research areas branching from or 
supporting agent research. Normative systems focus on the effects of norms on the behaviour of individual 
agents. Agent communications languages focus on agent mental states [108]. These are both implicitly 
single agent concepts which may be aggregated and viewed at a system level but this does not necessarily 
mean that they may be aggregated and viewed as a societal concept.
We are interested in social rather than individual agency and to this end the main thread through this 
work is the investigation of a logical representation of nested behaviours. The nesting brings both social 
requirements and social benefits. The benefits are that a group of agents acting together or in sequence may 
have greater ability to exert influence on its environment than individual agents. The requirements are that 
in order to exert this greater influence agents must operate within a social context that allows the group -  
rather than individuals -  to maximise influence on an environment. In order to investigate social agency we 
consider behaviour in agent agnostic terms, this makes sense as it allows us to examine behaviours and how 
agents contribute to them rather than agents and how they contribute to behaviours. Our view of agency is 
framed in so called s t it  semantics, s t it  is an acronym like contraction of seeing to it and characterises agents
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in terms of their abilities to see to it that some proposition, the complement of a s t it  expression, holds true. 
In this context agents are simply mechanisms for exercising ability. Their agency is a result of their having 
choices but their internal mechanisms and, indeed, their mechanisms for bringing about propositions, are 
of no concern. Standard s t it  is expressive enough to deal with single agents and its semantics encourage 
nesting. For single agents this nesting provides a convenient way of expressing acting and refraining from 
acting -  an agent may see to it that it does not see to it that A holds. Such nesting runs into difficulties 
when dealing with societal nesting, nesting where other agents are involved. If two agents, a  and /?, may 
act simultaneously to bring about A  or they may act sequentially so that one agent opens the possibility for 
the other agent to bring about A. The former presents no great difficulties but the latter, the case of an other 
agent nested s t it , where /3 sees to it that a  sees to it that A holds is much more complex. Intuitively this 
makes sense, when Chellas first proposed s t it  operators he did not state postulates for multiple agents (see 
Xu [125]) but Chellas [31] (and mentioned in Belnap et al. [8, page 275]) notes, in a statement which we 
have already met in the abstract and shall call upon again, that it would be:
“...bizarre to deny that an agent should be able to see to it that another agent sees to something”
The intuitive sensibilities of this nesting are not easily represented within the more formal constraints of 
s t it  theory and they present considerable difficulties. Our contention is that by replacing the “strict” sees 
to it reading with an alternative “influences” reading, one which allows for the fact that an agent’s abilities 
may be contingent, we may sensibly characterise such nested statements in a formal setting. We contend 
that “influences” is a valid reading of “sees to it” that captures dynamic aspects of interactions with an 
environment and other agents and that where an agent may genuinely and unambiguously see to it that 
A holds then “sees to it” and “influences” are equivalent. We contend, further, that in a practical setting 
coaching agents which attempt to maximise the influence of other actor agents will be able to constrain 
agent paths through potentially enormous state spaces in such a way that speeds the discovery of complex 
patterns of agent interaction which influence the agent environment.
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1.1 Thesis outline
We start with a survey of the related literature in chapter 2. In chapter 3 we explore our notion of agent 
influence and develop this into a practical theory in chapter 4. We present a partial logical characterisation 
of our theory in chapter 5 so as to indicate its compatibility with standard s t it  theory. Practical aspects are 
considered in chapters 6 and 7 where we explore how a coaching agent may detect influence and analyse 
it in such a way as to synthesise appropriate behaviours for simple reactive agents. Chapter 8 discusses 
agent influence and its performance in a practical setting and closes the work by discussing future avenues 
of research and possible applications.
The contribution of this thesis begins with an exploration of influence then moves on to develop a 
practical theory allowing us to formalise our observations. We then consider logical aspects of our theory of 
influence and offer a partial logical characterisation to support our claims that influence may be used as an 
alternative reading of strict s t it  and that in certain conditions may be seen to be equivalent to strict s t i t . We 
then return to agents and agent systems to consider how a coaching agent situated in the same environment 
as a number of actor agents may use its observations in conjunction with our theory of influence to synthesise 
new and more influential patterns of agent behaviour.
The areas explored are outlined briefly below.
1.1.1 An exploration of influence
We described our notion of influence as an alternative reading for s t i t , there are already other alternatives 
and these others provide mechanisms for addressing the same difficulty. Belnap et al. [8, page 271] list 
deontic, disjunctive, probabilistic and strategic readings as alternatives and each of these goes some way 
to addressing the difficulties of nested s t it . They also bring additional difficulties, a deontic reading, for 
example, brings a requirement for a system of transferring obligations between agents and has an attendant 
requirement for a system of sanctioning agents that fail to honour obligations. Obligations and sanctions 
bring additional systems and additional complexity making their application to systems of simple agents 
difficult. The strategic reading is closest to our approach but is not as general as our notion of influence.
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We have already mentioned influence several times, what exactly is influence? Chellas’s statement, 
above, is a recurring theme in this work. Milner [87] provides us with another touchstone which recurs 
throughout this work, he notes that:
The behaviour of a system is exactly what is observable.
Our view of influence is based on observed links between an agent’s choice of action and any changes in 
that agent’s environment. Described simplistically, if an agent’s choice of an action has influence in a set 
of circumstances then we will observe consistent results in the environment following from this choice. 
If there are preconditions, perhaps another agent’s action or the presence of another object, then we will 
also observe inconsistent results. If the agent has no influence in a dynamic environment then we will 
observe inconsistent results. Our initial exploration of influence is driven partially by experiment and is 
concerned with identifying single agent influence by observation and distinguishing genuine influence from 
environment noise. We then extend our single agent observations to groups of agents acting either in parallel 
or serially.
The fact that our notion of influence is based on observation gives it a flexibility that is absent from 
other readings. In a simple system, one where it is only the laws of physics which govern agent influence, 
then our observations will be of a process of cause and effect. If the system is complex and has societal laws 
which support obligations and sanctions then cause and effect may not be straightforward but our hypotheses 
of influence will cope with this by identifying behaviour sequences which lead to propositions being brought 
about. We are interested in raw evidence of influence and not the underlying mechanisms of influence.
Our investigation of influence leads us to a system of hypothesising about agency which frees us from 
detailed consideration of agents and examines their societal abilities to look for ways of producing agent 
communities that express greater influence than do their individuals. This leads us to the notion of societal 
gateways through which behaviour passes as influence expands. We develop agents and agent societies to 
a point where gateways are determinable, and show how to synthesise behaviours of communities that can 
move through the gateways. The notion of gateways rises from a novel view of the partitioning of a system’s 
state space into domains of influence characterised by single agent or multiple agent involvement.
The societal view gives us insights into aspects of obligation and ability. This is most notable in the 
area of system specification and the “ought implies can” deontic identity. If a system is intended to carry out 
a task then it must be able to do so in some manner and this may not be immediately evident. Our approach 
may admit a characterisation of this identity by way of sequences of gateways in a system’s state space and 
in doing so extends the semantic reach of standard s t it  theory.
1.1.2 A practical theory of influence
We have already stated that this is an agent agnostic approach to agency. Complete agnosticism -  a black 
box agent -  is not really viable, we have already indicated that agent influence is driven by an agent’s choice 
of action. Here we outline an agent algebra based on observable behaviours. Observability here may require 
some cooperation from agents, an agent’s choice mechanism is of no interest but its choices are. It is not 
unreasonable to expect these choices to be observable even after the fact, an agent may simply report “I did 
this..”.
We base our algebra on agent choice and develop a notation which allows us to carry our hypotheses 
of influence into a modal logic, branching time framework. This gives us a representation of agents as 
condensed binary choice mechanisms which map onto our theory of influence and put us on a position to 
consider the logical underpinnings of agent influence.
1.1.3 A partial logical characterisation of influence
We introduce two modal operators, “leads to” and “may lead to”, which fit with our notion of influence and 
provide an intermediary between the abstract notion of influence and the more definite notion of s t i t . We 
then consider modal agency operators and introduce an other agent extension which allows us to examine 
how these operators deal with cases of agents operating in parallel or in series, after discussing a number 
of operators we investigate them in terms of observed agent influence with our other agent extension. This 
allows us to describe cases where influence and strict s t it  are similar and indicates what sort of reasoning 
we apply to manipulating influence operators.
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1.1.4 Experimenting with our theory of influence
Our experimental work is in two stages, we have alluded to the presence of coaching agents and considera­
tion of these agents is the first stage. Coaching agents are a bridge between theory and practical application. 
We discuss how coaching agents will use observations to generate hypotheses about agent influence and how 
these hypotheses may be ranked based on observed evidence. One of the major differences between theory 
and application is that theory admits unbounded concepts -  the relentless forwards branching in a branching 
time model -  and agents are bounded. We discuss this and propose a hypothesis structure that admits loops 
allowing a state based branching structure which provides a structure for linking hypotheses in a coaching 
agent’s database of observations.
This database structure is then applied in a simple agent world and we experiment with its ability to 
detect agent influence in single agent and two agent settings in both noise free and noisy environments. The 
environment is then extended so as to allow agents to move around their world and we present results that 
indicate that an influence based approach is capable of identifying components of complex behaviour in 
noisy environments.
1.1.5 Influence and ability
Agents are bounded entities and this boundedness forces limitations on the abilities of an individual agent. 
These limitations may mean that an agent can only manipulate a very small part of its environment. Agents 
are also social entities, by working with other agents they may overcome their individual limitations.
To understand our notion of influence one should think of ability as being either transparent or opaque. 
A transparent ability is one that is fully under the control of agent, an ability that is fully contained by 
a single agent entity. Opaque ability is one which has a dependence on other factors, these factors may 
be other agents or tokens which extend an individual agent’s abilities and which may not be immediately 
apparent to that agent or to a casual observer. Environment factors may be random, cyclic or episodic but 
they do not involve any element of a priori agent choice, our consideration is confined to other factors that 
are a result of agent choice.
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Two agents simultaneously moving a large object that would be impossible for either to move individu­
ally; an agent handing a tool or token to another agent or an agent leaving a tool or token in the environment 
so that, at some future time, another agent may pick it up and use it. Each of these examples clearly involves 
another agent’s choice. The simultaneous action in the first case lies on the boundary between transparent 
and opaque influence, if both agents know that jointly they can move the object and the agents are aware of 
each other’s presence then the opacity lies in uncertainty about the other agent’s choice. Given that agents 
are able to perceive their immediate environment this opacity may be dealt with by some signal or language 
where agents may indicate their intentions. Sequential actions are more complex, in the second example one 
agent may signal its intention to pass a tool or token to the other agent but this is not possible in the final 
example where the agents are never collocated. It is in these latter examples that we are most interested, the 
examples where one agent’s behaviour may extend the potential influence of another agent. Where agents 
share an environment and are constrained or motivated by a common set of norms one could say that the 
first agent plays a part in seeing to it that the second agent carries out a particular action or brings about a 
particular environment state.
The notion of seeing to it is formalised as a modal logic in s t it  theory, s t it  theory has been extensively 
researched but there are problems in its abilities to represent nested other agent constructs, that is con­
structs representing one agent seeing to it that another agent brings something about. There are a number of 
approaches to managing such constructs but they carry heavy requirements for agents and agent societies.
We apply a novel notion of agent influence, rather than one of absolute agent ability, to s t it  theory. In 
doing so we offer a viable reading for nested other agent constructs, a reading that carries very little in the 
way of additional society or agent requirements. This makes it potentially suitable for societies of reactive 
agents with limited cognitive abilities and fixed sets of actions. Applying our theory to reactive agents allows 
us also to explore some aspects of emergent behaviour, a potentially powerful but little understood property 
of societies of reactive agents. We make no claims for new approaches to reactive behaviour but do believe 
that our notion of influence may be used as a catalyst making the exploration of emergent behaviour in large 
state spaces a viable prospect.
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Our notion of influence as one of opaque ability differs from other research on agent influence. It is,
however, an entirely appropriate description and one which shall use throughout this work.
1.2 The contributions of this work
The main results of this thesis are the introduction of an interpretation of s t it  which is based on the notion
of agent influence removing objections to other agent nesting and the partial logical characterisation of this
reading which allows for its implementation. These and the other contributions in this work are listed below:
A notion of influence which is offered as a reading for stit expressions in certain circumstances, most no­
tably where individual agents play a part in a joint action or sequence of actions whilst maintaining 
the independence that agency confers.
A notion of extended influence which allows the representation of domains of agent influence characteris­
ing single agent influence, two agent influence and so on.
A notion of gateway actions which allow an agent or enables other agents to operate in a two or more 
agent influence domain.
A notion of strict stit which allows for the description of influence using the same terms as standard stit 
and which captures the differences in the way that values of propositions may be assigned to histories 
whilst satisfying the “sees to it” aspect of a statement.
Modal leads to and may lead to operators which pave the way for the treatment of the notion of influence 
in a similar manner to standard stit expressions.
A partial logical characterisation of leads to and may lead to operators which illustrates the differences 
between them and their similarities to standard necessity and possibility operators.
A binary representation of agent choice which simplifies the treatment of hypotheses that an action by 
an agent has a particular effect and allows for a simple treatment of refraining from said action whilst 
admitting the possibility that a different action by the agent may have the same effect.
The application of discrete time to the standard  branching time fram ework which draws branching time 
into the domain of computation and provides a foundation for addressing the difficulties presented by 
busy chooser agents.
This list is summarised in the closing sections of this work where the the function of each contribution 
is outlined.
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Chapter 2
Literature survey
We intend to describe a society where coaching agents observe the behaviour of simple actor agents and -  
by applying a theory of influence to these observations -  tune the actor agent’s behaviour so as to maximise 
their influence on their environment. This chapter is an introduction and brief survey of the extant research 
disciplines that provide the underpinnings of this system. Agents are the central theme of this work and 
are, consequently, the first area to be explored. After agents the role of beliefs and approaches to belief 
management are introduced then we consider the “system” aspects. It is intended that systems be specified 
by sets of safety and liveness properties, these sit, generally, under the umbrella of norms and normative 
systems. The final area is automated learning, the coaching agents are part of our agent society and their 
attempts to modify actor agent behaviour allow the society to be cast as a self contained learning system. 
Learning about one’s environment is not a trivial task and learning to satisfy a set of rules or guidelines in 
a poorly understood environment is fraught with problems. This is an attempt at addressing some of these 
problems by applying extant techniques guided by a novel agent influence driven approach. Our contribution 
to the literature is the analysis of agent behaviour in terms of influence and the application of this influence 
to s t it  logics so as to give an account other agent nested ability.
This chapter provides an informal introduction to the disciplines and research areas drawn together in 
this work. The chapter is broadly divided into two sections, the first introduces the areas that this work draws
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Figure 2.1: Schematic layout of a coached system of reactive agents
from and the second indicates, informally, how they may be drawn together so as to construct our society of 
influence driven agents.
2.1 A system outline: agents, agent systems, belief, logic and learning
We present a simple image of the system which will be a vehicle for this research. It is a multi agent system 
which uses reactive agents as primary actors. These reactive agents are monitored -  by means of their leaving 
what we call “history patches” in the environment -  by coaching agents which synthesise new behaviours 
for actors and leave these as “behaviour patches” . Coaching agents aim to maximise agent influence in such 
a way as to encourage cooperation between agents. They aim to maximise agent influence whilst keeping 
the world within bounds imposed by system level norms, safety and liveness properties.
Figure 2.1 illustrates a simple system schematic diagram. The coaching agents and actor agents form 
a loop and communicate by way of data patches. Coaching agents may aggregate patches from a number of 
actor sources giving them a “broader view” of agent actions and abilities. These aggregated data are analysed 
for evidence of agent influence. The broader view afforded by data aggregation will be incorporated into the
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behaviour patches, which can potentially alter actor behaviour, and complete the agent /  coach loop. It is 
worth noting that although we have mentioned agent /  coach communications here communications proper 
play only a small role in the work. Our approach uses passive communications, coaching agents observe 
actor agents and actor agents may collect behaviour data synthesised by coaching agents - there is no real 
agent to agent communications path.
2.2 Agents, agency and agent systems
The concept of an agent has had a long history in philosophy1. These early notions were predicated on a 
human agent’s ability to make decisions on the basis of his or her intellect. The computer centric notion 
of an agent entertained by this work is considerably more recent and seems to have grown from Reid G. 
Smith’s work on the Contract net protocol (see Rosenschein and Zlotkin [97]). Research at this early stage 
was mainly concerned with ways of getting multiple software entities to interact appropriately and had no 
real concept of agent societies. Although separate software entities were involved there was still evidence 
of a centralised behaviour management or design. This is most notable where utility is considered at system 
level or where software entities have been designed with particular types of co-operation in mind. In time 
questions of self motivated entities, entities that considered utility on a personal rather than a system level, 
were raised. These did not fit neatly into the existing co-operation framework. Dealing with utility at a 
personal level gave these entities power to decide whether or not to co-operate with other entities. This early 
distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) (see Rosenschein and Zlotkin [97, page 14]), where specialised en­
tities dealt with specific parts of a problem, grew into co-operative problem solving (CPS) (see Rosenschein 
and Zlotkin [97, page 15]) and agent research was launched on its own thread. There is still no notion of 
agent society and consideration, at this point, is focused on the self motivation of independent entities.
'See, for example, work by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 who wrote of human agents acting knowingly and willingly. 
John Duns Scorns (1265/66-1308) considered agents intellects as being more limited than Aquinas had considered them - possibly 
preempting the notion of reactive agents.
12
2.2.1 What does it need before we can call it an agent?
Co-operative problem solving’s introduction of the notions of personal utility and personal autonomy1 pro­
vide convenient starting points for an informal list of agent properties. A number of these definitions may 
appear to be rather general and almost seem to anthropomorphise agents and their properties. Indeed, Di- 
jkstra (in a private communication now available at the University of Texas [38]) has warned against such 
anthropomorphisation. At this point these are best thought of as “convenience definitions” which make it 
easier to say what does not constitute an agent rather than what does. There is nothing contentious in any of 
these definitions and as this work progresses it will focus on specific types of agent removing the vagueness 
of anthropomorphisation. We proceed by outlining a series of working definitions of agent properties. From 
the personal utility and personal autonomy mentioned above we may observe that:
Observation 1 Agents are self interested and self motivated.
Self interest brings with it an implication of autonomy. Consequently an agent must have sufficient 
autonomy for it to be able to choose its actions independently. Autonomy is closely related to many aspects 
of agent behaviour and will be revisited below. For the time being we’ll simply state that:
Observation 2 Agents are autonomous.
Autonomy and self interest are aspects not normally associated with what may be called traditional 
software entities. Building complex monolithic software systems is a difficult process. Complex interactions 
between modules may lead to unexpected system behaviour. Heterogeneous systems may multiply these 
difficulties and building heterogeneous systems of autonomous agents is a fearsome prospect. Agents may 
appear to act in similar ways but in a heterogeneous assembly of agents it is very likely that their internal 
machinations, the processes which cause an agent to act in a particular manner may be entirely different 
from those causing another agent to act in a similar manner. Comparing agents at the internal level makes 
no sense and, as mentioned above, it has become common practice to attribute agents with anthropomorphic 
“attitudes” such as beliefs, desires and intentions. The role of these attitudes when dealing with agents 
has long been recognised, see Bratman [18], Georgeff and Ingrand [47], and Rao and Georgeff [95]. This
2By personal autonomy we mean that an agent is free to decide whether or not to co-operate with another agent.
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account of agent operation, abstracted by applying very “humanistic” descriptors provides a convenient and 
intuitive means of comparing the operation or performance of dissimilar agents and may be applied to even 
the simplest of reactive systems.
Observation 3 Agents have desires and intentions.
Desires and intentions imply an element of persistence. An agent may hold a desire to bring about a 
certain world state. If the agent does so and world state later changes then the agent will, once again, seek 
to bring that state about. If it is unable to do so, perhaps because it is no longer able, then it may either 
seek the assistance of another agent or to renew its ability. The (perhaps temporary) inability to achieve an 
intention does not necessarily mean that the agent will simply drop that intention, it will persist and the agent 
may find alternative means of achieving it. If the agent can’t do anything about the problem then the only 
course of action available may be simply waiting. It is worth noting here that persistence, particularly with 
purely virtual agents, does not imply a continuous existence. If a purely virtual agent saves its internal state 
before its process is halted then it will be able to restart in the same internal state with its beliefs, desires 
and intentions intact. It may be, however, that it is reinstated into a different environment but persistence of 
intentions will mean that it may attempt to find other ways to operate. It is worth jumping slightly ahead to 
note that abstract concepts like intentions may be handled by modal logics, discussed later, allowing us to 
manage these anthropomorphic concepts in a formal manner.
Observation 4 Agents have persistence.
To justify being described as self motivated an agent must be able to generate and fulfil any intentions 
that it sees necessary as a means of achieving its desires through its actions. In order to make the most of its 
manipulations of its environment an agent must be able to perceive at least some of its surroundings. Gen­
erally agents are situated in their environment but, as with persistence, its worth noting that this “situation” 
need not be physical. A computer system remotely sensing and manipulating its environment by way of 
embedded sensors and actuators is, to all intents and purposes, situated in that environment.
Observation 5 Agents are situated in an environment that they can perceive and influence.
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This rather informal description outlines the main features of agents in a very general manner. As 
mentioned above there is nothing contentious in these features and the intention is to provide a general 
description which will be refined as necessary later in this work. The final property -  situatedness -  implied 
that an environment was necessary and this is indeed the case. We continue by describing the properties 
of agent environments in a similarly informal manner. Environment details specific to our system will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.
2.2.2 The agent environment
Agents carry an element of situatedness, they need an environment to perceive and manipulate. Despite 
the lack of consensus (see Wooldridge [121] [122]) on what constitutes an agent it is safe to say that an 
environment is necessary -  agents are nothing without an environment. Environment properties can be 
broadly divided into two categories, physical and societal. Here we address the environment’s physical 
characteristics which we will see may support agent societies and societal behaviour. We consider these 
societal aspects in a little more detail in the following section.
Being able to hear confers no great advantages to agents which are required to operate in a vacuum. 
Being able to play soccer is not a great ability in a world where baseball is the only sport. The environment 
provides a collection of objects that agents (situated in that environment) can perceive and manipulate. This 
collection of objects also includes other agents sharing the environment, this means that any approach used 
to model agents should also be able to model their environment. Russell and Norvig [101] list five principal 
characteristics which may be used to describe and distinguish environments, these are uncontentious and 
are briefly described here with a view to indicating how these may require special attention in any model 
of an agent environment. Note that the descriptions here are from the perspective of a single agent situated 
in the environment under consideration. We draw heavily on descriptions from games here for the sim­
ple reason that their contrived and simple environments provide perfect examples of isolated environment 
characteristics.
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• Determinism : If an agent is operating in a fully deterministic environment then the next environment 
state may be determined entirely by the present environment state and any action or actions carried 
out by an agent or number of agents. The results of agent actions are, therefore, predictable and 
consistent.
•  Accessibility : Agents may not be able to perceive or manipulate certain elements of the environment. 
Games provide good examples; chess gives competitors a fully accessible environment where each 
player has perfect information on the state of the game before them. Games such as dominoes are 
partially accessible, a player may see his or her own pieces and what has already been played but is 
unable to see what any opponents are holding. Players do, however, have some knowledge of what 
other players are not holding. If an agent’s percepts are limited to a subset of what its environment 
presents then this may have the effect of making a deterministic environment appear to be non de­
terministic. An agent that is unable to perceive rain may not be able to understand why the ground 
occasionally turns to mud and makes moving around more difficult.
• Episodic or non episodic: Episodic environments operate in cycles with each cycle being a completely 
independent operational entity, an “episode”. In an episodic environment a poor decision in one cycle 
will not necessarily have any long term effect on the agents future utility. Games, once again, provide 
a good illustration; the card game snap is episodic, a moment’s inattention may cause a player to lose 
one round but will not necessarily affect that player’s chance of winning the next round. Chess is a 
non episodic game, a poor move in the early stages of a game may have serious consequences for that 
player’s chances of making good moves in the future.
• Static or dynamic : The state of a static environment will not change during an agent’s deliberation. 
A situated agent or agents will be the only drivers of change within that environment. If there is more 
than one agent then in order to maintain the static nature agents must co-ordinate their actions. Chess, 
again, provides a simple example with players taking turns to move pieces. Dynamic environments 
do not give agents the luxury of a change free period for deliberation. Elements of the environment
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may be in continuous change and this may be driven by uncoordinated agent action or natural events 
in that environment. Games, once again, provide several examples; chess is static because the players 
make alternate moves. Chess with a clock is semi static, if a player can complete deliberation and 
make a move within the specified time slot then the game is static, if not then the state game may 
change possibly rendering that agent’s deliberations useless. Soccer is a dynamic game as the ball 
and members of both teams are moving continuously. Outside of games truly static environments are 
rare, Bratman [18] wryly notes that even if an environment contains no other human or robot agents 
then nature often intrudes.
• Discrete or continuous : if an agent’s percepts and actions are limited, distinct and clearly defined 
then, as far as it is concerned, it operates in a discrete environment. In such discrete environments 
it is often easy to partition the agent’s world into distinct states and easy to gauge the effects of an 
agents actions. Games, again, provide good examples, chess is a discrete game, each piece occupies 
one square on the board and can move only according to certain rules. Soccer is continuous, there are 
still rules governing movement but within these players can move freely in any direction and the ball 
can be anywhere in the field of play. Because of its discrete nature chess is amenable to brute force 
searches of the game state space by computerised systems, a technique that is signally unsuitable for 
soccer playing robots.
These five elements may be perceived differently by agents (and, possibly, differently by each agent) 
situated in an environment. Events that an external observer may see as being linked by an obvious, simple 
causal conjunction may not be obvious to agents situated in that environment. Any method used to model 
an agent system should be flexible enough to be capable of representing the system from the point of view 
of an observer as well as from the point of view of the least capable agent within the system.
2.2.3 Agent societies
We have a number of definitions related to agents and a number of definitions related to agent environments. 
This work is concerned with agent systems, as with agents there is no widely accepted definition.
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We note that the ESSLLI course reader (Broersen et al. [20]) defines an agent system purely in terms 
of agents:
There are many definitions for what a multi-agent system is (see Wooldridge [121]). For the 
purpose of this course, we define a multi-agent system as a set of acting and interacting, delib­
erating and communicating, autonomous, goal directed and socially engaged computing com­
ponents.
This is, we feel, insufficient as agents are closely related to their environment and we have stated above that 
an environment is necessary. We therefore define an agent system as an environment with at least one agent. 
Because we are interested in the realisation of such systems in a computational setting we impose bounds on 
the environment. The nature of these bounds is unspecified but the import is that the environment consists 
of a countably finite number of elements.
Definition 1 An agent system is a bounded environment containing at least one agent which is capable o f 
perceiving and manipulating that environment.
This definition covers both single agent and multi agent systems and is general enough to cover simple 
systems and complex societies where agents interact with each other as well as with their environment.
2.2.4 Agent communications
Our aim is to build a society of reactive agents which is capable of adapting its behaviour so as to satisfy 
system norms. We intend to have these agents co-operate so as to deliver complex, aggregate behaviours. 
What level of agent communication is required for this to happen? Bryson [27] suggests that there may be an 
imbalance in agent systems research with too much effort being put into designing complex communications 
systems for relatively simple agents. Similarly, Singh [108] notes that communications are centred on 
individual agents rather than on societal aspects of groups of agents. Even though humans have a rich 
communications language much is still accomplished by simple signals. Reactive agents are not ideally 
suited to using a complex communications language so we intend to use implicit communications and briefly 
outline this later in section 4.2.
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2.2.5 Agent ability -  agency
Wooldridge [122] uses the terms agent and agency interchangeably. This may be justified if the agents under 
consideration are intelligent agents, agents that act with a view towards achieving short term intentions and 
longer term desires. They are agents and they express their agency through their actions. Agents are not 
necessarily intelligent, Minsky [88] cites the example of a vehicle steering wheel. A steering wheel clearly 
has no intelligence yet the vehicle’s driver may consider it as an agency for changing the vehicles direction. 
The steering wheel appears to know what to do in response to the drivers commands and the driver has no 
real need to know what the steering wheel does on his or her behalf. It is better to think of the steering 
wheel as an unintelligent agent that simply performs a given task. Consider, also, a coaching agent in a 
soccer team; without an understanding of what the game requires it would be very difficult for that coach to 
act deliberately so as to improve team performance. A soccer coach may be the oldest and least physically 
able member of a team. The coach may be unable to score the goals that the team require but the coach’s 
knowledge and communication abilities in combination with the other team members physical abilities bring 
goals within their collective agency.
Clearly an agency is not the same thing as an agent and we state:
Definition 2 An agency is an ability to carry out a particular task or bring about a required state. Such 
agency may be possessed entirely by an agent or jointly by a group o f agents.
Agents and agency are separate entities, the agent being a physical or virtual entity and agency being 
that entity’s capability. Were they both to be considered as entities then the former would be a physical or 
virtual entity and the latter a metaphysical entity.
2.2.6 Representing agency
To work with the agency aspect of agents we need some means of representing the results of an agent’s 
actions. Ideally this form would be portable across human and computer platforms. That is to say that the 
approach be computationally viable allowing computer based agents to use it and that it be to a sufficiently 
abstracted to allowing humans investigating system behaviour to understand its processes. Agency may
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be thought of as the behaviour of agents and this brings us, once again, to the touchstone phrase from 
Milner [87] that the behaviour o f a system is exactly what is observable. This allows us to take an abstract 
view of the agents in a system and think of them as entities which behave by exercising autonomous choices.
2.2.7 Agents and agent systems, the intentional stance
Schut et al. [103] note that the idea of using humanistic concepts, concepts such as beliefs, desires and in­
tentions, in the context of agents originated in work by Bratman [18] and Rao and Georgeff [95]. Although 
such abstract humanistic concepts imply that agents have a degree of cognitive ability they are still useful 
when dealing with reactive agents. Modal logics are capable of managing such concepts and these allow us 
to represent elements of these so called pro-attitudes (we consider this term in more detail in section 2.3.2) 
in a formal, non abstract manner. Bratman’s approach identifies two problems that must be addressed by an 
agent’s architecture; firstly the architecture must be able to support two forms of reasoning and secondly, the 
architecture must be able to deal with the problems of resource boundedness. The two forms of reasoning 
proposed are a means-ends reasoning approach to planning and an ability to reason about competing alterna­
tive courses of action. Resource boundedness can limit an agents abilities in a number of ways, limitations 
may be brought about either by the agent being unable to perform arbitrarily large computations or by the 
agent’s environment continually changing.
The chess with a clock example, of section 2.2.2, is a good example of resource boundedness, agents 
playing the game have only a limited time to consider each move and may be forced into making choices 
that are not optimal.
Rao and Georgeff [95] described a computational model of a generic belief, desire and intention driven 
(BDI) agent. This generic agent adopted plans (which were precompiled procedures) as intentions dependent 
on environmental conditions, in doing so the agent may need to select one from several competing plans.
Wooldridge [121] notes that adopting an intentional stance by attributing beliefs, desires and intentions 
to agents has become common practice in agent systems research and notes elsewhere (Wooldridge [122]) 
that doing so ascribes a strong notion o f agency. Considering agents as intentional entities provides a
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number of advantages; in a heterogeneous system these attributes can be a useful abstraction allowing re­
searchers or developers to reasoning about agents without having to delve into their internal workings. 
Shoham [105] suggests considering artificial agents as formal versions of human agents holding formal 
versions of knowledge, belief, abilities and choices and indicates that this view helps with agent oriented 
programming. Shoham [106] also suggests that multi agent systems provide a number of intriguing possi­
bilities for applying mental attitudes to assist in achieving coherent interaction between agents designed by 
different people. An intentional stance is useful when it helps understand the structure of a machine, its past 
behaviour or its future behaviour. There is a complexity floor below which adopting an intentional stance 
provides no advantage. An on/off switch could be thought of as a very simple agent, the simplicity of its 
behaviour means that there is nothing to be gained by adopting an intentional stance. We explore the notion 
of BDI agents further in the following section outlining agent architectures.
2.3 Agent architecture, cognitive and reactive agents
When faced with a new agent systems problem there is an immediate temptation to design a new architecture, 
a bespoke architecture perfectly suited to the task in hand. Wooldridge [121, page 235], however, notes:
You decide you want your own agent architecture. Agent architectures are essentially tem­
plates for building agents. When first attempting an agent project, there is a great temptation 
to imagine that no existing agent Architecture meets the requirements of your problem, and 
it is therefore necessary to design one from first principles. But designing an agent Architec­
ture from scratch in this way is often a mistake: my recommendation is therefore to study the 
various architectures described in the literature, and either licence one or else implement an 
’off-the-shelf’ design.
There are pitfalls in working with agent systems. This is a relatively young research area so there is 
a temptation, sometimes a great temptation, to try something completely new. There are many agent ar­
chitectures and describing even a small number of these would take considerable space. Instead we simply
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partition the world of agent types into two broad categories, those of cognitive agents and reactive agents. 
Reactive agents, in their most basic incarnation, simply respond to cues, triggers and stimuli in their environ­
ment and do so by executing pre-programmed reactive plans -  set sequences of actions -  aimed at achieving 
particular goals. Jennings [68] notes that a major selling point of purely reactive agent systems is that overall 
behaviour emerges from interactions between component behaviours. This is view championed by Rodney 
Brooks [24], a strong critic of symbolic approaches to agency. The conceptual simplicity of reactive agents 
masks a number of difficulties, notably those of designing agents in such a way that they can take account 
of non local information and in such a way as to be able to improve their individual performance over time. 
Jennings further notes that agents using a large number of behaviours can quickly become too complex to 
understand.
Cognitive agents differ from reactive agents in a number of ways. The most notable being the cognitive 
agent’s ability to plan by reasoning about its current state and its capability of maintaining models of its 
environment. These abilities intuitively carry advantages, an agent that can reason about things may develop 
new methods of carrying out tasks in a dynamic environment, its memory allows it to deal with non local 
perceptions and its model of the environment allows it to reason about the effects of actions.
Even though this work is concerned with reactive agents we have already indicated, following obser­
vation 3, that the notion of desires and intentions is not unique to cognitive agents. Despite their being only 
a small component of reactive agency we give this subject and considerable coverage so as to indicate the 
complexity required in explicitly managing beliefs, desires and intentions. This is a complexity that is not 
evident in reactive agents but in our coached system we need to be aware of this approach so as to allow us 
to abstract coaching agent operation where necessary.
2.3.1 The beliefs, desires and intentions architecture
We have already stated that the anthropomorphic notions of beliefs, desires and intentions are a useful 
abstraction for describing agents. This now common abstraction which describes a number of cognitive 
agent architectures grew from work by Rao and Georgeff following work by Bratman (see Tran et al. [114]).
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Much philosophical literature considers intentions as an aggregation of beliefs and desires, Bratman’s work 
argues that intentions are distinct from beliefs and desires. Rao and Georgeff [95] note that Intentions 
are partial action plans which may (or may not) help an agent to achieve its goals. The BDI family of 
architectures gives primary importance to these agent intentions.
BDI architectures provide only a very general framework leaving agent designers free to decide how 
an agent uses these beliefs, desires and intentions. With this in mind, rather than explore the specifics of 
interactions between the architectural blocks that build an agent we consider beliefs, desires, intentions and 
their management in a general manner.
2.3.2 Beliefs, desires and intentions -  pro-attitudes
Bratman [18] notes that desires and intentions are pro-attitudes, that is attitudes which have a motivational 
role in agent behaviour. (Belief and knowledge are considered as information attitudes [122].) Believing 
that turning on an air conditioner will make me feel cooler will not motivate me to turn it on. This belief in 
conjunction with a desire to feel cooler may produce an intention to turn the air conditioner on. Desires and 
intentions may interact, a short term intention may interfere with an agent’s ability to achieve a longer term 
desire so the agent will choose to suppress the shorter term intention. Intentions are conduct controlling 
pro-attitudes whereas desires are potential influencers of action. An intention involves a commitment to 
action that is absent from a desire, Bratman terms this relation between intention and action the volitional 
dimension of commitment.
The simple examples above use a belief-desire model, the intention to carry out a particular action 
may be reduced to the belief that given a desire for A  then the action will bring about A. This model has 
both descriptive and normative aspects, it attempts to structure a common-sense approach to action and it 
attempts to articulate a practical rationality. Is this simple model adequate? If one accepts the existence of a 
predominant desire then it is. Earlier intentions may cause an agent to reason about what it needs to do and 
cause it to generate new intentions giving commitment a reasoning centred dimension. A prominent desire 
to bring about A  means that an agent desires this more than other options which it may deem incompatible.
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If an intention to bring about A cannot be identified with a predominant desire then it does not admit either 
a volitional or reasoning centred commitment.
The tactic of reducing intentions to beliefs and desires is, it would appear, inadequate. Bratman [19] 
considers intentions in the context of a boundedly rational agent. Bounded rationality introduces a require­
ment for practical as opposed to omniscient reasoning. This leads to intentions being considered as partial 
plans which can play a role in future reasoning. Intentions are both inputs to and outputs from an agent’s 
reasoning process. As inputs they can pose problems -  does an agent have the abilities it needs to bring about 
A? They can also pose constraints -  does an agent’s desire to bring about A interfere with any other desires 
or intentions? Intention has two facets, one deals with intentional action and the other with co-coordinating 
plans, recognising these different aspects of intention causes us to consider intention as a distinct element of 
agency.
Our brief discussion of agent societies, section 2.2.3, mentioned agents as being autonomous, goal 
directed and socially engaged computing components. What, then, is a goal and how do goals fit in to the 
BDI abstraction? Cohen and Levesque (see [43, page 301]) do not offer a formal concept of a goal, instead 
they consider only the consequences of goals. This leads to intention being considered as a persistent goal. 
Goals, in turn, are a subset of an agent’s desires and form the set of desires that the agent has intentions of 
fulfilling.
This brief discussion may be summarised by a number of definitions:
Definition 3 A pro-attitude is something that plays a motivational role in an agent’s behaviour.
Definition 4 A belief is a fact that an agent holds to be true in its present state and which may be true in the 
future.
Definition 5 A desire is a pro-attitude which can, potentially, influence an agent’s behaviour.
Definition 6 An intention is a pro-attitude which controls an agent’s behaviour and to which the agent has 
some degree o f commitment.
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2.3.3 Belief management
Understanding how beliefs ought to be changed given new information has been an active research area in 
both philosophy and artificial intelligence. We cover this briefly and informally here, our work makes no 
explicit use of belief management but the underlying notions serve to guide our consideration of coaching 
agent operations. Two approaches to belief management have been studied in detail, belief revision and 
belief update. Agent beliefs may be described in two ways, a belief set is a set of beliefs that is closed under 
logical consequence. A belief base does not exhibit such closure and may, therefore, contain beliefs that are 
independent of others. Belief revision is concerned with the changes an agent should make to its belief set 
when a new belief is adopted. Friedman [45] notes that belief update addresses how an agent ought to change 
its beliefs when it perceives a change in its environment. An agent’s beliefs will, to a large extent, concern 
its environment so there is a subtle link between these approaches. Both approaches share the intuition that 
changes to belief sets ought to be minimal. The changes made by each approach differ, belief revision will 
attempt to identify beliefs which ought to be discarded so as to accommodate a new belief whereas belief 
update attempts to identify what changes to existing beliefs are necessary to accommodate a new belief.
2.3.4 Belief revision
Belief revision originated from studies in the philosophy of science and revision occurs following the adop­
tion of a new belief. If an agent learns <p and ip is consistent with its existing beliefs then the new belief, <p, 
is simply added to the agent’s knowledge base. If, however, <p is inconsistent with existing beliefs then these 
are revised by discarding older beliefs so as to maintain consistency. Friedman and Halpem [45] The most 
commonly accepted approach to belief revision is known as the AGM theory after Alchourron et al. [3] and 
Gardenfors [46]. This assumes that the agent’s epistemic state is represented by a set K  of formulas in some 
logical language, £.e over a set of primitive propositions. Belief revision takes a set of beliefs, A , a revision 
operator o and a new formula, <p and, after the operation, returns a new belief set, A  o <p. Intuitively this 
process should result in a minimal change to the existing belief set. Friedman and Halpem [45] list a set of 
postulates to characterise this notion.
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The AGM theory’s assumption that an epistemic state be represented by some logical language requires 
a little consideration. Recall that our work is biased towards reactive agents which are not the natural habitat 
of such systems. To this end we describe beliefs as the agent’s current vision of its world, a vision which is 
limited to its percepts.
Our agent’s beliefs may, then, be characterised as being of the form given a set o f percepts P then 
action a  is the best action. The choice of the best action falls into the remit of coaching agents which will 
guide actor agents in their behaviour. Beliefs, albeit in a very simple form, do exist in tangible form in a 
coached reactive agent system.
2.3.5 Belief update
Belief update originated from work in the database community (see Friedman [45]) and addresses the prob­
lem of changing a knowledge base so as accommodate new facts or beliefs about the world. If an agent 
makes a new observation that contradicts or is inconsistent with existing beliefs then existing beliefs are not 
necessarily considered as being false. Belief revision does not assume that the world is unchanging and, 
instead, attempts to capture changes in the world. This raises some interesting questions as there are subtle 
differences between static and dynamic environments and differences between changing and unchanging 
environments. We consider static and dynamic as describing worlds where the properties of objects remain 
constant (see, for example, Russell and Norvig [101, page 46]) and the disposition of world objects may or 
may not change during agent deliberation. A changing environment is one where the properties of objects 
are subject to change as, for example, an agent learns more about them. An unchanging environment means 
that object properties do not change though this, clearly, may still be a dynamic environment.
Katsuno and Mendelzon [71] characterised the belief update procedure as a set of postulates addressing 
formulas, rather than belief sets, which an update operation ought to satisfy.
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2.3.6 Some philosophical points
Belief management is a lively area of philosophical research and one that autonomous agent systems may 
contribute to. The inherent boundedness of agents allows the tuning of constraints so as to address certain 
issues, something which would not be possible with more complex human systems. Hansson [58] lists a 
number of philosophical concerns with belief revision, since some of these are pertinent to this area of work 
we briefly outline them here.
The AGM theory is unusually simple and elegant but this elegance comes with a cost. The simplicity 
is a result of assumptions about belief systems and AGM does not capture many of the subtle aspects of 
belief management. The simplicity and elegance is also rather fragile and much of it lost when postulates 
are added to make the model more realistic. Belief change processes may be extremely complex and are, 
consequently, subject to idealisation so as to produce tractable models. This idealisation is generally by one 
of two methods, simplification where complexities are left out, and perfection where standards of rationality 
are raised beyond what an agent may reasonably achieve. Most research has taken the latter approach 
resulting in simpler mathematical models which require unlimited cognitive capacity. Real agents may be 
bounded by many constraints making such an approach undesirable. Finiteness, although a weak restriction, 
takes us towards a realistic representation of cognitive capacity, Hansson asks if stricter cognitive limitations 
than finiteness may he represented in an interesting way? Belief management in a multi-agent environment 
may go some way towards answering this question.' Agents are by definition bounded entities and may face 
additional constraints such as limited abilities, having to depend on assistance from other agents and relying 
on delegated tasks or duties.
The logic of the BDI model.
BDI components are usually considered against a background of branching time and possible worlds - a 
standard approach for models incorporating logical modalities. We have noted that modal logics are capable 
of handling such concepts and for some examples see Halpem [55], Horty [66] and Wooldridge [122]. Rao
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and Georgeff build on earlier work using possible worlds frameworks and consider intentions as being on 
par with beliefs and desires (this elevation of importance is in line with Bratman’s consideration).
Possible worlds semantics traditionally treat each world as a set of propositions and model beliefs 
as a belief accessibility relation linking certain worlds. Halpem and Moses [53] note that a proposition 
is believed if and only if it is true in all belief accessible worlds. Each belief accessible world leads, in 
turn, to a tree of further worlds. Intentions can be represented, similarly, by a set of intention accessible 
worlds. Recall that an intention involves some degree of commitment, this allows us to characterise the set 
of intention accessible worlds as a set of worlds that the agent has committed itself to attempting to realise.
Rao and Georgeff [95] describe these in three accessibility relations, one for beliefs, one for desires 
(which may be applied to goals) and one for intentions. These relations deal with two types of attitude, 
informational and motivational. Bennett at al. [9] indicate that informational attitudes may be characterised 
by a KD45 modal system3 and motivational attitudes by a KD system.
2.3.7 Dealing with beliefs, costs and benefits
Beliefs may or may not be true but knowledge should always hold. Truth maintenance is a well researched 
area of traditional artificial intelligence. A truth maintenance system (TMS) ensures that any reasoning 
currently in progress and based on earlier assumptions is updated when these assumptions are validated or 
invalidated. The truth maintenance system may be integrated into, for example, a diagnostic system in such 
a way as to make its operation implicit. When alarms or information messages arrive they are checked 
against existing hypotheses and, if necessary, a new hypothesis is instantiated. The hypothesis list is then 
evaluated
Recall that agents have both goals and intentions and in section 2.3.2 we sketched the relationship 
between goals and intentions. An agent should only maintain an intention for as long as it is feasible to do 
so, unnecessary intentions may cany penalties in terms of additional resource usage. Clearly an agent must 
have a policy for reconsidering its intentions.
3Modal systems are described in a later section of this chapter.
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There is a body of related work which looks at managing the intentions of single agents. Schut and 
Wooldridge [102] examined costs and agent efficiency associated with reconsidering intentions in a complex 
environment. Earlier work on re-evaluating by Kinny and Georgeff [73] has shown that there is no best 
approach and that the approach used is dependent on the environment.
Kinny and Georgeff [73] deal with single agents, dealing with a task in a multi agent system may 
involve several agents co-operating and, perhaps, working to a group plan. Let us consider this plan as an 
embodiment of the intentions, or a meta intention, of that group of agents. Intentions are a future directed 
route map towards a goal. In a dynamic environment things may change unexpectedly, because of this the 
validity of intentions, in the context of achieving particular goals, may change. Any reconsideration of 
intention at an agent level may have knock on effects for other members of the group and may, possibly, 
render the whole plan invalid. One agent reconsidering its intentions may cause a violation of the intentions 
of another agent. In a dynamic environment intention violations are not only generated internally, other 
single agents or groups of agents working independently may change the environment in such a way as to 
violate one or more agent intentions in our plan.
2.3.8 Reactive agents
Cognitive agents, as their name implies, are capable of deliberation. Reactive agents, in their most basic 
incarnations, simply react to their environment but, importantly, Chang et al. [28] note that reactive systems 
engage in constant interaction with their environment. Intelligence and rationality appear in many different 
forms, humans are cognitive rational entities, entities that deliberate their actions and plan days or years in 
advance. Ants simply respond to their environment, although an individual ant may not exhibit intelligence 
in the same way that an individual human can it is hard to deny that ants, collectively, are rational.
In our system the actors are purely reactive, their percepts are interpreted as patterns which trigger the 
choice of a behaviour or set of behaviours. There is a rationality in these choices and that rationality seeks 
to maximise agent influence.
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Ferber [43, page 16] indicates that one of the difficulties raised by reactive agents is that their mecha­
nisms of reaction to events rarely admit to an explanation of agent goals or planning mechanisms.
2.3.9 A reactive bias
We have already stated that this system will be based on reactive agents and any following consideration 
of cognitive agents should be read with this in mind. Although the simpler reactive agents have no explicit 
belief management the fact that our proposed system will learn by adapting its behaviour indicates there 
something of this form is happening somewhere in the system. The consideration of belief management is 
here as a means of providing a context for our reactive agent’s coached behaviour adaptation.
We make some passing mention of hybrid agents here, these combine aspects of reactive and cognitive 
agent architectures and attempt to pick the best of both types. There is a body of literature on hybrid 
architectures covering areas such as process management agents, Debenham [37], hybrid control of robots 
using an interface agent, Strippgen and Peters [109], and symbolic/reactive hybrid robot control, Oliveira 
[89].
2.4 Normative systems
Our intention is to have a system of reactive agents develop appropriate behaviours to satisfy some system 
specification. We need, at some point, to say what is and is not appropriate behaviour and we do this by 
treating the system -  the coaching agents and the acting agents -  as a normative system and that is simply a 
system controlled or regulated by rules. These rules, or norms, either require agents to behave in a particular 
manner or forbid them from certain activities. A speed limit is a good example, a limit requires agents to 
drive at or below a stated speed and forbids them from driving at speeds greater than the stated limit. Agents 
are free to decide whether or not to violate the speed limiting norm, if they do then they risk sanction by 
way of suspension of privilege, loss of utility or both. One of the aspects of a normative system that makes 
it especially suitable for our approach is that norms can be violated. If an agent brings about a bad world 
state then that agent will not be individually sanctioned but the behaviour that led to the bad state will.
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The issue of norm compliance brings a number of problems. Agotnes et al. [2] discuss this issue with a 
view to logically describing the robustness of a normative system. For the time being we are concerned with 
the synthesis of behaviours which will satisfy norms and simply accept that there will be some violation as 
part of this process. Future work will investigate robustness and system recovery from norm violation.
2.4.1 Safety and liveness
A common systems representation of norms is safety and liveness properties. Safety and liveness properties 
were introduced by Lamport [78] and state, intuitively and respectively, that something bad will not happen 
and that something good will eventually happen. Lamport’s intention for safety and liveness properties was 
the verification of the correctness of multiprocess programs. A crucial aspect of safety properties is that 
the violation of a safety property may always be detected by a finite prefix or sequence of behaviour. We 
are interested in reactive agents and one of the characteristics of such agents is a constant interaction with 
their environment. We assume, therefore, that an agent’s behaviour is infinite. This is not a restriction (see, 
for example, Kurki-Suonio [77, page 62]) as terminating executions (such as the agent bridging state in the 
second of the experiments detailed in chapter 7) may be represented as a behaviour where a terminal state 
is repeated indefinitely. If a safety property has been violated then, Kurki-Suonio [77, page 63] notes, it 
can not be remedied in the future. It may be the case that violation of a safety property may lead to a bad 
situation that can not be remedied but in our system agent actions are local and the fact that the violation 
can be detected means that coaching agents may take steps to prevent future occurrences of the violation. 
This is the approach that we adopt for specifying agent behaviour.
2.4.2 Norms are social
Conte and Castelfranchi’s book Cognitive and social action [33] argues that norms are typically a social phe­
nomena and this supposition of a social aspect makes normative systems intrinsically multi agent systems. 
Certain norms from a given set may be for a certain class of agents, a subset of the system’s population. For 
agent classes norms may guide an agent’s desires or the assignment of tasks. Boella and van der Torre [13]
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indicate that normative systems share a number of properties with autonomous agents and, thus, may be 
considered as being agents in themselves. This implies that the normative system governing a society or 
system of autonomous agents may be considered as being some form of meta agent. The autonomy of each 
agent that is a member of the normative meta agent is preserved so the system remains a proper agent sys­
tem. In a dynamic society the composition of this meta agent will also be dynamic, it is composed of certain 
interactions between real agents, physical or virtual and these interactions may be constantly changing. This 
leads to a question; what is it in a system that binds certain agents together to make the normative meta 
agent? We attempt to address this question rather crudely by embodying the normative agent and character­
ising it as a specialised coach. We are interested in the emergence of system norms so this coach is tasked 
with identifying the norms required to guide agent behaviour. In order to formalise norms so that they can 
be analysed and manipulated we adopt the approach suggested by Boella and van der Torre [14] and use 
deontic logic.
2.4.3 Normative architectures
Several normative agent architectures and systems have already been proposed. Boella [12], for example, 
outlines NMAS, normative multi agent systems based on a normative interpretation of Searle’s [104] speech 
act theory and a counts as operator. Sttitz and Onken [110] describe a normative system for pilot assistance 
that uses case based reasoning to modify a Petri net that acts as the normative in a system. Other examples 
include the BOID architecture, Bratman [19], and Kollingbaum and Norman’s NoA architecture [75]. These 
systems focus on cognitive agents, agents that are able to reason about the consequences of norm violation. 
Such agents may deliberately violate norms if the perceived benefit outweighs the risk of sanction. We are 
interested in systems of reactive agents, agents that do not model their environment and are, consequently, 
unable to reason about possible sanctions resulting from norm violation. Boella and Damiano [11] describe 
a reactive architecture for an agent in a normative environment. Their reactive agent has a deliberative 
module which deals with planning and re-planning and they allow for deliberate norm violation. This is 
not the approach which we adopt as we are looking for norm compliance to be implicit in agent behaviour
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but accept violation as a part of the system’s exploration and learning sequence. This could be certainly 
be achieved by simply designing behaviours that do not violate norms but such hard wired ideal behaviour 
would not allow us to take advantage of one of the benefits of normative systems -  adaptability. Boella and 
van der Torre [15] indicate that an important feature of norms is that they allow for behaviour that deviates 
from ideal. Generally deviation from ideal behaviour may invite sanction and, in our case, sanctioning will 
be by coaching agents biasing actor agents against acting in that manner in the future. In normative systems 
agent autonomy has a higher priority than norms, the process of deciding whether or not a behaviour violates 
norms is an autonomous activity, as described by Boella and van der Torre [13], and one that is carried out 
by an observer in our system.
Boella and van der Torre [15] further note that norms may be considered as soft constraints in a system 
which detects and sanctions violations. Hard constraints, such as a token entry system, which make viola­
tions impossible are not really norms. This may be the case for social systems but recall that we wish to 
characterise system norms as safety and liveness properties. Safety properties are norms that must not (as 
opposed to should not) be violated but it would be difficult to have a system which learns by exploration 
never violate a norm. In order for a system to know how to observe norms it must know what violates norms.
One worrying aspect of sanctions is that they may be episodic in nature, as described by Russell and 
Norvig [101, page 46], and only affect an agent in one of a number of roles that that agent has, this may 
lead to the agent simply shrugging its virtual shoulders and not modifying its behaviour so as to avoid norm 
violation. We adopt the notion of a bad state or, more accurately, reduced utility as our implicit system level 
sanction. Utility, in our agent view, is influence and reduced influence is non episodic and, thus, more likely 
to be a useful behaviour modifier than an episodic sanction which may be taken out of context.
2.4.4 Managing norms, virtual agents and virtual societies
Boella et al. [12] describe a conceptual model of virtual organisations. This separates norms guiding agent 
behaviour into a separate normative system and then treats that normative system as a virtual agent. The 
normative system, then, defines roles that agents in the system may adopt. This allows the characterisation
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of agents and the normative system -  which is modelled as an agent -  as a recursive game. Although treating 
the normative system as another agent brings advantages, agent interaction with norms may be characterised 
in the same manner as interaction with other agents, it is unsuitable for our proposed system for a number 
of reasons. The prescriptive nature of the normative system does not fit well with our intention to partially 
address emergent behaviours, outlined in section 2.12. Emergent behaviour implies that there is no hierarchy 
of agents and that agents themselves adopt roles according to their abilities -  there is no prescriptive role 
assignment. The normative systems described by Boella and Hulstijn [12] have a sanctioning system and 
one of the roles described is that of “defender” agents. Such defender agents may be useful in a setting 
where norms can be guaranteed system wide but is potentially dangerous in settings where an agent may 
travel from one locality to another where there are different norms. If an agent travels from one system 
to another then defenders sanctioning newcomers will help to maintain system stability and educate new 
agents. If a defender moves to another system then it will, most likely, be poorly equipped to dispense 
judgement and, perhaps fortunately, it will be unable to apply sanctions. If we apply a world view to our 
system than it may be possible for a defender to move to another part of the world where its beliefs of 
what is proper do not hold but it still has an ability to impose sanctions. This is clearly not good. If an 
agent moves to a neighbourhood where its norms are not applicable then, in our system, that agent learns 
directly by utility reduction rather than by sanctions which are, possibly, being misapplied. Unless norms 
can be guaranteed system wide -  which implies a degree of centralisation -  then the idea of defender agents 
is untenable. Norms in our system may be thought of on two levels, the observer has notions of what the 
system ought to achieve and coaching agents have notions of maximising influence. We believe that the 
use of coaching agents, agents which educate rather than sanction, is a rather better approach allowing a 
decentralised system without a hierarchy or agent roles.
2.4.5 Reactive agents in normative environments
Our aim is to have agents operate in as pure a reactive manner as possible. Such an operating mode will 
mean that norm compliance is implicit in an agent’s behaviour. This requires that agents are equipped with a
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library of reactive behaviours that are sufficient to allow them to function effectively with minimal additional 
resources. Other approaches to reactive normative agents are encumbered by unnecessary support systems, 
our approach is designed so that an agent may shed such support when it is no longer necessary. Our ap­
proach builds on exploratory work by Logie et al. [82] where uncoached self organisation was investigated. 
Adding a coaching level abstracts the system’s self organisation to a point where we may formally reason 
about it.
2.5 Learning systems
There are numerous approaches to machine learning and coached agency so before examining what is avail­
able it is, perhaps, best to say what we are and are not interested in. Our aim is to develop a system for 
reactive agents which allows them to develop behaviours suited to satisfying environment norms. The lack 
of a world model and cognitive abilities makes reactive learning seem like a difficult task. One potential ap­
proach is to embed a neural network in the agent’s core. With suitable training or evaluation systems such an 
approach may well produce an agent that is suited to its environment and its associated norms but that agent 
and its behaviours are very tightly bound together. It is next to impossible to excise a single useful behaviour 
from a neural network which aggregates several behaviours. This is an important consideration, multi-agent 
systems may contain a number of similar agents or agents belonging to the same agent-equivalence class 
and we may wish to transfer behaviours developed by one agent to other agents.
2.5.1 Two broad categories of machine learning
Theories of machine learning fall into two broad categories [60], classical learning where a decision space 
is searched for a good fit to data and Bayesian learning which can be viewed as a process of reducing 
uncertainty. The former approach is not really suited to reactive agent environments as equipping agents 
or coaches with such abilities runs counter to the idea of simplicity. Coaching allows this by placing a 
coaching agent in a behaviour synthesising role. Learning may be a misnomer, coaching agents will, in 
reality, observe agent behaviour and synthesise new behaviours. Learning occurs when this is viewed as a
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system but no individual agents carry a complete learning process. The sections below very briefly outline 
some of the concepts involved in agent learning.
Russell argues that most Al learning research has focused on environments that are static, determin­
istic, discrete and fully observable [1 0 0 ] [1 0 1 ] as opposed to dynamic, stochastic, continuous and partially 
observable agent worlds that are of interest to us.
2.5.2 Reinforcement learning
Recently, reinforcement learning has made progress in agent applications. Shoham et al. [107] note that 
though reinforcement learning has been an active topic in general Al research there is still a very small 
body of research on multi agent reinforcement learning possibly because there is no clearly defined problem 
statement, Bowling [16], for example, notes that reinforcement learning research has tended to focus on 
single agents.
Reinforcement learning methods are aimed at solving fully observable Markov decision processes. 
Such processes consist of a reward function and a model, there is no real difficulty in accommodating 
the model of a reactive agent as it is simply a set of state transition probabilities. Reinforcement learn­
ing algorithms can be model free as in, for example, Q learning [111]. These approaches work well in 
fully observable worlds but, in agent systems, partial observability is rather more likely. Earlier work by 
Astrom [5] [100] has proved that optimal decisions in partially observable Markov decision processes de­
pend on the belief state of an agent. McCallum [85] has shown a way to approximate an agent’s belief state 
using recent sequences of percepts.
2.5.3 Collective intelligence
In order to be able to implement some form of reinforcement learning agents must have some idea of states 
that are preferable over others and that preference must be ordered in such a way as to allow the agent 
to see utility as some form of reward. Wolpert et al. [120] consider the problem of automated design of 
large scale decentralised systems and use the term Collective 7/Vtelligence -  COIN -  to describe systems
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which embody solutions to this problem. Wolpert’s approach uses an agent level reward function that that is 
updated so as to drive agents towards achieving a global goal. One of Wolpert’s main concerns is not having 
agents work at cross-purposes. However, this system has a function which considers utility at a “world” 
level which is something that we wish to avoid.
2.5.4 Evolutionary learning
Evolutionary systems are an active research area. Hoen and de Jong [64] note that multi-agent learning 
means that an agent must learn to select actions that maximise their utility given the action choices of other 
agents. Indeed, Hoen and Bohte’s work [63] is close to what is being covered here but its evolutionary nature 
makes it rather different from this work’s learning system. Evolutionary learning, like genetic algorithms, 
is population based and relies on producing generations of agents. The selection process, in common with 
genetic algorithms, applies some form of fitness function to a population in order to select candidates for 
carrying forwards to the next generation.
Our agents learn but they do not evolve, by this we mean that they start with a fixed set of percepts and 
abilities and these do not change during the agent’s life. It may well be that an agent’s behaviour, which 
in the case of reactive agents is a mapping from percepts to actions, changes so as to effectively suppress a 
particular action. This action will, however, remain with the agent and if its environment changes so that the 
suppressed action becomes necessary then it is available.
Hoen and de Jong’s work is based on the COIN framework and raises questions of global utility, we 
avoid addressing anything at a global level. Further, Hoen and de Jong’s approach attempts to evolve joint 
actions by decomposition, we adopt an approach which observes, searches and maximises influences without 
the need for considering utility and reward functions.
2.6 Modal logic
We have indicated that the notion of seeing to it is a useful and powerful tool for representing agent ability. 
Modal logics and the closely associated concept of s t it  and our characterisation of this as agent influence.
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Modal logics provide the formal core of this work and, consequently, we devote more to these concepts than 
other contributory areas. Here we introduce modal logic as a foundation for stit theory which we outline in 
the following section.
2.6.1 A brief, informal introduction
Modal logic concerns itself with the modes in which things may be true or false [93, page 20], in particular 
these modes are necessity and possibility. At its most simple, modal logic extends well formed truth func­
tional prepositional logic formulas by the addition of two modal operators, □ and O representing necessity 
and possibility respectively. Before I leave my apartment in the morning I look at the sky and decide that 
rain is a distinct possibility, consequently there is a chance that I will get wet. This may be expressed in 
numerous ways given these modal operators: “it will possibly rain so there’s a chance that I ’ll get wet” -  
ORain-* 01 will get wet. If my wife tells me not to get wet then I may reason that “there’s a chance that 
I may get wet so it may rain” -  01 will get wet^> ORain. To ensure the possibility of my staying dry it’s 
necessary for me to take an umbrella when I leave the house, 01 will stay dry-* □ / take an umbrella with me. 
Modal logic is commonly referred to as a logic of necessity and possibility [30] [42] but Fagin [42] notes 
that these terms should not be taken literally as they are very context dependent. Necessarily, he states, 
could mean according to the laws o f physics or according to my beliefs, this is a vital element which gives 
the flexibility to allow its use in heterogeneous environments.
2.6.2 Many types of modal
Modal logics are the result of prepositional logic being augmented by operators for necessity and possibility. 
There are a number of modal logics which provide different readings of necessity and possibility. Deontic 
logic adds operators representing concepts such as it is obligatory that.. . ,  and it is permitted that.. . ,  and 
it is forbidden that.. . .  Temporal logic adds operators representing it will always be the case that.. . ,  it will 
be the case that.. . ,  it has always been the case that... and it was the case that.. . .  Doxastic logic adds an
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operator to represent the case where x  believes th a t These are all members of the modal family. In this
work we will consider basic modal logic and, later, examine some details of deontic logic.
2.6.3 Branching time, possible worlds and truth in modal systems
In 1962 Jaako Hintikka recognised that it was possible to characterise an agent’s beliefs as a set of, what 
he termed, epistemic alternatives and proposed that they be represented by a possible worlds model. Saul 
Kripke later developed semantics allowing Hintikka’s ideas to be formulated in terms of possible worlds in 
a modal logic. Arthur Prior introduced the theory of branching time [94] and this theory was developed 
further by Richmond Thomason [ 112] [ 113].
We begin building a branching time framework by considering here and now. Looking backwards 
in time there is a single history leading here and now, things may have turned out differently but here and 
now they are as they are and the thread of past events is settled. The future is different and offers many 
possibilities, some of these possibilities are the result of chance, some the result of individual decisions or 
actions and some the result of third party decisions and actions. Here and now is a moment where a single 
past divides into a number of futures. Since branching time is one of the core components of this work we 
begin listing definitions relating to it.
Definition 7 A moment is where a single thread o f events divides, it partitions time separating the single 
thread o f settled past events from an indeterminate number o f future threads. The division may be the result 
o f agency or o f chance.
The notion of a moment is to capture an event which has some effect on how the future develops. A 
moment has an implicit sense of before and after and it is clearly silly to have all events occurring at the 
same time. We introduce a transitive and irreflexive ordering, < on sets of moments. Because of the nature 
of the passage of time through these moments, a single settled past and multiple futures, any ordering will 
render a set of moments into a tree like structure. The ordering, <, imposes is a partial, tree-like ordering on 
a set of moments, Tree, such that:
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Figure 2.2: Histories and moments arranged in branching time
Definition 8  For any three moments mi, m2  and mi from T ree, ifm \ < mi and m2  < m3 then either m\ = m2  
orm \ < m2  or m^ < m\ (from [66]).
This allows a structure similar to that of figure 2.2 which illustrates four moments, {mi, m2 , m3 , m f\ 
arranged as a tree. We list further definitions pertaining to the ordering of moments:
Definition 9 A set o f moments, M, from Tree is said to be linearly ordered whenever, fo r  any moments hm\ 
and hmi belonging to M  then either mi = m2 , m\ < m2  or mi > m2 (from [66]).
This linear ordering on a subset of moments from Tree allows us to extract a single path through the 
tree. This single path represents one possible evolution of events from the earlier moments at the bottom of 
the tree to the later moments at the top and we refer to it as a history.
Definition 10 A linearly ordered set o f moments, h, is a maximal linearly ordered set when it can be no 
larger whilst remaining linearly ordered. Such a maximal linearly ordered set o f moments from Tree is 
called a history (from Horty [66]).
It is occasionally useful to consider a number of moments occurring at the same time in a tree of 
histories. Belnap and Perloff [34] introduce the notion of an instant to do this.
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Definition 11 Given a branching time tree, Tree, containing a set o f moments, M, and histories, H. An 
instant is a horizontal partitioning o f the tree into equivalence classes such that each moment contained in 
an instant is said to occur at the same time.
With this definition we can see that figure 2.2 represents a tree containing four moments arranged in 
five histories. Because of the indeterminism of time a moment may be contained in more than one history, 
m2 is contained in both h2  and ho, We say that Hm = {h: m e h] represents the set of histories passing through 
moment m, the set of histories in which m occurs. Combining Tree with a transitive, irreflexive ordering, <, 
on its members gives a branching timeframe.
Definition 12 A branching timeframe is a structure !F o f the form {Tree, <) with Tree a non-empty set o f 
moments and < a transitive, irreflexive ordering on Tree (from [66]).
We now turn to the evaluation of the truth of a formula against this background of branching time. It is 
straightforward to evaluate the truth of a formula at a given moment. The fixed nature of the history leading 
to a moment makes the evaluation of a past operator, P similarly straightforward. Evaluating the truth at 
future moments by, say, a future operator F, is not so easy. In figure 2.2 we see that A is true at moment m*, 
but what can we say about the future truth of A, FA at the earlier moment m \ ?
Some approaches, notably that of Prior and Thomason, are unable to address this question. FA is true 
at mi with A really being in the future if either h2 , h \ or /15 is achieved and false if h\ or hs are achieved. 
Each of these is possible at m\ and this limits what we can say. A moment alone, it would appear, does not 
provide sufficient information to allow evaluation of FA. Prior and Thomason suggested that the evaluation 
of future directed statements must be against not only a moment but also a history passing through that 
moment. This index can be represented as m/h, a moment m and some history h e Hm.
If this approach to evaluating future directed statements is adopted then for the sake of semantic con­
sistency other formulas ought to be evaluated in the same manner. Branching time models thus become 
structures of the form M  = (T ,  v) where T  is a branching time frame and v is a valuation function which 
maps each propositional element onto the set of m/h  pairs where the propositional element in question is
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true. The basic truth definition for branching time models indicates that propositional elements are true 
where v says so. We list definitions for evaluation rules for basic operators.
Definition 13 For an atomic formula, A, a valuation function v and an index m /h from a branching time 
model M :
M ,m /h \=  A iff m /h e v (A )  (2.1)
Al, m /h \= A  A B iff At, m /h  f= A and Al, m/h  f= B (2.2)
Al, m /h  [= -iA iff Al, m /h ft A  (2.3)
At, m /h ft PA iff 3 m' e h such that m < m  and At, m '/h  f= A  (2.4)
M ,m /h  [= FA iff 3 m ' e h  suchthat m < m ' and M ,m '/h  ft A  (2.5)
(From [66].)
More formally, Kripke semantics are usually represented as structures and the most usual is a triple [59] 
Al = (W,R, P) where W is a set of all possible worlds, R is a binary accessibility relation on W  and P is a 
mapping from the set of natural numbers to subsets of W.
How does this relate to an individual agent’s situation? Recall that an agent is a bounded entity situated 
in an environment and that an agents sets of percepts and actions are finite. At a given world an agent 
may perceive certain things and use these with its knowledge and available actions to generate a number 
of possible future worlds. Intuitively R encapsulates an agents knowledge and abilities in specifying which 
worlds it may consider as being accessible (or possible) from its current world. This leads to informal 
definitions of belief and knowledge. An agent believes a proposition if that proposition is true in at least one 
future world and an agent knows a proposition if that proposition is true in all future worlds. Knowledge and 
beliefs are precipitated on actions, recall that definition 1 stated that an agent can at least partially manipulate 
its environment. This also addresses environmental determinism, if an agent is certain of the consequences 
of an action then it knows that it is able to see to it that something is brought about, most likely as a result
42
of an action or sequence of actions by that agent. Horty [6 6 ] covers this aspect thoroughly and uses it to 
express ability predicated on an agents choice of action, this idea will be explored in detail in the following 
sections.
Given that an agents beliefs about future worlds are predicated on actions (note that an action may be 
to refrain from doing something) we may now define the notions of knowledge and belief predicated on an 
agents actions. Belief and knowledge carry implications of cognitive ability but the notions are applicable, 
at an abstract level, to reactive agents. Recall that our coaching agents operate by observing agent behaviour 
and generating hypotheses based on these observations. An agent is cast as an entity which partitions 
possible futures by its choices, a rational cognitive agent and a rational reactive agent may make similar 
choices and may be viewed as being of the same agent equivalence class despite having different operating 
methods. Beliefs and knowledge are in the coaching domain and the strength of evidence for a particular 
action bringing about A  may be reflected in the strength of a coaching agent’s beliefs about that action. 
Definition 14 An agent believes a proposition if, as a result o f its action or actions, that proposition may be 
true in some future world.
Definition 15 An agent knows a proposition if, as a result o f its action or actions, that proposition will be 
true in all future worlds.
This idea that knowledge is a true belief is widely used (see, for example, [41]) and can be easily 
represented by the knowledge axiom (see section 2.6.6). The importance of Fagin’s observation, mentioned 
in section 2 .6 .1 , now becomes apparent, the accessibility relation embodies an agents knowledge, beliefs 
and abilities.
2.6.4 More than one agent.
Consider two agents, a  and/? meeting at some location in their world. Figure 2.3 illustrates their potential in­
teraction as a possible worlds structure. This illustrates some interesting aspects of multi agent interactions, 
it is clear to the observer who has an external vantage point (and from the way that the diagram represents 
the situation) that worlds W2 and W3 are equivalent. This equivalence may not be apparent to the agents
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Figure 2.3: Interaction between two agents represented as possible worlds
because their view of the world is from within and they may use different symbols to represent the same 
things. The differences in the agents beliefs about the world is also apparent, a  believes that W6 , following 
W2 is possible. f3 considers only W7  following its W2 equivalent, W3 . An external observer has a privileged 
position and may see equivalences that are not apparent to situated agents.
2.6.5 Truth and validity.
Possible worlds semantics provide a framework for describing modal truth and validity from both a general 
and an agent centred perspective. This is a powerful property as it allows us to take an agent agnostic view, 
one which treats agents as autonomous choice partitioning mechanisms, of behaviour without weakening 
any of the aspects of the agenthood of the agency of actors within a society. Consider the valuation of the 
statement 0 A if/ at some world w, Vw(jp A if/), this statement is true just when Vw((p) is true and Vw(if/) is 
also true. The worlds play no part in the valuation of the statement since it is truth functional and dependent 
solely on the values of 0 and if/. Consider the same propositional statement with a modal qualifier, 0 (0  A ip). 
How can we say if this is true or false? For this to be true there must be at least one world in the set of
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possible worlds where Vw(<p) is true and Vw(\f/) is also true. Similarly, for something to be necessary it must 
be true in all possible worlds. This gives evaluation rules for necessity and possibility:
Vyv(O0) = T  iff 3 w' e W  such that wRw', Vw>(<p) = T
Vw{n<p) = T  iff Vw' e W  such that wRw', Vw>(<p) = T
The truth of a modal sentence is not dependent on the present value of any propositions that it contains.
2.6.6 More formally, some set theory and axioms.
Now that we have an informal notion of modal logic, an outline of Kripke structures and their associated sets 
of worlds and an outline of validity we can examine things in a little more detail. This section introduces the 
set theoretic properties of the relation element contained in a Kripke structure the simplest system, K and 
describes the properties of normal and non normal systems. Set theoretic properties are described before
introducing a number of well known modal systems. The section finishes by informally outlining how these
elements relate to agent systems.
Recall that the binary relation, R, of a Kripke structure controls which worlds are accessible from a 
given world. R may exhibit set theoretic properties [30, page 80] characterising the relation as being:
• Serial or extendible iff for every w in W  there is a w' in M  such that wRw'
• Reflexive iff for every w in W, wRw
• Symmetric iff for every w and w' in W, if wRw' then w'Rw
• Transitive iff for every w, w' and w" in W, if wRw' and w'Rw" then wRw"
• Euclidean iff or every w, w' and w" in W, if wRw' and wRw" then w'Rw"
Modal logic systems are generally accepted as having at least two basic properties [30, page 6 ], the 
distribution axiom, sometimes known as K, and the rule of necessitation.
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These combined with propositional logic result in the most simple normal modal logic system, known 
as K (for Saul Kripke). Additionally all normal systems of modal logic contain the modal validity DfO4  and 
the rule of inference RK5  [30, page 114). A normal modal logic system is simply an extension of K  and 
is usually obtained by adding axioms or properties which strengthen the logic. The truth of a proposition 
interpreted in a K system is preserved in other normal systems. Non normal logics are weaker than K.
These properties together with necessity, possibility and propositional logic allow the derivation of a 
number of axioms and the S5 system of modal logic6. S5 is generally regarded as a logic of knowledge [40] 
and its axioms are listed below with brief descriptions of how they relate to an agent’s knowledge:
• K. u(<f) —» if/) -» (n 0  -» nif/) If a conditional and its antecedent are both necessary then so is its 
consequent, this describes closure under consequence.
• T. U(f) —> (p : Whatever is necessary is so. Often referred to as the knowledge axiom, it treats knowl­
edge as true beliefs and provides an agent with a means to distinguish between what it knows and 
what it believes. T is characteristic of reflexive relation functions.
• 5. O<p —> nO<p : What is possible is necessarily possible. The negative introspection axiom, an agent 
knows what it does not know. 5 is characteristic of euclidean relation functions.
• D. O0 -» 0 0  : Whatever is necessary is possible. This ensures that agents do not hold contradictory 
beliefs or knowledge, an agent cannot believe that today is Tuesday and simultaneously hold the belief 
that today is Monday. D is characteristic of serial relation functions.
• 4. n<p —> nn<p : whatever is necessarily so is necessarily necessarily so. The positive introspection 
axiom, an agent knows what it knows. 4 is characteristic of transitive relation functions.
4DfO. 00 -'□-'0 what is possible is just what is not necessarily not so. Possibility in terms of necessity.
5R K . ^  0) expresses general modal consequence, a proposition is necessary if it is the consequence of a 
collection of propositions each of which is necessary. For further details see [30, page 19].
6C.I. Lewis proposed five systems of modal logic which he named SI to S5, see Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logic, 1931.
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These are, but for one exception7, independent and may be combined [93, page 39] as required. By 
adding these properties to the basic modal system K a family of logics can be obtained. Historically, 
KR e fle x iv e  is known as T, Ks e r ia l  is known as D, KR efiex ive + S ym m etr ic a i is known as B.
As an agent learns (or is told) more about its environment and the results of its actions then it can tune 
the appropriate parts of its relation function so as to improve its beliefs of the accessibility of future worlds.
The standard S 5 system presents a number of difficulties, difficulties that are exacerbated by the 
bounded nature of agents. Axioms 4 and 5 imply that the agent has perfect knowledge about what it does and 
does not know, there is some concern about the suitability of these axioms for a resource bounded agent [121, 
page 276] but it is accepted that positive introspection is less demanding and, perhaps, more suitable for such 
agents. Chellas [30] notes that, in addition to the standard axioms, S 5 assumes two rules of inference. These 
are Modus Ponens and the rule of necessitation, RN, which means that I- uA  whenever I- A, Chellas [30, 
page 14] writes this as: ^  . Wooldridge [121, page 275] notes that RN  implies an agent’s knowing all valid 
formulae, this necessitates the agent knowing an infinite number of propositional tautologies, a feat which 
is not going to be easy even for an unbounded agent. Additionally, K implies that an agent’s knowledge 
is closed under consequence, this taken together with RN give rise to the logical omniscience problem. K 
and RN mean that an agent cannot hold logically inconsistent beliefs. Closure under consequence of a set 
of inconsistent formulae is the set of all formulae so an agent holding inconsistent beliefs must believe all 
formulae. Since K and RN are at the heart of any modal logic system then so must the logical omniscience 
problem, this is not good for bounded agents. Konolige (see [121, page 276]) suggests that logical con­
sistency is much too strong a requirement for resource bounded reasoners and suggests non contradictory 
reasoning as an alternative. An agent cannot simultaneously believe <p and - > 0  but could hold logically in­
consistent beliefs. Such a weakening may not cause any problems for an agent, just as an agent is bounded 
the results of its actions may well have bounds.
With allowances for logical omniscience a modal logic could feasibly be used to form the core of 
a resource bounded agent’s reasoning system. Approaches to dealing with logical omniscience include
7If a relation is reflexive then it is also serial, consider <pR(f>, <p certainly relates to something.
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Levesque’s logic of implicit and explicit belief (see [122]). Levesque proposes an agent with a small set of 
explicit beliefs, a larger set of implicit beliefs and logical operators for each. Explicit beliefs are represented 
semantically by a weakened possible worlds model and implicit beliefs by a standard possible worlds model. 
This approach brings other problems, most notably an inability to represent nested beliefs which may render 
it incapable of dealing with common knowledge (see [54] for a description of common knowledge) which 
may be a triggering force in agents co-operating to investigate their environment.
2.6.7 Why use modal logic?
There are alternatives to modal logics for representing agent systems. Petri nets, for example, were devised 
as a tool for modelling a particular class of problems [90], the class of discrete event systems with concurrent 
or parallel events. This encompasses the class of problems commonly encountered in distributed systems. 
Agent systems have much in common with distributed systems so tools suited to modelling distributed 
systems ought to be at least useful in modelling agent systems.
Non deterministic environments are easily represented by Petri nets, if more than one transition is 
enabled then the choice of which transition to fire can be made in a non deterministic manner. This choice 
could be random, controlled by forces that are not modelled or controlled by an agent. This non determinism 
is useful in modelling agent systems but can introduce significant complexity. The generally accepted way of 
dealing with this is to consider the firing of a transition to be an instantaneous event. Since time is continuous 
and instantaneous events require zero time then the possibility of two events occurring simultaneously is 
zero. Tasks that have a time requirement can be decomposed into discrete, instantaneous start task and 
finish task events.
Holvoet [65] concludes that using a single Petri net for modelling a large and complex system is not 
really feasible. Such systems would require the use of a number of dissimilar nets which may lead to 
unnecessary complication. Social systems and complex heterogeneous systems appear to be unsuitable 
candidates for Petri net representation.
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Halpem [52] notes that logic has permeated computer science over the last thirty years and that com­
puter science has benefitted from an extensive and continuous interaction with logic. Modal Logic has 
developed into a powerful mathematical discipline dealing with restricted description languages for talking 
about relational structures [36]. In the Advances in Modal Logic Initiative start-up document de Rijke [36] 
notes that in addition to considerable theoretical advances there has been a rapid expansion of the use of 
modal logic in computer science, cognitive science, linguistics and philosophy.
Modal logic and “classical” logic are systematically related [10] so that by using a set of standard 
translation mles it is possible to translate a modal sentence into a first order logic sentence. Some of these 
standard translation clauses are (after [1 0 ]):
1. S T x(p) = P(x),p  e PROP8
2. S T M  -> if,) = S T x(<p) ^  S T M ')
3. S Tx{u<p) = Vy(Rxy A S Ty{tp)
The modal sentence up  —» p  can be translated by way of these clauses:
S Tx{np —» p) = S Tx(np) —» S Tx(p) Clause 2.
=STx(pp) —» Px Clause 1.
= Vy(Rxy —» STy(p)) —> Px  Clause 3.
= Vy(Rxy -» Py) —> Px  Clause 1.
If something can be represented in modal logic then it can also be represented in first order logic. So 
why use a modal logic? Blackburn [10] notes that although modal logic and classical logic talk about the 
same models they do so in different ways each providing different meta-logical properties. Modal logic may 
provide both a global and internal perspectives on models which, as we noted in section 2.6.5, is a powerful 
tool for dealing with agent systems. Recall that agents are bounded and may only have partial access to
%PROP is a given set of propositional symbols, {p, q, pr, q t , . . .}
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the environment (section 2 .2 .2 ) and that an agent system may contain a number of agents (definition 1 ). 
Halpem [51, page 196] notes that multi agent systems may be represented by considering each agent’s local 
or internal state which encapsulates all if the relevant information that that agent has access to. Modelling 
a multi agent system requires modelling at an agent level and at a system level. Modal approaches treat 
local and agent internal perspectives as just that -  the perspective of a single, situated agent. The reasoning 
framework of modal approaches is the same at this local level as it is at a system level, such approaches 
allow for a reasoning framework that is consistent across the spectrum from single agents to agent systems.
2.7 Logics of agency, the STIT approach
We have seen that modal logic is a useful and powerful tool for representing the evolution of a world from 
both an observers perspective and from a situated agent perspective. We have seen that this allows us to 
view agents in an agnostic manner treating them as autonomous mechanisms which partition the future 
according to their choices. We now link this view more closely to the agents and agency aspect of the 
notional partitioning mechanism.
One of the main themes of logic of agency is that actions are abstract and that they may be identified 
with what they cause. The first semantics for this were laid out by Chellas [29]. Two main groups of logics 
of agency then followed, Kanger [69] and Pom [91] [92] adopted a bringing it about approach with Belnap 
and Perloff [34] and Horty and Belnap [67] adopting a seeing to it approach.
The bringing it about approach was occasionally adopted but there were problems with the clarity of 
the semantics.
2.7.1 Agency and ability in a modal context
The earlier treatment of agency dealt with the possibility that an agent may bring something about. This 
views agency in an impersonal and abstract manner which is more suited to a systems than a society centred 
view. It captures the fact that an agent may be involved in bringing something about but does it genuinely 
represent how an agent’s ability to bring something about led to it being brought about. Possibility is a
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vital aspect in any treatment of agency. However this must be bounded so as to ensure that limited agent 
resources are not “wasted” on frivolous exploration of possibility. Belnap notes [7] this by describing objec­
tive possibility and Xu [124], perhaps more concisely talks of possibilities based in reality. Xu notes that we 
use the terms possibility and possible course o f history in a manner that does not encompass everything that 
we can conceive of, factual possibility rather than fictional possibility. Belnap lists a number of points [7] 
indicating the need for factual possibilities in a treatment of agency;
• There is no probability without possibility.
• There is no action, no doing, no responsibility.
• There is no agency without possibility.
• There is no causality without possibility.
Possibility appears to be an integral part of agency and any agent wishing to learn about its environment 
must be able to identify its role in possible events.
Belnap outlines several principles of agency [7], if agency is to be attributed to an entity, a, then, in 
an appropriate context, we must be able to find a sentence saying that a  sees to it that something is brought 
about.
There is no agency without choice, our aim is to develop agents and not simple, situated automata 
that react only in a stimulus and response manner. This has a number of implications, if an agent is tasked 
with ensuring that A  does not hold and it has an ability to counter A  and that ability is rechargeable and 
transferable. When A  occurs that agent may face the choice of running to a charge source repeatedly in 
an attempt to counter A  or forming part a bucket brigade like chain to transport the counter A ability. This 
choice of methods endows it with agency. An important aspect is that an agent cannot make tomorrow’s 
choices today, an agent cannot position itself somewhere and wait for A to occur as this prevents it from 
doing other things. Any treatment of agency and ability should be able to accommodate these principles.
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2.7.2 stit theory
The idea of representing an individual’s agency or actions as a modality is an old one, one which dates at 
least as far back as 1100 ad and Anselm of Canterbury [67]. The notion of agency as a modality idea has 
also been dealt with by Anderson, Aqvist, Chellas, Fitch, Horty, Kanger, Pom, Segerberg, von Kutschera 
and von Wright. This idea has received attention more recently with a series of papers by Belnap and Perloff 
using an approach which they termed stit theory and which captures the intuitive concept of an agent being 
able to see to it that some state of affairs is brought about. Stit theory expresses this notion by using a 
construct of the form [or stit: A] which says that agent a  can see to it that that A  is brought about. We 
use this concept of “seeing to it” to characterise the abilities of an agent and in a bounded environment and 
coaching agents will operate on this notion of agent ability when reasoning about agent behaviour.
Belnap and Perloff [34] coined the term stit theory to describe their approach to treating agency as a 
modality. Stit theory is predicated on the notion of agent ability and ability is characterised as the agent 
being able to see to it that either something is done or a state brought about. This is usually expressed in an 
abbreviated form as:
[or stit: A] (2 .6)
This notation represents that notion that agent a  has the ability to bring about A. Let us consider Kenny’s 
example of a poor darts player [72] used by Horty and others.
In figure 2.4 a darts playing agent, a, has the choice of throwing or not throwing a dart, a ’s, set of 
choices is represented at that moment, m, by the notation Choice™ which is standard in the literature. If 
the agent elects to throw a dart then both possible outcomes guarantee hitting the board but the agent is not 
sufficiently skilled to be able to guarantee hitting either the top half or the bottom half of the board. If the 
agent elects not to throw a dart then the only possible outcome guarantees that it does not hit the board. It 
is obvious, in this case, that the agent has the ability to see to it that it hits the board but it cannot guarantee 
hitting the top or bottom half of the board though either is clearly possible. Similarly, we can say that the
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Figure 2.4: The choices available to a poor darts player
agent knows that by throwing a dart it can hit the board, the agent can only believe that it can hit the top 
half of the board. If we take H as being “hits the board”, T as “hits the top half of the board” and B as “hits 
the bottom half of the the board” then it is easy to see that [or stit: H] is true, the agent has the ability to 
guarantee that it can hit the board. Similarly, [a stit: T] and [a s tit: B] are false. The agent does not have 
the ability to guarantee that it will hit the top half of the board
An attractive aspect of this analysis is that, in broader contexts, it is not prescriptive, if it is cold 
then an agent may have the ability to make itself feel warmer by either putting on a sweater or turning on 
the heating. This method agnosticism is especially attractive in agent systems where agents with differing 
abilities may be able to bring about the same results. We can state goals for agents and whilst we are 
concerned with results we can remain disinterested as far as methods are concerned. The use of such an 
analysis for normative systems is especially attractive.
Horty [67] notes that Belnap and Perloff give an intuitively compelling account of their stit operator 
within a logical framework of indeterminism, a framework which holds possible future worlds that an agent 
may or may not have experienced.
53
2.8 Agency and what it means to see to it that...
Our system is concerned with creating reactive agents that operate in a social manner so as to satisfy certain 
norms imposed by a societal rules and possibly observed by an external entity. These norms are characterised 
as safety and liveness properties (see section 2.4.1) and we consider them as being “strict” norms. Reactive 
agents, as their title implies, don’t really deliberate their actions. At its most simple their operation is a cycle 
of sensing their environment, selecting a suitable action from a set of available actions and then carrying 
that action out. The agent’s main concern is selecting the appropriate action for its current percepts. This 
sense-select-act cycle has a very short horizon but this does not mean that a reactive agent is incapable of 
planning so as to bring about specific goals and neither does it mean that reactive agents are incapable of 
learning or being coached.
Horty’s analysis of agency deals with what we described earlier, in section 2.2.7, as a strong notion o f 
agency. This is the type of agency which may be exhibited by very able agents with strong cognitive and 
planning abilities. Our agents are rather less able and a full application of Horty’s analysis in unnecessary. 
The differences between Horty’s analysis and our needs is most apparent when it comes to refraining from 
acting where our needs are very much simpler.
Consider a world -  possibly bounded, this is of no real significance, with a population of agents. The 
world is governed by a simple norm, A should not hold. Unfortunately instances of A  will spontaneously 
appear in this world so this norm obliges agents to counter A  when they come across any instances of A. 
The d s t it  operator implies that an agent has the ability to deliberate about its actions -  here is an instance of 
A  and I am able to counter it. Do I counter it or do I wander off and do something else? Not countering A 
would be a violation of a system safety property so there is no real need for deliberation unless, of course, 
the agent would be damaged in the process. The existence of the norm, -A , may precede the agents ability 
to satisfy it.
In addition to actor agents the world contains a number of coaching agents. Coaching agents are a 
separate class of agents that can not manipulate the environment directly but can analyse observed histories 
of events left by actor agents. Coaching agents pool the observations of numerous agents and attempt
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to understand the abilities of these agents so that they can begin to suggest patterns of behaviour that may 
satisfy system norms. The coaching agent’s analysis of observed events -  the link between observed histories 
and improved behaviours -  is the motivation for this work. We seek to provide a logical characterisation of 
such an analysis.
2.9 s t i t  and belief
Stit semantics may be used to characterise beliefs about the behaviour of agents. This is usually done in cases 
given strong positive introspection, environment knowledge, knowledge of abilities and the consequences 
of actions. We are more interested in simple reactive agents and, consequently, use stit semantics as a 
tool for analysing agent influences on the environment. This gives a tool which we may use to guide a 
coaching agent’s beliefs about agent ability. Beliefs are not absolute and, consequently, we represent them 
by a possibility or “may lead to” operator. Moving to the observer’s point of view, if an observer sees many 
cases of an agent choosing a particular action that leads to ~>A and a few cases of counter evidence then the 
observer may hold that that action leads to -A . With weaker evidence the observer may hold a belief that 
the action may lead to -iA.
Because this stit operator is based on belief of an agent’s ability rather than the truth functional status 
of formulas in a possible world we need to adopt different evaluation criteria. The statement that an agent’s 
action may lead to A  is true if and only if there is some point where the agent has a future choice that brings 
about A.
2.9.1 Belief as a ternary operator?
When does a coaching agent believe that [or action may lead to : A]? In order to believe this then a coaching 
agent must have evidence that or is able to bring about A and must have no evidence that or can not bring 
about A. If or has managed to bring about A in the past and a recent attempt has failed then there is both 
positive evidence and counter evidence against its ability which leaves it unsure of its absolute ability in a 
given set of circumstances.
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We have considered using a ternary settledness operator to accommodate this. Using a minimal model, 
in the same manner as Brown [25] addressed the problem, brings problems and would require a higher order 
modal logic to deal with potentially complex relation functions. A ternary operator is a little less “brutal” in 
partitioning future worlds than a normal true/false operator A ternary stit type operator may be evaluated as:
• Settled true if a  has evidence that it can bring about A and has no evidence to the contrary.
• Settled undecided if a  has evidence that it can bring about A  and also has evidence to the contrary.
• Settled false if a  has no evidence that it can bring about A.
This ternary evaluation may be thought of as expressing a coaching agent’s confidence in an actor agent’s 
abilities. Indeed, this ternary evaluation is a prototype for our coaching agent’s hypotheses and this is 
something which we shall examine in greater detail in later chapters.
2.9.2 Belief and knowledge
This work is based on the notion of agents being able to influence their environment and that this influence 
is extendible across agents. The consideration of belief as a ternary operator provides one of the foundations 
for a theory of influence, the belief that an agent can bring about A. It may be that an agent can not help 
but to have A hold after an action. A may be a constant and in such cases it is clear that an agent has no 
influence. This provides a second foundation for a theory of influence, in order for us to be able to say 
that a  has influence over A it must be that A is not a constant. Considering this following the definitions 
of belief and knowledge in the context of agents, definitions 14 and 15 respectively, allows the formation 
of conditions for agent influence. This neatly partitions into knowledge and belief, in order for us to be 
able to say that an agent has influence on a proposition we must have knowledge that that proposition is not 
constant and evidence that an action by the agent results in that proposition holding. The knowledge content 
is not that a proposition will change in all future worlds but that a proposition is changeable and to this end 
we need only observe one instance of change.
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2.10 Other studies of influence
We noted earlier that other researchers have used the term “influence” in agent systems research. Ferber and 
Muller’s multi agent based simulations (MABS) [44] formalism uses the notion of agent influence. Ferber’s 
model is an action theory which is based on a foundation of influence and the environment’s reaction to that 
influence. Agents do not act in the traditional sense, instead they generate influence which may or may not 
result in an effect on the environment. Instead, there is a distinction between influences and reactions in a 
system that is composed of two sets of dynamics. An agent may attempt to lift an object or attempt to counter 
an instance of A  and if its attempt has the appropriate influence then it succeeds. This differs from our work 
in many respects, the most notable being a mechanism which aggregates agent influence at a global level and 
this is a level of operation that we are keen to avoid. Ferber’s approach is implementation dependent and does 
not readily model simultaneous actions (see Michel [8 6 ], indeed the original theory handles joint actions in 
a way that casts a single agent as an initiator and has it making decisions for other agents. Michel [8 6 ] notes 
that the Ferber and Muller model has not been applied in its natural form. Weyns [119] notes that Ferber and 
Muller’s approach is limited to synchronous systems. Michel [8 6 ] goes on to describe an approach which 
applies Ferber’s influence / reaction model and goes some way to addressing these problems. Although the 
notion of influence is closer to Ferber’s Michel does adopt a two step process consisting of an influence 
phase and a reaction phase. This agent action and environment response is something that we address 
implicitly in our underlying branching time model and instantaneous view of actions discussed in chapter 
four. Although we model our system on a discrete branching time framework this is as a convenience for 
modelling a logical system. The time steps in our system are of an arbitrary size and may be arbitrarily small. 
Our notion of influence is similar to that of Ferber and Muller’s but we are working in an opposite direction 
taking the results of an action and attempting to divine the influences that caused it. Further, we are dealing 
with influence as an “enabling token” which may be used as a vehicle for analysing and synthesising agent 
behaviours and this is a very different approach from Ferber and Muller’s simple aggregation of causes.
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2.11 Computational tractability
We have informally characterised agents, in a branching time setting, as mechanisms that partition the future 
by their current choices. Agent choices are associated with moments in the branching time framework but 
not all moments provide choices -  some may be vacuous where an agent has no choice that influences its 
future. For long term goals, agent level or system level, it is preferable to have an enumerable set of choice 
points. Having a non enumerable set of choice points may force the agent into a sequence of constant 
decisions which is not good. Belnap et al. describe a “busy chooser” as an agent that makes infinitely many 
choices in a finite period. This leads to scenarios where there is no single witness. A witness, in this context, 
is a characteristic of achievements s t it  expressions and is a moment where a prior choice ensures that things 
evolve in such a way that A is guaranteed at the evaluation instant (Belnap et al. [8 , page 36]). Instead, 
witnessing is by a chain of moments (Belnap et al. [8 , page 249]). The difficulty with chains is that there 
may be no last member of the chain. Xu [123] proves a correspondence between the numbers of modes 
of actions/inactions and the complexity degrees of busy choice sequences and this avenue may provide an 
insight into the optimisation of sequences of behaviours.
The ten minute mile example used by Belnap et al. [8 , page 49] illustrates the busy chooser difficulty 
with s t it  semantics. This is illustrated in figure 2.5, at mo an agent sets of to run a ten minute mile. It faces 
a choice, run at a pace that allow the agent to complete a ten minute mile, A, or at a pace that will not, 
-iA. This is not a one time decision as it is immediately followed by a similar choice which is immediately 
followed by a similar choice and so on until the agent completes the mile or runs beyond ten minutes. At 
any point in the run the agent faces the choice of continuing to run at ten minute mile pace or not. This 
makes the runner a busy chooser, there are an indeterminate number of decisions between mo and the agent 
completing its ten minute mile.
This presents obvious difficulties for computational solutions. Something more “granular”, something 
with enumerable and discrete decision points would be much better. We see the [or stit: [/3 stit: A]] construct 
as having an enabling moment. In this example it’s where agent a  makes some choice which enables (3 so 
that it may see to it that A holds.
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Figure 2.5: The busy chooser, a chain of choices for a ten minute mile
2.12 Self organising systems and emergent behaviour
Our research has elements of self organisation and emergent behaviour. Intuitively the system is expected to 
be self organising as it is intended to adapt its behaviour and -save for an external observer which evaluates 
target achievement -  there are no external agencies involved in guiding or evaluating system progress. Self 
organisation in agent systems appears to contradict the second law of thermodynamics -  thermodynamic 
systems are often used as examples of self organisation. Van Dyke Parunak and Brueckner [117] note 
that this has been explained by couplings between the macro and micro levels of a system. Our approach 
explicitly admits this view by using coaching agents as the macro component and actor agents as the micro 
component with a random element in actor behaviour providing entropy.
This work builds on earlier experiments with pheromone driven emergent behaviour where Logie et 
al. [82] investigated normative descriptions of pheromone based reactive systems (Van Dyke Parunak and 
Brueckner [117] note that the pheromone in such a system is the micro level with agents operating at a 
macro level). We make no claims for new methods of identifying and predicting emergent behaviour, our
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approach is to explore a behavioural state space by concentrating on areas where influence is evident and 
ignoring areas of the state space where agents have no influence.
2.12.1 Self organisation
The notion of self organisation occurs in many fields, Gershenson [48] lists cybernetics, thermodynamics, 
mathematics, information theory and synergetics. Self organising systems also occur in nature, animal 
flocking and herding for example. Humans provide many examples self organising systems, people moving 
through a crowded area or in and out of a crowded commuter train for example. As with agent systems there 
appears to be no single definition of what a self organising system is but Gershenson and Heylighen [48] 
note that one property is often used to characterise self organisation, that of negative entropy. Since we 
intend to use notions of influence in our system we may use this as a metric for entropy, our system becomes 
more ordered as agents use their influence less wastefully. Heylighen [61] indicates that another definition 
for self organisation is that it is the creation of a globally coherent pattern out of local interactions. Global 
coherence, in the context of our system, would be agents not violating system level norms which are defined 
in a procedure agnostic way. The self organisation is implicit in that we expect the system to learn on its own 
with no intervention from external agencies. Coaching agents will assist actor agents but these are internal 
elements of the system and, beyond knowing system level norms, are free from external influence.
Heinz von Foerster developed the notion that noise within a complex system is a driver for organisation, 
this counter intuitive notion was dubbed the “order-from-noise principle” (see, for example, Heylighen [61] 
or Foerster [118]). This notion is predicated on “attractors” and the idea that the larger the random pertur­
bations, noise, that affect a system, the more quickly it will self-organize or produce order. Our approach 
builds on this notion, coaching agents observe influence and then reinforce it in a manner similar to positive 
feedback by seeding influence maximising behaviours into the environment.
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2.12.2 Emergent behaviour
Heylighen [61] notes that organisational closure may turn a collection of interaction components. Hey­
lighen [61] notes that many natural systems exhibit emergent behaviour:
Organizational closure turns a collection of interacting elements into an individual, coherent 
whole. This whole has properties that arise out of its organization, and that cannot be reduced 
to the properties of its elements. Such properties are called emergent.
This may be thought of as a subset of self organising behaviour. A flock of birds may fly in such a way that 
there are no collisions, this is simply a scaling of individual behaviour. A single bird may be able to carry 
out the same journey without the support of a flock. Emergent behaviour is, as per the quote from Heylighen 
above, best thought of as aggregate behaviours that individual entities are incapable of. A termite nest, for 
example, could not be built by an individual termite and food foraging may be carried out by single termites 
or groups of any size.
2.12.3 System or society
Dastani et al. [35] offer an interesting perspective considering individual agents and multi agent systems as 
different computational entities. Their approach is based on co-ordination operations and has a well defined 
interaction protocol. We adopt a different approach without explicit co-ordination and this allows us to build 
systems with simple, reactive agents.
Jennings [6 8 ] notes that a major selling point of purely reactive agent systems is that overall behaviour 
emerges from interactions between component behaviours. We are more concerned with societies o f agents 
than the interaction of behaviour components within agents. Our approach, in this work, is to deliberately 
keep agents simple so that overall behaviour emerges from interactions between agents rather than interac­
tions between agent components.
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Chapter 3
Agent influence
Our outline of s t it  theory indicated that it was a useful tool for representing agency. Our approach is founded 
more in computer science than in general agency and, for us, this introduces constraints. These constraints 
are, for the most part, the introduction of bounds. Our agents are tightly bounded in their abilities (both 
physical and cognitive), perceptions and memory. The agent world is similarly bounded being a finite 
construct containing a bounded number of bounded entities. The import of these constraints is that the 
nature of computational agents and their environment makes experimentation feasible and this is the path 
which we intend to take.
Our work is intended to address difficulties presented by standard s t it  theory, these are concerned with 
what are called other agent nested sentences, sentences which describe where a number of individual agents 
combine their abilities to jointly bring something about. Syntactically such sentences are well formed but 
present semantic difficulties. These difficulties centre on the nature of one agent seeing to it that another 
agent sees to it that something holds or is brought about and these difficulties centre on the independence o f 
agents postulate (see Belnap [6 ]). Xu [125] summarises this intuitively and neatly:
this constraint says that any combination of possible choices available to different agents at the 
same moment must be compatible. That is to say, roughly, at each moment, each agent can 
choose each of his alternatives, no matter what the other agents are doing at the moment. Thus
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a possible choice for an agent at a moment should be considered as a real alternative for the 
agent, i.e., the realization of that alternative is exclusively up to the agent.
Xu’s description of the independence of agents postulate, above, provides a convenient point for the intro­
duction of the notion of agent choice in the context of this work.
Definition 16 Given an agent, a  with a set o f abilities which are characterised as atomic actions, Actionsa, 
we define a ’s choice set, Choicea, where Choicea e P(Actionsa) and containing viable actions or combina­
tions o f actions such that all actions associated with a choice will be executed simultaneously.
By “viable” in the above definition we mean that, at agent level, all of the combinations of choices are 
sensible in the context of the agent’s world. For example, a choice element containing “move forwards” and 
“move backwards” is not viable for a mobile agent. As a convenience we extend the Choicea notation of 
definition 16 by considering it at a particular moment.
Definition 17 Given an agent, a  with a choice set Choicea, and a moment, m, we write the the set o f viable 
choices at that moment as Choice™ where Choice™ e Choicea and contains viable choices at moment m.
Viable, in the context of definition 17, encompasses the viable of definition 16 with the additional 
constraint that the set of choices are only those viable at moment m and be ordered in such a way as to group 
certain of them for convenience.
We have noted, in chapter two, that agency has a large element of autonomy and this is explicitly 
expressed by the independence of agents postulate. A strict reading of s t it  seems to imply that one agent 
has control over another, if this is the case then the other is no longer an agent, this is something of a 
difficulty. In another of the touchstone phrases from the introductory sections Chellas [31] (and in Belnap 
et al. [8 , page 275]) notes that it would be:
“...bizarre to deny that an agent should be able to see to it that another agent sees to something”
Xu [125] introduces the notion of nested choice formulas to overcome the difficulties arising from the inde­
pendence of agents postulate. Xu, however, deals with current choices only and is consequently limited to 
the consideration of deliberative s t it  constructs.Having frequently raised the notion of a “strict” reading of 
s t it  at many points we now state a definition for this term.
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Definition 18 Given an agent, a, and a set o f observations o f a  choosing a particular action, K, in a given 
set o f circumstances identified solely on the basis o f a ’s percepts. We say that a  choosing K, a/K,  has the 
unambiguous ability to see to it that that some proposition, A, holds i f  and only i f  the set o f observations 
contains no cases o f a /K  leading to -A. We consider this unambiguous ability as satisfying a strict reading 
o f  s t it . The presence o f observations o f a /K  leading to ^  A fails to satisfy a strict s t it  reading but does not 
necessarily mean that a  has no influence over A.
Applying definition 18 to multiple agents and nested agentives a strict interpretation of [or s tit: \J3 s tit: A]] 
requires that a  has some means of guaranteeing that fi sees to it that A holds. This is certainly possible but 
in cases where one agent is able to see to it that another agent sees to something there is usually a social or 
societal framework which governs agents by, for example, obligation or sanction. Belnap et al. approach this 
problem by considering various interpretations of other-agent nested s t it  constructs. These are deontic, dis­
junctive, probabilistic and strategic. These interpretations bring additional system requirements which make 
them unsuitable for simple, reactive agents and draw us away from our aim to present a simple reading for 
nested other agent statements. A deontic interpretation, for example, requires mechanisms for creating and 
transferring agent obligations and, by extension, agents must be able to reason about obligations in order 
to operate in such a system. Although we are interested in such normative approaches this is unsuitable 
because our very simple agents have no means of either imposing obligations or assuming obligations from 
others. Probabilistic approaches are similarly unsuitable because we are more concerned with qualitative 
than quantitative aspects of agent behaviour. The disjunctive approach fails in a similar fashion to the deontic 
reading because simple agents cannot force choices on others.
Our agents operate in a society and we intend them to adapt their behaviour so as to build a society 
that conforms to a number of norms. These norms are cast as safety and liveness properties but they are 
described in an agent agnostic manner at “system level”. Our approach to this is to maximise what we term 
agent influence, the observed and apparent ability of agents to singly or jointly bring about change in their 
environment. Our interpretation of nested agentives is similar to the strategic reading in that the strict s t it  
element is replaced by an evaluation based on the influence which agents may have on other agents and may
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be interpreted as a reactive plan or strategic interpretation of s t it . There are other approaches to managing 
strategies, van der Hoek et al. [116] describe a counterfactual extension to alternating time temporal logic 
which allows reasoning about strategies. This involves an element of agent commitment and is, therefore, 
more suitable for cognitive agents than our reactive actors.
Although this work has similarities to that of Belnap et al. [8 , page271] there are a number of significant 
differences. The similarities are that we minimise the role of agent intention, and, consequently, the role of 
the individual agent, to concentrate on causality which we view in a social context. One difference in 
our approach is that we avoid a reification of actions, instead we are considering agent influence and we 
characterise nesting explicitly via agent actions. Our influence based approach implicitly admits witness by 
chains, as outlined in section 2 .1 1 , although we do so in a simple manner and this is described in section 
3.5.6.
Our work is intended to be a component of a computational system and this brings both benefits and 
difficulties. The benefits are that we are able to generate experiments to test theories and, if necessary, to 
trace and characterise every aspect of an agent’s behaviour. Consequently, the behaviour of any system 
composed of computational agents may be fully characterised. The disadvantage is that we must define 
both our agents and the world that makes their environment. The computational systems aspect of our work 
means that parts of the usual branching time / agent choice which underpins s t it  theories need to be defined 
explicitly with a computational system in mind.
3.1 What is influence?
So far we have mentioned the notion of influence frequently, have mentioned it relative to s t it  and have 
stated that it is not the same as the influence described by Ferber et al. [44]. What, then, is influence in the 
context of this work?
The foundation of our notion of influence is that an agent may act so as to bring about a change in its 
environment and that the results of that action may be contingent. The key point is that an agent may have an 
ability only in certain circumstances and where these circumstances are dependent on other agents standard
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s t it  theory does not extend across agents without the support of additional frameworks. Rather than state a 
definition of our notion of influence here we observe that:
Observation 6  We observe that an agent, a  exhibits influence over A i f  and only i f  A is changeable and that 
in a given set o f circumstances a  may acted so as it is capable o f changing its environment to bring about 
A. This set o f circumstances may be contingent on the environment state, a ’s state or actions by one or more 
so called other-agents.
This gives an informal foundation from which we may build a theory of influence.
3.2 Why investigate influence?
In section 2.12 we stated that we make no claims for new methods of identifying and predicting emergent 
behaviour. Our approach, we indicated, is to explore a state which represents an environment and at least one 
agent. Here we outline informally how we hold that influence operates by considering a simple state space 
which agents may move through by executing actions. The entire state space is not necessarily accessible to 
a single agent, one class of agents may have the ability required to reach a given state whereas another class 
may not.
We view this as a privileged observer, we may see where good states are achieved and we may also 
see the trails of actions left by agents. Agents situated in the environment simply act and, as a result, move 
through the state space.
As we observe the state space we are looking for two things; agents reaching a good state (which is 
system level requirement that observers are aware of) and an agent behaviour or sequence of behaviours that 
allow agents to bring this good state about.
This carries prerequisites, the state space must contain at least one instance of the good state and that 
good state must be reachable either as a result of individual agent action or as the result of the actions of a 
set of agents. We cast the system as a normative system and task the agents with bringing about good states 
so the latter requirement is simply a statement of the ought implies can deontic identity. There are many 
approaches to state space searching which guarantee complete coverage and, by a given metric, finding the
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optimal solution or good state. State spaces may be large, meaning that complete searches may consume 
formidable resources. Heuristics may be applied to constrain searches but these also present difficulties, 
looking ahead in an unknown environment is difficult and makes evaluating heuristics problematic.
A randomly behaving agent may eventually reach a good state but it is unlikely in the extreme to reach 
the good state via an optimal path. If two or more agents need to interact in order to reach a good state
Two agent joint influence
a path through 
,  -  -  state spaceP path through 
state space • O ' '
State space
Agent actions
Single agent influence
Figure 3.1: Two agent interaction in random state space walk
then the multiplicative combination of probabilities may greatly reduce the chance of an optimal solution. 
Figure 3.1 combines the situated agent and observer perspectives to illustrate this in a notional state space. 
Influential and non influential agent actions are indicated in figure 3.1, even though an action is not influential 
from the point of view of an observer it may still involve a change in the state space. An agent may carry 
out an action that does not change the observed environment but does alter the state space from that agent’s 
point of view, may attempt to lift a heavy object at state /?:1 and fail. At state f3:2 an observer may see 
[3 and the unmoved object, no change from the observer’s point of view but ft has expended considerable 
energy in its attempt to lift the object and perceives that it has moved to a different state. The observer is
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unable to see the internal change in p  and may only consider this by inference from a series of observations 
rather than direct observation. However, the observed sequence of events provides an observed pattern that 
may be repeated in later observations. It may be thatp  can lift the object Milner [87] observes that:
The behaviour of a system is exactly what is observable.
This is something which we shall consider in more detail in the following chapter but, for now, it serves to 
bring attention to the differences between observing a behaviour and knowing what drives that behaviour. An 
external observer may see some aspects of a system’s behaviour but there may be internal aspects, such as P's 
reduction in energy, that are not evident. The coaching agent may be working with incomplete knowledge, 
Levesque and Lakemeyer [80, page 273] argue that a difficulty of dealing with incomplete knowledge is 
that it is computationally demanding. We wish to approach this in such a way as to minimise resource 
requirements so as to allow simple coaching agents to manage partial world knowledge.
There is an example of joint influence in figure 3.1, this may only occur where two agent paths cross 
(note that paths may only cross at points where agents act) in the state space. Paths may cross in such a way 
that agents are collocated and able to act simultaneously, a  handing an object to p. There may be a temporal 
separation where one agent passes through the same location after the other agent and becomes involved in a 
sequential joint behaviour, a  dropping an object for p  to later pick up and use. From an agent point of view, 
P may be aware of the token that it has picked up but is not necessarily aware of the history of that token. 
The situated agent’s view of its environment is limited to its local perceptions and the observer’s view of the 
world is limited to what it can observe.
We introduce coaching agents as an intermediary between the observer and the actor agents. Coaching 
agents are privy to partial agent internal data and are able to aggregate this so as to construct a fuller repre­
sentation of events in an environment. This aggregated local data means that coaching agents have a broader 
view of the environment than actor agents but they are still not privy to the global view that an external 
observer may have. The coaching agent’s view of its surroundings -  the environment and actor agents -  is 
discussed more fully in section 6 . 6  where we explore details of coaching agent operation.
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Returning, briefly, to the deontic identity, the observer has knowledge of system norms and implicitly 
requires that actor agents bring about so called good states. Since only actor agents are able to change the 
environment this means that they must be the drivers of change and that change is a result of their influence. 
If the environment is not in a good state then the only way that it can reach a good state is by change and 
this implicitly means as a result of agent action. We characterise this agent driven change as agent influence 
and hold that by maximising influence -  promoting change in the environment -  a system is more likely to 
reach a good state.
Coaching agents are not aware of “good” states in the same way that an observer is but they are con­
structed with two implicit operating principles.
• Agent influence is a driver of change in the system.
• Complex behaviours involving two or more agents increase agent coverage of the system state space.
One way of considering such joint behaviours is to view the state space as being partitioned into a number 
of behaviour domains. The simplest level is the set of states that single agents of all classes may have 
influence over. This is contained within the domain of states that require two agents to bring about and so 
on. As these domains extend outwards from the single agent domain they encompass increasingly complex 
behaviours requiring preparation or cooperation from multiple agents for influence to be expressed. States 
outside of the single agent influence core are properties of societies of agents. This notion of behaviour 
domains is illustrated in figure 3.2, intuitively behaviours which enable transitions between domains lie on 
the boundaries between domains. The right hand image in figure 3.2 illustrates possible agent choices at 
such a gateway. Here a  may attempt to transfer a token to /?, if (3 behaves in such a way that it accepts 
this token then its potential behaviours move it into the two agent behaviour domain. If (3 does not accept 
this token then it remains in the single agent action domain. Such gateway behaviour may be sequential or 
simultaneous.
We approach this as an iterative process and hold that, over time and as more of the system behaviour 
is observed, the ways that agents exercise their influence may be altered so as to bring their joint behaviour 
closer to optimal.
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T hree agen t influence Two agen t influence
Single agen t influence
Two agen t behaviour 
dom ain .
Single agen t behaviour 
dom ain
Figure 3.2: Gateways between single and multi agent influence domains
This thumbnail outline at an intuitive level indicates that influence gives us a means of managing agent 
ability in an uncertain environment and, more importantly, provides a means for coaching agents to explore 
areas of a state space that are only accessible to complex, aggregate behaviours. This drive towards complex 
aggregate behaviours will be a catalyst for emergent behaviours which allow systems to achieve states which 
an observer may view as goal states.
3.3 How to make sense of [a stit: \fi stit: A]]
Our notion of influence is based on agent ability, represented by stit notation. When we write \fi s tit: A] 
we are stating that f3 has the ability to bring about A  subject to the constraints imposed by the s t i t  operator 
embedded in the statement. At this point we consider a simple generic stit operator which assumes that 
an agent has a choice which will guarantee A  at some evaluation instant. Our interest lies in cases where 
\fl s tit: A] is contingent on a choice made by some other agent. For example, if a  gives ft an access token 
and uses that token to enter a new behaviour domain by seeing to it that A  holds when it was previously
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unable to do so. The fact that ft? stit: A] holds is contingent on a  having given /? a token at some point 
before (3 executes the choice that leads to the truth of A. sttt notation allows for nesting so it would seem 
that this could be represented as [a stit: ft? s tit: A]]. Is this really the case for standard s t it  operators?
When we say that [or stit: ft? s tit: A]] are we saying that a  sees to it that [3 sees to it that A holds or are 
we saying that a 's  action makes it the case that [3 is able to see to it that A holds? If the former reading were 
true then a  must exercise some influence over (3 but there is some concern that this is not correct. Belnap
et al. [8 , page 274], object to this reading on the grounds that it is inconsistent and justify this stance by
demonstrating a contradiction. Assume that:
[or s tit: ft? stit: A]] is settled true at m i, that w is a witness moment. (i)
Assume that m2  is a counter such that:
ft? stit: A] is not settled true at m2 . (ii)
By independence of agents we must have some moment m3 such that both:
mi and m3 are choice equivalent for or at w. (iii)
and,
m3 and m2 are choice equivalent for f3 at w. (iv)
By (i), (iii) and Chellas’s witness identity lemma (definition 49), it must be the case that:
w is a witness for [a s tit: ft? stit: A]] at m3 . (v)
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Taking (i) and (iii) with the positive condition we must have:
[f3 s tit: A] settled true at m3 (let w\ be a witness moment for this.) (vi)
From (v), (vi) and the witness identity lemma infer:
w\ < w. (vii)
This means that (iv) and (vii) imply (by backward monotony (definition 48) that:
m3 and m2  are choice equivalent for /3 at w \ . (vii)
The second witness lemma (definition 50 ) with (vi) and (viii) results in \J3 stit: A] being settled true at m2
which contradicts (ii) completing the proof.
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the logical impossibility of [or stit: \J3 stit: A]] (I = \J3 stit: A])
This is illustrated in figure 3.3 showing a two agent interaction. If we take /  as meaning [J3 stit: A] at 
witnessing moment mo. Because I  represents a stit by /? wherever I  appears in a choice row for (3 it must 
fill that row. This means that I  is settled true at mo contradicting the negative requirement and settling the
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statement true at the witness moment. Alternative readings -  deontic, disjunctive, probabilistic and strategic 
-  are suggested. The notion of the deontic reading is that, in this set of circumstances, a  creates an obligation 
on p  to bring about A by the act of giving p  some token or ability. The probabilistic reading indicates that 
or sees to it that there is a high probability that ft brings about A. A disjunctive reading is offered but this 
requires that one agent has some power to force choices on another agent and is not suitable here. The 
strategic reading is perhaps most in keeping with what we are trying to do here, with a coaching agent in the 
system and working from agent ability represented by stit we are trying to develop a strategy for the system 
to use in order to bring about good states.
Returning to the token example of above, ideally if p  receives a token from a  it should hold on to 
that token until it encounters a set of circumstances where it may use the token to extend its influence by 
bringing about A. If p  is predisposed to do this then a  may appear to be seeing to it that p  brings about 
A but if a 's  influence extends through p  in this manner then it is at the cost of reduced choice for p. Our 
approach is to consider an alternative reading of this nested construct and that a  has influence over p  and 
that that influence plays a part in p  seeing to it that A holds. Given that p  is the agent which carries out that 
action that brings about A can we say that a  causes p  to do this? Xu [124] considers causation in branching 
time and describes conditions of necessity and sufficiency. The causing event is sufficient in some sense 
and necessary in some sense for the caused event. Xu is not concerned with what he terms regularities, that 
is one object followed by another and all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the 
second. Instead, Xu concentrates on individual events and notes that we may speak of a particular event 
causing another without committing to notions of regularity. Xu’s second reason is based on the claim that 
The way particular things and events are related is the foundation o f any regularity. Regularity, Xu notes, 
is not a prescriptive rule that nature has to obey, but a descriptive pattern showing how particular things and 
events in nature are actually related. Thus even if the observers, standing outside of the world, try to figure 
out what the regularities in this world are, they must take into account the relations among particular things 
and events in order for them to succeed. We are attempting to find regularities by aggregating data on single 
instances of object sequences. Xu considers the chain of events leading to a house fire:
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Someone reconnected the electrical wires in a house in such a way that if a certain switch was 
later turned on, the house would catch fire. Another person, without knowing what the first 
person had done, turned the switch on. As a result the house caught fire. Assume that the 
particular tuming-on of the switch was contingent before it happened. Many people may think, 
even under this assumption, that what the first person did caused the fire.
Xu intuits that it is the second person that caused the fire and not the first. What the second person did 
was sufficient for the fire under the circumstances, circumstances which include the first person tampering 
with the wires. Xu cites a second example to justify this intuition.
Suppose that what the first person did was to hang a magnetized needle by an electrical circuit 
in such a way that the needle would start moving if a certain switch was later turned on, and 
what the second person did was to turn the switch on (assuming that it was up to him to turn the 
switch on). As a result, the magnetized needle in the magnetic field started moving.
It seems more reasonable to consider, in the second example, that the second person caused the needle to 
move. There is no element of blame in the second example and the two examples seem to be very similar if 
there is no consideration of blameworthiness.
Xu’s account of causation seems to admit elements of intention and although this is of no interest to 
us it is worthy of mention as it preempts elements of coaching agent operation. Rather than looking for 
intention, coaching agents will be looking for connections between agent behaviours.
3.4 Extending notions of influence
An agent may have the ability to change its environment but in some circumstances this ability will be 
contingent on the choices made by another agent or agents. In these cases more than one agent contributes 
an influence to a final change. By examining agent behaviour and, in particular, agent choices and the 
results of these choices, it is possible to identify and measure such influence. In the following sections we
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informally explore the concept of agent influence as part of a complex behaviour. This informal exploration 
builds to an intuitive theory of influence which we formalise in the following chapter.
3.4.1 Sequential influence
We earlier considered two agents, a  and /? in a setting where a  was able to provide (3 with a token which 
extended f i’s influence. We introduce two new types of agent, y  and 6 which are similar to a  and (3 but do 
not rely on a collocated action for token exchange. The y  type agent may leave tokens in the environment 
and the 6 type agent may, if it encounters one, pick the token up and to extend its influence. Figure 3.4 
illustrates both agent’s perspectives of such a sequence. The y agent’s history is depicted by a solid line and 
the /? agents by a dashed line. At Iq the y  agent has a choice of dropping or not dropping a token. 6 has no 
influence at this instant and this is indicated by its inability at 7o to choose between hi, hi,, h$ and he,. If y 
drops a token it follows hi and at instant la the diagram indicates that the histories (and not necessarily the 
agents) work’ together in some way that extends 6’s influence in this purely sequential behaviour pattern. 
There is no need for the agents to be collocated as in the example above. The completion instant is clearly 
obvious but the enabling instant is not so easily identified. Enabling requires that y  drops a token bringing 
the environment into a state where 6 may take advantage. The agents may not be collocated but some means 
of coordinating their behaviour seems to be required.
3.4.2 Joint collocated influence
Figure 3.5 illustrates (3's perspective of the world. In this example we assume that a token giver agent, a, 
attempts to give f3 a token at 7o and the results of fi’s actions at mi are based on this assumption. If [3 elects 
to move or use the token immediately then (3 will arrive at I\, where there is a an instance of A, without the 
ability to counter A (we neglect the move choice at I\ for clarity). This brief sequence indicates the influence 
that both agents contribute to bringing about a scenario where (3 is able to see to it that an instance of A is 
countered. In line with our informal outline of s t it  evaluation it is possible for \J3 s tit: -iA\ at m i but not at 
m3 . It appears that f3 alone is unable to see to it that -A  holds. Although its action, given a token from or, is
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Figure 3.4: Sequential two agent action in branching time
necessary and sufficient to guarantee -A  It is also necessary that be provided with a token beforehand and 
this requires the joint action with a  at Iq which we term an enabling instant.
Although figure 3.5 illustrates 1\ and h  as adjacent instants it is possible for /? to carry out a number of 
actions between the enabling instant and bringing about A at the completion instant. The behaviour sequence 
requires that the agents be collocated at the same location in their world when the influence extending event 
-  a  choice which we describe as giving a token to fl -  occurs and a degree of inter agent cooperation may 
be required, fl should not choose to do anything which inhibits a  or the transfer of the token. Co-location is 
not the only condition under which influence can be extended.
3.4.3 Influence extending behaviour
These two simple examples reveal hints to some of the features of successful behaviour sequences and some 
of the difficulties of locating these behaviours. Each sequence has a starting point, in the example of section
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Figure 3.5: gent P's view of joint action where a  gives p  gives a token at m\
3.4.2 this occurs at a meeting of agents but in the sequential example of section 3.4.1 the environment acts 
as an intermediary. The influence extending part of the behaviour involves bringing the environment into a 
state that potentially acts as a gateway to a new behaviour domain. This is evident the sequential example 
but it is also the case in the co-location example, from a s  point of view p  is part of its environment and a ’s 
attempt at giving p  a token is an attempt to bring its environment into a state from which it is possible for (3 
to move into a new behaviour domain. The starting point is an environmental transition to a result possible 
state but this may not be immediately evident.
The end point in each case is a readily identifiable transition to a good state as identified by system 
norms. Intuitively with less than perfect behaviours there will be more occurrences of starting points than 
of successful end points and many potentially good sequences will lead to unsuccessful results. There will 
also be occurrences of coincidental events over which the agent has no influence such as A  spontaneously 
clearing itself coincidentally with a tokenless f3 attempting to counter A. Additionally, in a complex environ­
ment, good behaviours may be masked by a larger number of bad behaviours and this makes simple pattern 
searching impossible.
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3.4.4 Uncertain histories
Here we note that notion of a history in this work differs from that of a history in the standard branching 
time framework. Semantically, the treatment of histories is the same in standard s t it  and our theory of 
influence. Although semantic treatment is the same the concept of a history in our influence model differs in 
that it also admits uncertainty, this is necessary because of its accommodation of “other” agency. Were we 
to follow a strict s t it  approach it would be necessary to consider sets of histories with the selection of which 
set is actually followed being dependent on choices by the other agent, allowing uncertainty means that we 
may operate on a single set of histories with the other agency being implicitly managed by the notion of 
influence.
3.4.5 Semantic extensions to standard s t i t
We have noted above, in section 3.3, that other agent nested s h t  presents semantic problems. We address 
these problems by reading the strict s t it  as influences. Recall that influence does not necessarily guarantee 
that an agent will be able to bring a proposition, -iA, about. An absolute guarantee would bring the statement 
under the remit of standard s t it . If an agent has all the pieces required for a particular influence then it will 
be in a position to guarantee ->A. The pieces of an agent’s influence may be dependent on other agents 
and this is where influence allows a semantically sound reading of nested other agent sentences. If a  does 
something that allows (3 to bring about ->A then saying that a  influences (3 which, in turn, influences A  makes 
sense. We shall address operators and syntax in the following chapter where we develop a practical theory of 
influence. Substituting this into a nested s t it  sentence, [a influences: \j3 influences: A]], is semantically 
sound with no cost to individual or group agency.
3.5 A first validation of nested influence
Our first exploration of nested influence question is set in a small world which has four cells arranged as a 
square and is populated by two agents. The agents, let’s call them a  and f3, have different abilities, agent a
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can give a token to /3 and (3 can use this one time token in any of the world’s four cells. Each cell contains 
a seed which may randomly cause A to hold. The world operates in action cycles and when A  is randomly 
brought about if the proposition has a finite (and random) life, if it is not countered -  by agent /3 using a 
token -  within this life then it will clear itself.
The purpose of this simple experiment is twofold, firstly it is to attempt to formally identify events 
which increase agent influence on the world by bringing about states that an agent is unable to bring about 
on its own and, secondly, an attempt at synthesising agent behaviour patterns in a manner that will allow us 
to have agents repeat behaviours leading to a greater incidence of such states.
3.5.1 Characterising influence
The idea of influence extending behaviour was introduced in section 3.4.3, we formalize the notion here 
and we also consider some potential difficulties. Informally, a  giving a token to/3 is a necessary step which 
extends f i’s ability but is not, on its own, sufficient to clear an instance of A. f i ’s using a token on A is 
necessary and sufficient (just in case A does not spontaneously clear) to counter A. The relationship between 
influences and s t it  can, informally, be seen here. Necessity and sufficiency equates to stit whereas necessity 
alone equates to influence. A strict reading of [or stit: \fl s tit: -A]] is not consistent but by considering 
stit as encapsulating influence and by examining events that have occurred we are able adopt a consistent 
reading for statements of this form.
We characterize the extended influence part of ability as a variation in the mapping of histories to the 
choice partition seen by an agent at a moment. In figure 3.5 the use token choice partition at m2  (given that 
A holds) has one certain future whereas the use token choice at m3 is indeterminate. We extend the Choice™ 
notation of figure 2.4 in section 2.7.2 by prepending an h to indicate that some history is “choosable”. That 
is that this history may be guaranteed by an agent choice. Thus, h.Choice™ reads some history, h is available 
to agent a  at moment m by a ’s executing one of its choices. This allows us to consider the existence of a 
single “choosable” history when comparing choice sets. This extension permits us to represent a collocated 
action where one agent enables another and in doing so extends its ability in equations 3.1 and 3.2 indicating
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that a joint action has an effect of the distribution of histories causing it to differ from the distribution in an 
individual agents choice partitioning.
3h.Choice™^(h) £  Choice™ (h) (3.1)
or
3h.Choice™p(h) £  Choice^(h) (3.2)
Informally, joint action by a  and (3 will alter the choice partitioning visible to a  and /? individually and will 
do so by either adding or removing histories or by refining the extant partitioning. These equations hold 
in figure 3.5 where a joint action carried out at Io leads to (3 being able to bring about A  at the completion 
instant, Io. The example of figure 3.5 is “short” in that the completion instant immediately follows the 
instant where (3 acquires the ability to see to it that A  holds. Following the influence extending joint action 
P's reaching a completion instant is contingent on it not doing anything which compromises that ability and 
this is something which we shall address in the following section.
Sequential action is, intuitively, rather different from cooperative actions. Agent influence in a collo­
cated and cooperative action may be thought of as being commutative, a  cooperating with p  is the same 
as f3 cooperating with a. Sequential influence is not necessarily commutative. A y  type agent dropping a 
token in a cell after a 5 type agent has visited that cell will not provide an enabling instant (looking at a 
closed sequence of events that have already occurred so that there is no possibility of 8 returning) whereas a 
y  dropping a package in a cell before a 8 visits will provide an enabling instant.
3h.Choice™.6(h) £  Choice™ (h) (3.3)
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Informally this reads that the choices available to 5 at moment m when preceded by y ’s action is con­
tained within what 6’s choices would have been in the absence of y ’s action. Intuitively, y ’s action plays a 
part in refining the distribution of histories in 6’s choice partitioning so as to either remove uncertainty or 
add new histories and extend 6’s ability.
We continue by exploring this informal characterisation of influence by exploring history traces pro­
duced by a simple experiment.
3.5.2 Examining initial experimental data
The dismissal of [a stit: \fi stit: A]] as being impossible (section 3.3) is certainly true if one is viewing 
current events and considering the future. If a  gives a token to f3 then it is not correct for us to say that a  
sees to it that ft sees to it that A does not hold. If, however, we look at events that have happened and view 
these events in terms of agent ability we can say that a  giving a token to has seen to it that fi countered A 
because a ’s action enabled /? to do so.
Some agent histories are examined below, these are taken from data generated by simple experimental 
systems. The leftmost column indicates the achieved state following the agent actions detailed in the two 
right hand columns. The agent state data in these columns are those before agent action and are, thus, 
percepts from the immediately preceding state. We term such percepts preceding an agent’s choice precepts 
and, similarly percepts following an agent’s choice are termed postcepts.
Definition 19 Given an agent situated in an environment, which it is able to perceive and manipulate, we 
define precepts as an agent’s set o f percepts before that agent makes a choice that may alter its environment.
Definition 20 Given an agent situated in an environment, which it is able to perceive and manipulate, we 
define postcepts as an agent’s set o f percepts after that agent has made a choice that may have altered its 
environment.
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If, for example, a  gives a token to f3 then this will not show up on the agent state table until the next 
cycle. Any transitions indicated are those between the previous and current cycle. This is illustrated in table 
3.1 which lists a series of events in a 2 x 2 cell agent world.
Table 3.1: Example history fragment table
State ID Transition a P
16 S S
15 EA E
14 W N
13 G W
1 2 S E
Agent actions and state are represented using the following code; G = attempted to pass token to another 
agent, T = used token, X = No action, A = this agent perceives A (at start of cycle), N,W,S,E = moved in 
specified direction. Additionally, a  and j3 mean that the agent sees the other agent in its current cell. Where 
cell numbers are mentioned these are zero based and run from bottom left to top right. We simply state 
Cleared where a A  changes to ->A and make no distinction between forcible clearing and or the proposition 
simply coming to the end of its life. When /? is carrying an enabling token this is indicated, for convenience, 
by an asterisk in tables.
Each fragment is outlined in two ways, the transition column indicates a global or observer’s view by 
explicitly indicating proposition transitions. The a  and (3 columns provide a situated coaching agent view 
detailing the agent level data that coaching agents will work with. Note that it is assumed that coaches know 
that propositions do not move so when a A  drops from an agent’s percept data after a move this does not 
necessarily mean that A has been countered or has come to the end of its life.
3.5.3 Experimental data -  fragment one
A number of experiments were run on a simple simulation of this four cell, two agent world. The tables in 
this and the following sections represent data gathered from the log files generated by these experiments. 
This first fragment (illustrated by figure 8.2 in appendix 2) represents three possible routes from enabling -
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when a  gives a token to /? -  to a proposition being countered. These sequences range from two steps long 
to five steps and each begins with a  and /3 meeting in cell 1 having moved south and east respectively in 
the previous cycle. The sequence of fragment 1.1, table 3.2 starts at the bottom of the table (the top entry
Table 3.2: Fragment 1.1, worlds 12-16, -A  state 16.
State ID Transition a P
16 Cleared AS U
15 EA EA*
14 W N*
13 Enabling GA W*
1 2 SA EA
being the most recent) with agents a  and moving south and east, respectively, into cell 1. Both agents 
detect that A holds in this cell, a  gives a token to ft and /?, now carrying the token, moves west to cell 0, an 
empty cell. Step 14 is a simple move step with both agents moving into other empty cells. Step 15 sees both 
return to cells where A holds. In the following step a  attempts a south move which, because of its position 
in the south row of its world is effectively, a null move whilst /? uses its token and counters the instance of 
A in that cell. We represent this series of moves by temporarily using slightly modified stit notation with 
world indices added for convenience to allow cross reference to the data that are in tables. Thus we have 
[a stitw 1 3 : [fi stitwie : A]] meaning that a  sees to it at world 13 that ft is able to see to it that A does not hold 
at world 16.
How can we view what is happening here? We bound the sequence and declaring two sets of instants, 
Iw -  the set containing the witnessing moment -  at the start of the sequence and Ic -  the set containing the 
completion moment where an agent makes the choice that brings about -A. This is illustrated in figure 3.6. 
Our intuition is that, in this case, the sequence begins at mo with a  giving a token to /?. In this scenario J3’s 
ability to see to it that -A  at some point in the future is contingent on a  giving a token to j3 and, if there is 
no instance of A at the agent’s joint location, /? not immediately using the token.
There may be an indeterminate number of instants between lw and Ic, this may introduce uncertainty 
about result of the sequence. This uncertainty may be handled by reading the expression, as noted already,
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Choice
Figure 3.6: Fragment one from experimental data, does [or stit: [J3 s tit: A]]?
as a  sees to it that /? is able to see to it that A. The truth of the statement is contingent on ft's agency. 
The indeterminacy of the number of moments is computationally difficult and we address this problem later 
when we examine details of the coaching agent in section 6 .6 .1 .
Our intuition is that any semantics used must have a negative condition (which holds until the com­
pletion instant), there is some uncertainty between the witnessing moment and the closing moment. Uncer­
tainty, at its simplest, means that there is a chance of A not happening. This is perhaps best thought of as 
there being a possibility of ft  losing its ability to see to it that A by simply using its token in a cell where -A  
already holds. This leads to an interesting question -  is refraining from acting acting? We avoid this issue 
by considering the positive commission aspect of actions thus j.3 not using a token may be thought of as ft 
acting in such a way as to maintain its potential influence.
3.5.4 Experimental data -  fragment two
Fragment one, discussed above and illustrated in figure 8.2, contained three history paths from world 12 and 
each of the three paths led to a state where an instance of A was countered. Fragment two (illustrated in 
appendix 2 as figure 8.3) contains two possible paths and only one of these leads to an instance of A being
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countered. As in fragment one the interesting part of the sequence starts at world 21 where, as in world 12, 
or passes a token to ft and ft does not use it immediately.
Table 3.3: Fragment 2.1, worlds 20-21/26-28, A countered at state 27.
State ID Transition a fi
28 W NA
27 Cleared EA U
26 SA SA*
2 1 Enabling G EA*
2 0 EA NA
Table 3.4: Fragment 2.2, worlds 20-25, A  not countered.
State ID Transition a P
25 NA UA
24 EA EA
23 Disabling W U
2 2 SA W*
2 1 Enabling G EA*
2 0 EA NA
Fragments 2.1 and 2.2 are detailed in tables 3.3 and 3.4. By compressing the two evolutions and using 
the same layout as figure 3.6 we get the scenario illustrated in figure 3.7. The witnessing moment is at world 
21, at world 27 agent 1 uses its token in the same cell as an instance of A  and counters it but at world 25 
using the token does nothing. Using the token at mc is inconsistent despite the previous enabling action at 
mw. Clearly something is happening at an instant between Iw and Ic to disable the agent. Our privileged view 
and knowledge of the world tells us that it is using the token at world 23 that removes the agent’s ability. 
In the cloud of uncertainty between Iw and ft's use action at Ic when A does not hold removes the agent’s 
ability to see to it that A and closes the sentence, illustrated in figure 3.8. On reflection this is not really any 
different from the illustration in figure 3.6
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Choice »"
Choice
Figure 3.7: Fragment two from experimental data representing [a s tit: \J3 stit: A]] A ->[a stit: [/? : A]]
Choice
Figure 3.8: Fragment one from experimental data with intermediate choice for j.3
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3.5.5 Identifying extended influence from observations
Extended influence, intuitively, manifests itself in settings where more than one agent is needed to complete 
a behaviour. Each agent has an influence on the execution of the action. We have noted above, in section 
3.5.1, that joint action, a\\fi may be expressed or identified by comparing choice partitioning. Joint action 
exists if a  and(3 together have access to a history that would not have been available had they been operating 
individually.
3h.Choice™^h) £  Choice™
or
3h.Choice™^Ji) £  Choice^
This is evident in figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 where, in each case, when a joint action is carried out at Iw 
leads to /? being able to extinguish a fire at the completion instant, Ic.
3.5.6 Noisy influence and the lifespan of influence
The examples illustrated in figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 are complex in that there is uncertainty between the 
enabling and completion instants. Let us take a very simple case, worlds 12/17-18 from history one, and 
remove the cloud of uncertainty from the illustration. The key point in the 12/17-18 example is that the 
witnessing instant is immediately followed by the completion instant, this is shown in tables 3.5 and 3.6, 
note that the witnessing instant has been labelled Io and the completion instant Ic.
Table 3.5: Fragment 1 .2 ,12 / 17-18, A  countered at state 18.
State ID Transition a P
18 Cleared NA T
17 GA EA*
1 2 SA EA
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Table 3.6: Fragment 1.3,12 /  17-18, A countered at state 18.
State ID Transition a
19 Cleared G T
1 2 SA EA
The joint agent action is illustrated in figure 3.9, without the cloud of uncertainty we can see that the 
give token /  do not use token combination at the witnessing instant delivers agent(3 directly to the completion 
instant and world 18 where (3 has a choice that allows it to see to it that an instance of A  is countered.
Choice g '
Choice
Figure 3.9: Fragment one from experimental data with uncertainty removed, does [a s tit: \J3 stit: A]]?
If we consider agents a  and f3 individually, figures 3.10 and 3.11 respectively. In order for {3 to reach 
world 18 it is necessary that f3 be in the same location as an instance of A and for f3 to be carrying a token, a  
is unable to counter A on its own so, clearly, in the absence of /? a  is unable to reach the choice at world 18 
(which is a member of Ic).
If (3 is acting on its own and (3 arrives at the witnessing moment not carrying a token then, like a, (3 has 
no choice available to it that will bring it to world 18 at the next instant.
Intuitively one stit like construct handles the entry to and another the exit from a sequence of events 
that brings about A being countered. If the entry stit like construct is not satisfied then the agents do not 
enter into a state that may lead to an instance of A being countered.
Choice g 1
Choice ™°
Figure 3.10: Fragment one from experimental data representing a ’s situated perspective
Choice g 1
Choice "g
Figure 3.11: Fragment one from experimental data representing f i’s situated perspective
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3.6 Summary - an outline theory of influence
We have introduced the notion of influence and explored its potential as an agent ability operator that allows 
a meaningful interpretation of other agent nested s t it  type constructs. We have extended the notion of 
influence to account for what we term serial and parallel influence. Our consideration of influence has been 
in the abstract and this indicates that influence has an advantage over s t it  in that it admits cases where agent 
ability is dependent on factors outside of its direct control, without entailing any additional complexity over 
the extant s t it  like construct. Our intention is to apply our theory in a practical setting, a consideration of 
noisy influence is a first step in this direction. The ability of the theory to carry a potential or undischarged 
influence allows agents to operate in a noisy environment. In the following chapter we take our notions 
of influence and apply them to a practical setting in a noisy environment. In this setting we attempt to 
identify where influence occurs and to do so purely on the basis of observations so as to allow us to develop 
a practical theory of influence.
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Chapter 4
Developing a practical theory of influence
We have extended the semantic reach of nested s h t  constructs by introducing the notion of influence as an 
alternative to strict s t it . The previous chapter built an outline to a theory of influence, in this chapter we 
fill in that outline and work towards a practical theory of influence. We begin by considering an algebra 
for agents and then proceed to develop a theory which allows us to apply influence in this setting. The 
development of this practical theory and the description of agent algebra will then put us in a position to 
consider, in the following chapter, how coaching agents operate and how they may manage any hypotheses 
formed from their observations of agent behaviour. Our investigation of the relationship between s t it  and 
influence will follow the path illustrated in figure 4.1.
4.1 Preliminaries, discrete branching time and an instantaneous s t i t
Standard branching time is dense in that its ordering for moments is simply an ordering and does not contain 
absolute time interval data. We need to have a guaranteed minimum time interval between instants so as 
to guarantee both an intra-instant interval where an agent may complete an operation cycle and that the 
results of agent actions will be evident at the immediately following instant. In the standard branching time 
model if m\ < m2 we know that m\ occurs before m2  but we do not know by how much or even if m2  is 
the moment immediately following mi. This presents problems for a bounded reactive agent system which,
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STIT(a) Influence(a)
A Algebra and 
characterisationEvidence
levels v
:
What can we say about the characterisation?
Figure 4.1: The investigation path from s t it  to influence and back
as Chang et al. [28] note, is in constant interaction with its environment. How many instants lie between 
two given instants? Tulenheimo [115] indicates that there is a need for investigation into time division for 
tree like structures. One way of dealing with this may be to introduce a next instant operator. Broersen 
[2 2 ] describes a next-time relation but this is related more to the serial and deterministic nature of an agent’s
logic but this, again, lacks a deterministic representation of time. The notion of a discrete time s t it  based on 
a temporal next operator, X, (equation 4.1) is described in [23]. Time is discrete in the sense that a following 
moment or instant is guaranteed to be the next in a sequence. This is close to what we need but there is still 
no guaranteed time interval between moments or instants and, thus, no means of describing or guaranteeing 
an instantaneous action.
M , m/h\=X<p <==> 3m' e him < m', A i, m '/h  |= <p, $m" e h(m < m" < m')) (4.1)
We adopt a simplistic approach to this and assume a discrete background time and impose its ordering on 
instants.
Definition 21 Given a set o f time ticks, t and the natural numbers N. Let time = N+ We refer to time as t with 
to being the first time tick and to < t\ < ?2 • • • with no intervening ticks. Ticks are separated by an arbitrary 
but consistent time interval.
actions than the absolute time involved. Broersen also describes a s t it  extension to alternating time temporal
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We extend our definition of instants, 11, by adding time indices.
Definition 22 Given a branching time tree, Tree containing a set o f moments, m, and histories, h and a set 
o f discrete time ticks, t. An instant is a horizontal partitioning o f a branching time tree which groups events 
occurring simultaneously. Instants are linearly ordered and lie on time ticks which may be used as an index 
to uniquely identify an instant within a context. Instant in,fa r  example lies on time tick tn.
This allows us to define when one instant follows another:
Definition 23 Given two instants, ia and ib, instant ib, follows instant ia iff h  > ta.
and we may also say when one instant immediately follows another:
Definition 24 Given two instants, ia and ib, instant ib, immediately follows instant ia iff tb > ta and ljltc such 
that tb> tc > ta.
We do not specify a time interval between ticks but note that each instant notionally contains an agent 
cycle allowing agents to acquire new behaviour patterns if available, gather precepts, select and execute an 
action, gather postcepts and drop historical data. This is an agent-internal behaviour cycle that we shall meet 
again so we state this as a definition for agents in this work.
Definition 25 Given an agent a  which may perceive and act in its environment. An operating cycle fo r  a  
consists o f gathering a set ofpre action percepts, precepts, selecting and executing an action then gathering 
a section o f post action percepts, postcepts. These steps are all contained within the discrete time o f a single 
instant.
Further, any changes in the environment caused by that agent’s action will stabilise and be visible to 
precepts at the next instant.
This relationship between instants and a background discrete time framework allows us to entertain 
meaningful notions of instantaneous actions and to define an instantaneous s t it  evaluation rule for such 
events.
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Where a  is an agent and m /h  is an index from a stit model Mr.
M ,m lh  [= [or istit: A] iff (4.2)
(i) Choice a (h) c  |A| £  and |A|
(») 3 /  at time t such that m e  I , 31' at time t + 1
(m) V/i G Choice 2 (A), 3m' G h and m' G / '  where A holds.
Equation 4.2(/) is the standard deliberative stit rule which states a positive condition, that A be true on 
all histories in a partition available at moment m, Choice 2 (h) Q |A| m and a negative condition that the 
set of histories where A holds is not the full set of possible histories branching forwards from m. Equation 
4.2(n) states that there are two instants, I  and / ',  separated by one time tick and that m om ent, m, belongs 
to the instant immediately preceding / '.  Equation 4.2(iii) is, perhaps, the most awkward. When an agent 
is acting in such a way as to influence another then the results or effects of that action must be available to 
other agents. We state this by saying that there are moments belonging to / '  and lying on all of the histories 
satisfying A from a choice partition where A holds at that moment.
This notion of an instantaneous s t it  is a convenience which gives us an implicit synchronisation mech­
anism. This allows us to assume that in a sequence where one agent’s ability depends on the actions of a 
previous agent then the results of the previous action will be available at the start of an instant.
4.2 Requirements for an agent algebra
We intend to apply our notion of influence to purely reactive agents and this brings some difficulties. Earlier
work such as Ferber’s approach to influence allows for one agent forcing a decision for other agents (see
Michel [86]) and this strips agency from some of the parties involved in a joint action. Clearly preservation 
of agency requires that each party involved in a joint action have some form of synchronisation that preserves 
individual agency. This seems like an opportunity for agent communication but as we indicated earlier there 
is a trade off between agent and communications complexity (see Bryson [27]) and we have elected to use
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implicit communications driven by agent percepts and an implicit expectation of other agent behaviour. 
When one agent meets another agent and they are able to jointly extend their individual influence then what 
do they do? van der Hoek at al. [116] propose a counterfactual extension to a temporal logic. This is a ternary 
operator which assigns a value to any suppositions that an agent may need to base its decisions on, these 
may be questions like will the other agent co-operate or not. We have briefly mentioned, in section 2.9.1, 
a ternary approach to belief and this is something which we shall revisit when considering coaching agent 
operation. Such reasoning is beyond our simple reactive agents so we adopt a default logic approach. If an 
agent has a behaviour pattern that is contingent on the presence of another agent and the conditions for that 
behaviour are satisfied then the agent will simply go ahead and follow that behaviour pattern. The agent’s 
action selection will never be absolutely guaranteed because behaviour patterns are biases towards rather 
than prescriptions for a particular action. Our approach to describing agent behaviour and, consequently, the 
algebra of their behaviour is based on this default approach.
4.3 An agent algebra and observable behaviours
We begin our consideration of an agent algebra by recalling our touchstone observation by Milner [87].
The behaviour of a system is exactly what is observable.
We have considered a single agent’s influence on some aspect of its environment and noted that there are 
sets of circumstances where a single agent may have no influence but where a group of agents may. In 
order to reason about the behaviour of groups of agents we need some form of representation, an algebra 
which allows us to manipulate agents so as to build group behaviours. There are many variations of process 
calculi based the notion of communicating sequential parallel processes, such as those by Milner [87] and 
Hoare [62], but these may not be best suited for our needs since, as per observations 1 and 2, agents are 
independent, autonomous entities.
We have stated our intention to maintain the independence of agents throughout the development of 
our theory. Standard process algebraic approaches allow for processes to be combined so as to construct
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new processes -  take P i, chain it with P2 to get a new process P 3 -  the processes have no say in the matter. 
Combining agents and maintaining agency seem to be mutually exclusive operation. If a  chooses to act in a 
certain way and f  chooses to act in a complementary way then together the agents may achieve something 
that they could not have done individually. If a  and f  are forced to act in a certain way then they lose some 
of their agency. We begin with this notion of choice and use this as a grounding for modelling our agents as 
state machines.
4.3.1 Defining agent choices
We assume an autonomous agent which may choose how to behave from a number of possible choices. 
Definition 26 For an agent a  with a set o f choices Choicea, and some choice K  e Choicea we will refer to 
the choice o f K  by a  at some moment as a /K .
When an agent makes a choice it is carrying out some action which, when viewed against the back­
ground branching time framework, selects a set of possible future histories lying within the equivalence class 
defined by the histories branching forwards from that particular choice. Choices and actions are closely re­
lated but not necessarily the same because an agent that is not suitably equipped may execute a choice but 
be unable to complete the action associated with that choice. We are investigating the influence of an agent 
and that agent’s choices on some aspect of the agent’s environment in order to evaluate whether or not a /K  
has influence over A. a  may have a number of choices in addition to K  but since we are concerned only with 
the influence of a /K  over A we use a simplified characterisation of the agents choices.
Definition 27 For an agent, a, with choices, Choicea, and fo r  a choice element K  e Choicea we define the 
negation ofK , ->K as the set Choicea\K.
If, for example, an agent has the set of choices {7, K, L, M } then the set ->K  will be {/, L, M}. When 
considering the influence of a /K  over A we will do so with a choice set {->K, K} with - 1K  representing any 
agent choice other than K. It may be that some other choice available to a  will bring about A but this is of 
no concern to us as we are concerned only with the influence of a /K  over A, if a  makes a different choice, 
say L, that influences A then that will be the influence of a /L  over A.
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4.3.2 An algebra based on choices
If we consider agent interaction as having two dimensions, events and agents, then the more major of these is 
events and these events are directly related to agent choice, Our means of representing this is to write agent 
driven events as choices subscripted by agents. For example, parallel agent action may be written as Ka\\Lp. 
This extends readily to groups of events, for a set of choices C = {K, L} and a set of agents, G = {a,j3} we 
may say C gII/A .
Similarly the serial agent action may be written as Ka ; Lp. Shifting to a set or group based notation 
is more complex because serial behaviour requires some form of ordering. We assume that this is implicit 
in the ordering of the actions. The agent ordering is not strict, what is important is that for each event in C 
there is at least one agent in the set of agents that is capable of making the required choice in appropriate 
circumstances.
The set of events required to bring about A and, in the serial case, the sequencing of those events may 
be fixed but this is not necessarily the case for the set of agents required to drive those events. Extending 
the serial case to a more general notation. This extends readily to groups of events, for a set of choices 
C = {K2 , L\) and a set of agents, G = {a,p} we may say Cq ; I A  and we note that the ordering on the group 
of choices C is a strict ordering which does not necessarily apply to the group of agents G.
This group of actions postfixed by a serial or parallel operator allows us to combine a number of 
aggregate behaviours. For example, a serial action followed by a parallel action may be represented as 
C g i ’,Dg2WIA
4.4 Agent empirical studies of influence
Observation plays a great part in our analysis of agent behaviour. We have adopted a privileged observers 
role in earlier discussions and have indicated that this is unsuitable for coaching agents. Coaching agents will 
observe how other agents in the world behave from a similarly situated perspective. We do, however, give 
coaching agents an insight into agent operation by allowing them to see what choices an agent has made at
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any particular moment. Coaching agents operate with a family of hypotheses. These form a sequence based 
on the hypothesis that an agent has influence over its environment. If the coaching agent observes evidence 
of influence of some sort and that evidence is unable to satisfy a single agent behaviour hypothesis then 
the coach will test the evidence against two-agent hypotheses that agents may influence their environment 
jointly. The intuition behind the second of these hypotheses is that agents may act in ways that extend their 
influence over what they may achieve individually. Two agents may carry a larger object than one or a 
bucket brigade may transfer objects more quickly than agents working individually.
Other researchers have introduced logics for dealing with evidence. Halpem and Pucella [56], for 
example, describe a logic for reasoning about evidence. This approach differs fundamentally from ours as 
it regards evidence as a function from prior beliefs to posterior beliefs. Prior beliefs are those held before 
making observations and posterior beliefs are those held afterwards. Although our system may be thought 
of as holding beliefs these are simple and the coaching agents do not hold any prior beliefs because their 
operation is built on observation and observations provide evidence to generate and rank hypotheses.
4.4.1 From s t t t  to influence, leads to and may lead to operators
Intuitively if some agent choice pair, a /K , has influence over A we would expect that A should hold following 
a/K . We will talk of A following a /K  so to avoid ambiguity we state:
Definition 28 Given an agent a  acting at moment m with m e instant I  by choosing K  from its available 
choices brings about A then we say that A follows a /K  when A evaluates true at the immediately following 
instant, 7+1 .
It may occasionally be more convenient to talk of an agent/action pair immediately leading to A  so, 
again to avoid ambiguity, we introduce an leads to operator:
Definition 29 Given an agent a  acting at moment m e some instant I  by choosing K  from its available 
choices then we say either that a /K  leads to A and write this as a /K  ^  A when A evaluates true at the 
immediately following instant, 7+1.
98
a /K  A is a necessary part of demonstrating that a /K , has influence over A but on its own it is not 
sufficient. If A  were constant and a  had no influence then not only would A follow a /K , but it would also 
follow a / -iK. We require that A is not invariable in order for a  to have influence and we expect to see 
instances of -A  following a/->K as evidence of a ’s ability to influence A. If ->A follows a /K  then it would 
appear that a /K  has no influence over A.
Coaching agents will gather evidence, by observation and by gathering details of agent choices, to 
support or deny their hypotheses of agent influence. We outline three classes of observed evidence, positive 
evidence, negative evidence and counter evidence, by the following observations:
Observation 7 Positive evidence fo r  a hypothesis that a /K  has influence over A is an observation o f A 
following a /K .
Observation 8  Negative evidence supporting the hypothesis that a /K  has influence is an observation of-iA  
following a/-iK .
Observation 9 Counter evidence fo r  the influence o f a /K  over A is an observation o f  -A  following a /K . 
We note that these look rather similar to the ternary belief operator outlined in section 2.9.1.
The negative evidence requirement of -A  following a/->K need not be consistently observed for a 
number of reasons. Recall that, by definition 27, ->K is the complement of K  and Choicea and that another 
choice by a  may also have influence over A without compromising the influence of a /K  over A. It may also 
be that a proposition already holds, if a  gives (3 a token when fl already has a token then f i ’s token count 
does not increase. Similarly if a  does not give a token holding f3 a token then fl  remains as a token holder 
This second case allows us to define a fourth class of evidence, if A follows a / ->K  then we can infer neither 
influence nor lack of influence and make the following observation:
Observation 10 An observation o f A following a/->K is neutral and gives no evidence fo r  the influence o f  
a /K  over A.
This brings us to a point where we may refine our broad view of agent influence and restate this as the 
first of the coaching agent’s hypotheses. The coaching agent’s hypotheses are intended to allow it to interpret
99
observed behaviour in a manner that corresponds with an agent’s choice partitioning and the possible futures 
that may result from agent choices.
Hypothesis 1 The Single agent influence hypothesis is that a /K  has influence over A. Evidence fo r  this 
hypothesis will be:
i) A following a / K
ii) A t least one ->A following a/->K
A  counter hypothesis, a hypothesis that a /K  has no influence over A, is indicated by -A  following
a/K .
Hypothesis 2 The Single agent influence null hypothesis is that a /K  has no influence over A. Evidence fo r  
this will be:
i) -iA following a /K
We now have a hypothesis and null hypothesis which allow us to identify single agent influence. These 
are supported by a partitioning of observed evidence into classes which either support, deny or are neutral 
towards the hypothesis. So far, these hypotheses cover only the single agent case. We shall investigate this 
in a more depth then extend the single agent hypotheses to deal with two agent influence. After considering 
the two agent influence hypotheses we will have sufficient information to be able to consider the general 
case and generate hypotheses for communities of agents.
4.5 Single agent influence at a single moment
The single agent hypothesis that a /K  has influence over A is examined against a simple single agent exam­
ple. Figure 4.2 illustrates all of the possible outcomes for a single proposition, A, at a moment contained in 
an instant, I. By examination of the possible histories, {h\,h2 , h$, ^4 } and evaluating A following a ’s choice 
we see that:
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S upports No information D enies S upports
Figure 4.2: Evidence classification for Single agent influence on A
• History h\ shows -A  following a/-*K  and this falls into our class of negative evidence. It also partially 
supports hypothesis 1 by providing evidence that -A  is possible and that it may follow a/->K.
• History /*2 , where A  follows a /-iK  lies in the no evidence class and provides no information for the 
hypothesis.
• History indicates -A  following a /K . This falls into the counter evidence class of observation 8  
and satisfies the null hypothesis indicating that, on this history, a /K  has no influence over A.
• History hi, indicates where A follows a /K  satisfies the influence hypothesis and falls into the positive 
evidence class.
For this simple case we see that each of the possible histories may fall into only one of our evidence classes 
which removes the possibility of ambiguous evidence. Ignoring /* 2  which provides no evidence, we see that 
each history may satisfy either the hypothesis or the null hypothesis but not both. For the simple case of a 
single agent at a single moment the single agent hypothesis and evidence classification hold.
Let us consider this further with some simple examples where we set an agent in an example world in 
order to consider simultaneous events. Assume that a  has a fire extinguisher and is standing beside a piece 
of faulty electrical equipment which is not burning but may spontaneously ignite. We read A as equipment 
not burning and -A  as equipment burning. If a  uses the fire extinguisher, K, at a moment m belonging to
some instant I  then there are three possible states for A. A  may hold so that the equipment is not burning 
at I  or it may not hold so that the equipment is burning at 7. We call these case A  and case B respectively. 
The third state, case C is a little more complex, consider the equipment spontaneously igniting at /  just as a  
chooses to and uses its fire extinguisher. Recall that we cast this system against a background of discrete, 
branching time with time steps bounded by instants and agents acting at these instants. We informally adopt 
an instantaneous view of actions which means that an action at one instant is evaluated at the next instant. 
This instantaneous view is described more formally in section 5.1 at the end of this chapter. A fire which is 
fizzling on the boundary of ignition may gradually take hold so its start may be across a number of instants. 
If a  uses a fire extinguisher at 7 and that fire extinguisher works then it will destroy the environment required 
for supporting a fire. By the time the evaluation instant arrives the extinguisher will have extinguished the 
weak fire. It is not unreasonable to assume -  against a framework of discrete branching time -  that in such 
circumstances a fire starting at the same instant as an extinguisher is used will not continue to bum. Case C, 
there, is similar to that of case B and we assume a starting fire is extant at 7. In case A, if a  chooses K  then 
we will observe an pattern and if a  chooses ->K then we will observe an /i2  pattern. Case B will give 
and h\ patterns for K  and -iK  respectively and case C will also give and h\ patterns. For a simple, single 
agent example where, intuitively, the agent has influence over A  the hypothesis and evidence classes hold. 
We summarise these histories in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Single agent influence
K A a /K  A
1 -*K -i A Supports
2 A Neutral
3 K iA Denies
4 K A Supports
The balance of evidence that a coaching agent observes contains some subtle information. The fourth 
row of table 4.1, where A follows K  supports the hypothesis and the third row, -iA following K. denies 
it. There is nothing contentious in this interpretation. The second row is neutral, if an agent knows that K
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leads to A and A  already holds then why K1 The cases represented in the first and third rows carry more 
information than merely supporting and denying the hypothesis. If a coaching agent sees neither of these 
then this indicates that ->A has not occurred whenever a  has acted then this indicates that A  may well be 
invariant, we have evidence that A  follows a /K  we have no evidence that ->A  is possible. In order for the 
coaching agent to assume that a  has influence over A  it must have evidence that ->A is possible and that ->A 
follows a / -iK, as described in observation 8 , at least once.
4.6 Joint multiple agent influence at a single moment
Consider the above scenario with a slight change. Instead of a self contained fire extinguisher a  has a fire 
hose. However, the hose is not as self contained as the fire extinguisher, it requires a tender at the other 
end and this tender must be manned. This manning requirement may be that another agent, p  needs to 
continuously operate a pump or that j.3 needs only to connect the hose and open the associated valve.
If p  were to fail to do either of these then a  would be stripped of ability and we would see only 
pattern histories. If p  occasionally pumps foam or occasionally opens the valve then we will occasionally 
observe /1 3 and /1 4  pattern histories where there were always /1 4  patterns before. The incidence of h\ and 
/z2  histories will be unchanged, a  will appear to have influence occasionally. This leads us to our second 
hypothesis that other agents may contribute to a ’s influence. With a hose and tender it seems that a  alone 
has no influence over A since it needs assistance from p. p  alone is unable to influence A because it needs 
a  to aim and use the hose. We call such influence examples extended influence and two classes of this are 
illustrated by the hose example. If p  needs to pump foam as a  sprays it at the faulty electronics then both are 
contributing influence at the same time and in parallel. If p  simply needs to open a valve before a  uses the 
hose then P's action must precede a ’s using the hose and the two actions operate serially. We shall examine 
these parallel and serial behaviours in following sections we consider both of these joint action types to 
examine how they fit into our notion of influence and to characterise them in such a manner that a coaching 
agent may be able to observe and identify them.
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If a /K  does not consistently exhibit influence over A  then the coaching agent may hypothesise that 
some other agent is occasionally assisting and extending the influence of both agents. There are two possible 
simple scenarios for this. The first is joint parallel influence where, for example, fl must continue to pump 
foam as a  uses the hose and joint serial influence which we consider later.
Before proceeding we extend the a /K  notation of definition 26 
Definition 30 For a group o f choices, C = { K ,L ,... ,  N), and a group o f agents G = {a, (3 ,...,6 } with 
{K £ C :3 a  £ G : K  £ Choicea} and |Cj = |G| we will refer to the simultaneous choice o f C by G (at some 
moment) as G||/C.
We extend choice negation to the multi agent parallel case where it becomes more complex. Intuitively 
for a set of choices spanning multiple agents the negation of that set is a set where at least one agent choice 
is is not contained in the set of required choices.
Definition 31 For a group o f agents, G, a group o f choice sets Choicec = [Choicea, Choicep, . . . ,  Choices} 
and a group o f choices C = [K £ Choicea, L £ Choicep, . . . ,  N  £ Choices) we generate a negation o f 
the choice sets Choicec -  -i L , - > N )  and a complement set o f choices C' = {Kf £ K, LI £ 
->L,. . . ,  N ' £ -iN). The negation ofC , -iC is a set o f choices with at least one element £ C '.
Moving on, we now consider parallel agent choice:
Definition 32 Given a group o f agents, G, and a set o f choices C and an instant I  we say that these agents 
have parallel influence over A i f  and only ifG\\/C has influence over A.
Coaching agents may look for one of the two types of two agent influence outlined above. For this to be 
the case then it must have been unable to find clear evidence supporting its single agent influence hypothesis. 
We consider the two agent parallel case before considering the two agent serial case in the following section.
Having been unable to observe evidence supporting the single agent influence hypothesis the coach 
may examine its observations against a two agent parallel hypothesis. There are now two agents involved in 
influencing A so the evidence types of observations 7 . . .  10 -  which are predicated on single agent influence 
-  will need to be extended.
We make the following observations for evidence of two agent parallel action:
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Observation 11 By positive evidence fo r  the influence o f {a,fl)\\l{K,L) over A, we mean an observation o f 
A following {a,f)\\l{K, L}.
Observation 12 By negative evidence supporting the idea o f the influence o f {a,J3}\\/{K, L) over A, we mean 
an observation o f  -iA following {a,f3}\\l~^{K, L).
Observation 13 By counter evidence fo r  the influence o f {a, j3}\\/{K, L} over A, we mean an observation o f 
-v4 following {a,p}\\/{K,L}.
Positive, negative and counter evidence are simple extensions of the single agent case into the two 
agent domain. We also have a requirement that that the group of agents act at the same instant. Neutral 
evidence is also similar thus A following {a,(3}\\l->{K, L) provides no useful information. If, in the context of 
parallel actions, a  uses its hose on the burning electronics, fl is next to a  and not at the hose tender then there 
may be some other agent, y  operating, the pump. A following {a,fl)\\l^[K, L), where ->{/£,£} is {K, ->L}, 
is simply the occasional positive influence observed for a  in the single agent influence domain being cast 
into an inappropriate two agent domain. The other agent here is y  and the observation of A simply indicates 
that a  occasionally has some influence over A and the evidence may be considered neutral. If -iA follows 
{a,fl)\\l->{K, L), where ->{K, L} is [K, -<L), then the other agent may not be operating the pump.
The extension of our view of neutral evidence into the two agent domain weakens certain single agent 
evidence observations so as to account for the additional uncertainties involved in reasoning about multiple 
entities.
Observation 14 An observation o f A following {a,fl}\\l~^{K, L) gives no evidence supporting the notion o f 
{a,fi)\\l{K, L) having influence over A.
The two agent parallel action case is a simple extension of the single agent case considered above. We 
now state these observations as observed behaviour hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3 The two agent parallel influence hypothesis is that {a,fl]\\l{K,L) has influence over A. Evi­
dence fo r  this hypothesis will be:
i) A following [a,/3}\\/{K,L}
ii) A t least one ->A following {a,p}\\l~^{K, L)
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Figure 4.3: Evidence classification for parallel, two agent influence on A
Hi) No evidence that either a  or J3 has individual influence over A
A counter hypothesis, a hypothesis that {a,fl)\\l{K, L} has no influence over A, is indicated by -A  
following [a,{3}\\/{K, L}.
Hypothesis 4 The two agent parallel influence null hypothesis is that {a,fl}\\l{K, L} has no influence over A. 
Evidence fo r  this will be:
i) -A  following {a, fl} | | /  [K, L}
Examining these hypotheses against a simple two agent example using the a  with a hose and /? operating 
a pump example described above.
By inspecting figure 4.3 we observe that:
• History p\ has -A  following a\\/3/->K, ->L. Neither agent has chosen to execute influence over A, -A  
holds and, as for the single agent case, this is supporting evidence for two agent influence providing 
evidence that A is not constant.
• History P2 is more difficult to classify. -A  follows the - 1K /L  action pair. Taken individually, A 
following - 1K  supports the single agent influence hypothesis for a  and -A  following L  denies the 
single agent influence hypothesis for J3. Recall that to be looking for two agent influence the coaching 
agent has already been unable to show single agent influence for either a  or [3 so this is not really
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helpful information. Taken together the agents action fall outside of the K /L  that the two agent 
parallel hypothesis requires and give -A  so this history pattern provides support.
• History p i  has -A  following the required actions and denies the two agent parallel hypothesis.
• History P4  is similar to p i  and supports the hypothesis.
• History ps offers no evidence as do histories pe and p&.
• History p i  has the required group action leading to A and provides positive evidence.
These data are summarised in table 4.2 with the group choice indicated as {K, Ljwith negation of this 
group choice, ->{K, L} following definition 31. The data in table 4.2 supports our statements above.
Table 4.2: Two agent parallel influence
K L A  {K ,L } { a M \ l { K ,L } ^ A
-^K —>L -A  -.{£,£} Supports
—i L A ^{K,L} Neutral
L -A  -.{isT, Z,} Supports
L A ^{K,L} Neutral
K —i L -A  ~-{K,L) Supports
K —i L A —.{AT, L) Neutral
K L -A  {K,L} Denies
K L A  {K ,L } Supports
Parallel influence is more complex than single agent influence because -  assuming a simple increase 
in the number of agents -  of the larger set of available choices. Instead of a choice of single actions there 
is a choice of action combinations. Because we are considering parallel joint influence leading to A then 
anything where participating agents bring about A individually does not constitute joint influence.
4.7 Serial influence
Before proceeding to examine serial influence it is worth examining how we may apply s t it  semantics to 
our discrete branching time agent framework, s t it  operators may be in one of two general families, that of
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deliberative semantics and that of achievement semantics. Both families adopt the same underlying view 
of agents as choice partitions on branching time but differ in their methods of evaluating the truth of a 
statement. The primary conceptual difference between the two operators is that the truth of an achievement 
stit [a astit: A] depends on two separated moments whereas the deliberative s t it , [<a dstit: A], depends only 
on a single moment.
An achievement s t it  formula is evaluated at an outcome moment and some prior moment where the 
agent in question makes a choice that guarantees the outcome. Recall that the evaluation rule for the achieve­
ment s t it  is: A t, m /h f t  [or astit: A] iff there is a moment w < m such that:
1. Mm' Choice™ equivalent to m, A t, m' / h' 1= A for all h' e H(m>)
2. 3m" e im such that w < w" and A t, m" ft A for some h" e H(m»)
A  deliberative formula is evaluated at the moment where an agent makes its choice and, in the case of 
our system, acts and its evaluation rule is: A tm /h, [= [a d stit: A] iff
1. A t,m /h , ft AMIi' e Choice%
2. 3h" <= H(jn) for which A tm /h", ft A
Both of these evaluation rules share positive, clause 1, and negative, clause 2, requirements. This means 
that A is not settled true so that an agent’s actions may be seen as having some real effect. This negative 
requirement is represented in our hypotheses by the requirement that there be at least one occurrence of 
what we term negative evidence, a/->K -A .
One of the difficulties of characterising behaviours involving a number of independent agents is the role 
of histories. If (3 acts in a manner which assists a  then how do we treat the intersection of histories, do a  and 
(3 share futures? Horty and Belnap [67] note that although the evaluation rules above refer to histories and 
moments this is only for semantic uniformity and the histories are idle in the achievement s t it  evaluation. 
This bodes well for multiple agent actions as an achievement s t it  may guarantee that A holds at an instant 
and that instant may act as the “transfer point” between agents and this is rather simpler than managing 
intertwined histories. The achievement approach, however, brings difficulties.
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4.7.1 interaction between the two stits
Horty and Belnap explore the differences between deliberative and achievement statements by examining 
plausible interaction between the two types
[a astit: A] D  P[a dstit: FA]
[a dstit: FB] d  F[a astit: B]
4.7.2 Influence and s t i t
Nested s t it  expressions are a useful tool for analysing single agent behaviour. However, for various 
reasons nested s t it  expressions present difficulties when considered in an other agent setting. Consider the 
expression \fi istit: [a istit: A]] With p  operating a valve at the tender and a  operating a hose. This says 
that ft sees to it that a  sees to it that A, the equipment not burning, holds. Belnap et al. [8 , Chapter 10] 
question how meaningful this statement is and suggest a number of interpretations. Our approach is to 
interpret this as a statement of influence, p  influences a  which has influence over A and to apply what we 
term an instantaneous s t it  at the point where influence is exercised. The influence reading handles many of 
the objections of [8 ] and may be thought of as a strategic reading of such statements.
This is not the main reason for discussing s t it  here, the main reason is that a nested s t it  has an explicit 
ordering. When we say \p istit: [a istit: A]] we expect a  to be the agent that finally causes A. This would 
not be the case if Alpha points a hose at the burning equipment and p  then opens the foam valve. We 
outlined Xu’s [124] discussion of the notion of a sufficiency requirement in section 3.3 and here we note 
that the nested s t it  expression has an explicit ordering which clearly identifies the final actor in a chain of 
actions. In \p istit: [or istit: A]] the final actor is a, the agent closest to A so any descriptions that we use 
must be able to account for this. The simplest method is to impose an ordering on the group of agents G and 
the related set of agent choices C.
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4.7.3 Serial influence
We begin by imposing an ordering on groups of agents and their associated groups of actions. The intuition 
is that for a group of agents G and an associated group of choices C we have an implicit set of moments 
where each agent makes its choice. Each of these moments is associated with an instant and these instants 
are ordered so as to provide a discrete time background for the agent world. Each agent /  action pair is, 
thus, implicitly associated with an instant if we order these instants then we are also ordering the groups of 
agents and actions. We are concerned here with serial behaviour, behaviour which involves agent choices at 
different instants. Parallel behaviour may be viewed as a degenerate form of serial behaviour with the set of 
choice instants collapsing to a single instant.
Definition 33 Given a group o f agents G and a group o f choices C we may generate a set o f moments, M, 
where each agent in G makes the appropriate choice in C. Each moment in M  has an associated instant I  
and instants have a fixed ordering. We project the ordering o f these instants on to the sets o ff agents and 
choices.
This allows us to list agents in an ordered manner. If G = {a,/3, . . . ,  6 } then a ’s choice precedes 
f f s  choice which precedes 6  and all intermediate agent choices. We wish to consider serial and parallel 
behaviour separately and the condition that each agent act at a unique moment prevents serial behaviours 
from becoming parallelised.
Having defined an ordering on agents and their choices we now discard it from our notation by assuming 
that ordering is implicit. This implicit ordering will allow us to use the same notation for sets of agents and 
sets of actions. A single agent or parallel statement will be at a single instant and a serial statement will 
cover a number of instants.
Definition 34 For a temporally ordered group o f agents, G = {a, f i , . . .  , 8 } and a similarly ordered group 
o f choices, C = {K e Choicea, L  e Choicep, . . . , N e  Choices} we will refer to the serial choice o f C by G 
along a sequence o f moments as G,/C.
We have two ordering required is implicit in the influence expression and we continue with this as­
sumption.
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Definition 35 We impose an implicit ordering on groups o f agents and choices. The ordering used is depen­
dent on the influence function in question.
i) Given a group o f agents G, a set o f choices C and a statement that G 'fC  has influence over A then we 
impose the temporal ordering o f definition 33 on G;/C
ii) Given a group o f agents G, a set o f choices C and a statement that G ||/C  has influence over A then we 
impose a simultaneous choice on G\\/C forcing all agents, Ag e G to choose at the same instant.
We now consider negation of choice in the multi agent serial case. Intuitively this negation is similar 
to that of the parallel case and our adoption of implicit ordering allows us to use the notion of definition 31, 
Intuitively serial influence occurs when an ordered group of agents, G executing an ordered group of 
choices, C, has influence over A. As before we consider the negation of C  as definition 31. The serial nature 
of influence here brings a minor complication, both G and C are ordered groups of agents and this ordering 
is a necessity. If the agent choices remain the same but their ordering changes then we have G' and C ', these 
are not equivalent to G and C  so any change in ordering is also considered a negation of G and C. Positive 
evidence, negative evidence and counter evidence are as for the parallel case. The coaching agent’s two 
agent serial influence hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 5 Two agent serial influence hypothesis is that {a, (3} ; /  [K, L} has influence over A. Evidence 
fo r  this hypothesis will be:
i) A following {a,/3} ; /{K,L}
ii) A t least one ->A following {a, {3}; /-> {K, L}
iii) No evidence that either a  or/3 has individual influence over A
A  counter hypothesis, the two agent serial influence null hypothesis, is that {or,/?} ; /{K, L} has no 
influence over A, is indicated by -A  following [a, f t ) ; /{K, L).
Hypothesis 6 Two agent serial influence null hypothesis is that {a,(3) ; /{K, L) has no influence over A. 
Evidence fo r  this will be:
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Figure 4.4: Possible histories for two agent serial influence on A
i) -A  following {a, J3} ; /{K,L}
4.7.4 An example of serial influence
Serial influence is a further complication of parallel influence as, in a two agent case, the additional choice 
partitioning is augmented by ordering. In the example here we consider only one ordering, /3’s action pre­
cedes or and we are seeking to characterise \J3 istit: [o' istit: A]] as {J3, a } ; /L, K  has influence over A  The 
ordering of G and C described above are explicit when these groups are written out in full, (3/L precedes 
a/K .
An example is illustrated in figure 4.4 where {3 chooses from {->L, L} at instant Ip and at the later instant 
Ia, a  chooses from {—<AT, A'}.
Examining each of the histories and assuming that the ordering of choices is fixed we note that:
• History h\ supports the two agent serial influence hypothesis, the choice requirements are not met and 
the outcome is not satisfied and this history is a necessary requirement to indicate that in the absence 
of the agents that -A  is possible.
• History hi provides no information.
• History h3 supports the two agent serial influence hypothesis, the behaviour requirements have not 
been met and ->A holds.
• History I14 provides no information.
•  History h$ supports the hypothesis, as for the behaviour requirements have not been met and - 1A 
holds.
• History h6  provides no information.
• History hi denies the hypothesis, we observe all of the behaviour requirements being satisfied but the 
result is not as required.
• History h% supports the hypothesis and is a necessary requirement.
Representing these in table form we see that two agent serial influence hypothesis, when considered 
with implicit ordering, satisfies evidence requirements in the same manner as the two agent parallel influence 
hypothesis.
Table 4.3: Two agent serial influence
K L A {L,K} { /3 ,a } ; /{ L ,K } ^ A
-*K ~i L -A  ->{L, K] Supports
- 1L A  ->{L, K) Neutral
-*K L - 1A ~<{L, K } Supports
L A  -i{L, K} Neutral
K —1L —iA ~'{L, K} Supports
K —>L A  ->{L, K) Neutral
K L -A  {L ,K } Denies
K L A {L ,K } Supports
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Table 4.4: Single, two agent parallel and two agent serial influence
K L A a /K  A P/L^>  A C G||/C  A G ;/C ^ >  A
-.AT -i L -A Supports Supports ->C Supports Supports
-i K L A Neutral Neutral -i C Neutral Neutral
L -A Supports Denies ->C Supports Supports
L A Neutral Supports -i C Neutral Neutral
K —>L -■A Denies Supports -i C Supports Supports
K -i L A Supports Neutral ->C Neutral Neutral
K L -A Denies Denies C Denies Denies
K L A Supports Supports C Supports Supports
4.8 Agent influence - discussion and generalisation
We may condense the table above by simplifying our view and consider evidence as being either complete 
or incomplete. Complete evidence simply means that all of the requirements of a hypothesis are met. If, 
for example, a parallel hypothesis requires that two agents choose K  and L in order to influence A then if 
they do choose K  and L  then the evidence is complete. Any choice that is not K  and L  is incomplete. The
Table 4.5: Condensed agent influence
Evidence A Single Parallel Serial
Incomplete -A Supports Supports Supports
Incomplete A Neutral Neutral Neutral
Complete -A Denies Denies Denies
Complete A Supports Supports Supports
core evidence for each of the hypotheses was based on agent action. Our approach to the negation of group 
and sequential actions allows us to treat group and sequential actions in the same manner as single actions. 
From the condensed data of table 4.5 we see that this treatment of action carries from single agent cases to 
serial and parallel two agent cases.
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Choice,
Figure 4.5: Historical data showing a ’s single choice at various moments
4.9 From influence hypotheses to branching time
We have represented influence in terms of hypotheses about agent influence. This is a first step and in order 
to be able to cast these influence notions as a reading for nested other agent s t it  statements we need to be 
able to represent influence in branching time. In the previous section we considered the influence of a single 
agent, agents operating in parallel and agents operating in sequence. We follow the same sequence so as to 
have a parallel development of the ideas set against the different background of branching time and its more 
explicit representation of agent choice.
4.9.1 Representing agents
Prior [94] and Thomason’s [112] branching time framework provides for an explicit representation of agent 
choice. Coaching agents will interpret agent history data which gives them observations of agent actions. 
Coach observations will be of a single agent /  choice pair leading to a single history for that agent. A 
coaching agent may, for a single agent a  observe a series of choices, Ta . . .T g as illustrated in figure 4.5 
representing several events which a coach will have observed at different times and have been aggregated. 
These events show what choices are available to a  and data associated with a ’s postcepts following the 
choice. Note that here we have limited the postcept data associated with each history to A or -A  as this is 
the notional vehicle for describing a ’s influence. A  is simply a subset of the agent’s postcepts. These data
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h.
Choice.
Figure 4.6: Aggregated historical data represents a ’s choice set and observed outcomes
Choice.
Figure 4.7: Binary representation of a ’s choices relative to K
may be aggregated by a coaching agent so as to represent an agent’s potential choices and possible results 
related to those choices. Following aggregation the coach will have a set of choices which it has observed 
a  making and this set of choices is treated as an abstract agent class. The histories of figure 4.5 may be 
aggregated to give the agent image of figure 4.6 where we consider or as a set of choices, Choicea. Here 
Choicea = {J, K, L, M} leads to five possible histories. If we apply the same notion of negation as definition 
27 we see this collapse into two choices as illustrated in figure 4.7. All of the choices that are ->K, that is 
{J, L, M } are grouped in a single -iK  equivalence class leaving K  and any histories associated with it in a 
complementary equivalence class. However, our interest here is focused on evaluating a ’s ability to bring
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Figure 4.8: Condensed binary representation of a ’s choices relative to K
about A and the four histories branching forwards from the condensed -■K  choice partition are redundant. 
What is of interest is that the ->K choice leads to possible futures where A holds and where A  does not hold. 
We condense the representation further to remove redundancy and give an outline of the minimal agent class 
than a coaching agent will use for behaviour analysis and synthesis in figure 4.8.
As a brief aside, consider the computational load on coaching agents. The large branching factor evi­
dent in figure 4.6 brings formidable computing requirements. The focus on A with the consequent reduction 
in branching factor concomitant with the binary choice may significantly reduce computational complexity. 
Coaching agents will need to maintain and update a database of full agent class representations, as in figure 
4.6, but any analysis and behaviour synthesis will be based on a condensed binary choice representation of 
an agent. We define an observed agent and condensed binary agent here:
Definition 36 Given a set o f agent histories H  each containing a number o f choices c e H  then we may 
construct an observed agent class and represent it as a set o f choices C = {c: c e H).
We define the condensed binary choice agent where a /K  A.
Definition 37 Given an abstract agent class a  with a set o f choices C and a single choice element K  e C we 
define a binary abstract agent fo r  a /K  as an agent represented by the choice partition {C\K, K) and write 
this as {-iK, K}.
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This representation of agents as a choice partition with its association with histories provides a method 
for incorporating the agent a /K  ^  A  concept discussed above into a branching time framework. A frame­
work that provides a link to the s t it  representation that we intend develop. Before addressing our evidence 
hypotheses in this context we briefly mention some related issues which will be discussed in more detail 
later.
4.10 A practical theory of influence?
In the previous chapter we discussed the notion of agent influence in general terms noting that it may provide 
a way to make sense of nested other agent statements without additional system or society burdens. In this 
chapter we moved this theoretical consideration onto a more practical grounding, one based on observation. 
This led us to describing agents in terms of equivalence classes based on their observed choices. From these 
agent and choice pairs we are able to detect influence by its effect on the results or availability of agent 
choice. We can also build hypotheses, based on observed behaviour, about agent ability and we are able 
to classify observations into one of three classes which support, deny or are neutral towards a hypothesis. 
Practicality, here, means that from observations we are able to hypothesise about ability. Our next step is to 
examine agent influence in a formal setting. We have frequently compared influence to s t it  and to ground 
this comparison we present a partial logical characterisation of influence in the following chapter. After 
characterising influence we return to a practical setting to discuss the operation of coaching agents, already 
mentioned frequently, and build a simple system to test the basic ideas that we have presented.
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Chapter 5
A partial logical characterisation of 
influence
We have explored the notion of hypotheses of agent influence based on observed agent behaviour and have 
identified influence in contexts of serial and parallel behaviour. We have noted that influence is not as strong 
as s t it  but that there are similarities and that influence tends to s t it  with strong evidence. One of the results 
of s t it  being widely researched is that it has been has been characterised logically and this provides a sound 
basis for reasoning with and manipulating s t it  expressions. In preparation for a discussion of how coaching 
agents will operate, essentially how they may manipulate hypotheses, we consider how a number of standard 
modal rules apply to evidence based hypotheses. We also introduce an other agent extension to certain of 
the standard rules so as to explicitly investigate the workings of other agent nested statements.
Our contention is that our influence operators are similar to s t it  and that given perfect evidence they 
are the same, essentially that s t it  is a subset of influence. Before exploring this claim we outline some 
supporting concepts to provide us with relation operators and a means of ranking evidence by its strength. 
We discuss our evidence based relations in a little more detail before outlining our other agent extension 
and considering a number of modal rules.
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5.1 Preliminaries, evidence based relations
We have a notion of agent ability for single agent cases and for group cases where agents operate in serial or 
parallel. If an agent, a  has self contained ability then we say that an appropriate action by a  will lead to A 
holding and we outlined a notation for this in definition 29. If, however, a ’s ability is contingent on another 
agent’s action, an action which may be before or at the same time as a ’s action, then we say that a ’s action 
may lead to A  holding and building on definition 29 we introduce a may lead to operator:
Definition 38 Given an agent, a  with a choice K  and a proposition A i f  we observe instances o f a /K  ^  A  
and instances o f a /K  'p* A w e  infer that a /K  may lead to A and write this as a/KQ^> A.
Our may lead to relation combines the modal possibility operator, O, and a leads to relation, 
a/K<y^> A  reads a /K  may lead to A and indicates that a ’s ability may be contingent on other agent ac­
tions.
In section 4.4 we observed that evidence may be divided into three classes, positive evidence (which 
has two requirements), counter evidence and neutral evidence. What do we consider as strong evidence and 
weak evidence? In an ideal, noise free environment with perfect observation absolute agent influence would 
always cause positive evidence. In a noisy or uncertain environment we may expect to observe some counter 
evidence to that agent’s ability and does not necessarily mean that the agent has no influence. Maybe a 's  
ability is contingent on another agent or maybe another agent acted so as to counter a 's  choice. Evidence 
is countable, an instance of A following a /K  would constitute one piece of evidence for the hypothesis that 
a /K  A. Similarly an instance of ->K following a /K  would constitute one piece of counter evidence for 
the hypothesis that a /K  A.
We adopt two metrics which allow us to rank hypotheses. The first of these is the ratio between the 
positive and negative evidence counts, the P : C ratio which we term the PCR. This is a strong indicator 
of influence but experiments showed that in very noisy environments noise could swamp the P : C ratio for 
nested behaviours. We adopt a second metric which is simply the raw difference between the positive and 
counter evidence tallies for a hypothesis. This P -  C or PMC  value serves as a filter for noisy PCR data. 
Intuitively hypotheses for strong influence will rise to the top of a hypothesis table ranked by P :C  ratio.
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Hypotheses with no influence will sink to the bottom and the PCR is used to identify potential candidates 
for other agent behaviour from the mid regions of a PCR ranked table. These concepts are discussed in more 
detail in chapter 6  but are introduced here as the notions of evidence strength in terms of P :C  ratio are used 
in the following chapter.
Note that in the text below we simply use P/C  to generate the P : C ratio, this allows it to reach infinity 
which is clearer and more intuitive for reading. In experimental code we use P/(P  + C) so as to limit the 
upper value to 1 and prevent divide by zero errors.
5.1.1 Two influence operators
In section 5.1 we introduced two relations which represent an agent being able or possibly being able to 
bring a proposition about. The second of these, a may lead to relation, could, we noted, be an indicator 
of other agent involvement in an agent’s influence. In this section we examine these relations in a modal 
context with the investigation being driven by observed evidence so as to represent what situated coaching 
agents will perceive. The first, a leads to operator, may be considered as being similar to a s t it  operator. 
For to hold we must observe evidence of ability and consistent results. This evidence of ability has a 
negative condition allowing us to cast this in the deliberative s t it  mould. The leads to relation differs from 
s t it  in that it is based entirely on observation and does not necessarily represent a complete characterisation 
of an agent’s choices or exploration of its world.
The second of these, a may lead to operator, was introduced to allow us to hypothesise about other 
agent influence. Casting this as a s t it  operator is more awkward, implies ability without consistency. 
It has positive and negative requirements just like and deliberative s t it  operators but it also admits cases 
where an agent fails to bring something about. The intuition is simply that if there is another influence 
at play then the coach will observe inconsistent results. The and operators are related, for to 
hold there must be no counter evidence, no cases where a  on its own fails to bring about A. If there is 
counter evidence, a case where a  does not bring about A and there is evidence of potential influence then 
this allows the coach to use the operator. In a noisy and dynamic environment a coach may only rarely
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observe a hypothesis being satisfied. There may be false positives because of the multi agent nature of 
the environment. It may be that if a  and /? are in the same location and /? acts so as to bring about A. a  will 
see A  in its set of postcepts and it may appear that a ’s action brought about A  when it really had no effect.
Of course there are cases where an agent may not have influence. A may come about coincidentally 
with an a ’s actions. A coaching agent may then hypothesise that another agent is doing something that 
allows a  to see to it that A holds whereas a 's  choices may be driven by the same cues that trigger A. If the 
coach synthesises a new behaviour based on this hypothesis and seeds it in the environment there may be 
more occurrences of the hypothesised other-agent action but, in this case, no change in the strength evidence 
for a 's  influence and the hypothesis may become a candidate for being withdrawn.
5.1.2 Modal rules -  introduction
Observation is rarely perfect and environments may be noisy. It may be that a  has influence over A and 
that with noise and uncertainty removed from evidence then holds. This will occur only in ideal circum­
stances. Coaching agents will admit the uncertainty in evidence by considering that a behaviour with a P: C 
ratio above a certain level is considered as satisfying A  P: C ratio of oo indicating that the requirements 
of 'v* have been fully satisfied.
In order for these operators to be manipulated as modal expressions we must demonstrate that they 
satisfy a number of rules which are associated with characteristics of modal systems. One of the major aims 
of this work is to characterise other-agent influence and to do this we extend some standard modal axioms, 
those where it might be said that an agent influences itself, to encompass other-agent influence.
Since our system is driven by evidence and evidence is unlikely to be noiseless we approach this from 
two points of view. We assume, first, the operator holds then consider examples or counterexamples on 
this assumption. Evidence, in this case, is noiseless and that where an agent has influence over something 
then this influence is unambiguously captured. These ideal cases serve to demonstrate that the system is 
capable of supporting or denying certain modal principles. We then consider the same examples with noisy
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data using the 0 ~» operator to investigate if it is safe to consider whether or not the same modal principles 
are supported by an influence operator.
We have observed that with a P :C  ratio of oo is indicative of a type expression. In a noisy data 
environment this is unlikely to occur and this, potentially, brings difficulties. To overcome -  though it is 
perhaps more accurate to say accommodate -  these difficulties we introduce two hurdle values for the P : C 
ratio. A high hurdle above which we consider to be the case, a low hurdle below which we hold that the 
agent has no influence and between the hurdles where we consider to be the case.
Standard s t it  semantics are choice agnostic, they read that an agent is able to see to it that A holds in a 
non prescriptive manner. The ^  and operators are similar but we bring an implicit prescriptive element 
their association with hypotheses based on the observation of agent choice. This is a necessary requirement 
which allows coaching agents to meaningfully analyse and manipulate agent behaviour. It may well be that 
an agent has two different actions that lead to the same result, this means that coaching agents may hold two 
hypotheses -  one for each action. When we consider hypotheses in conjunction with a or relation 
then the agent and action are implicit parts of the statement.
5.1.3 Syntax for a leadsto operator
We have discussed leadsto and s t it  separately, we now bring these together and cast our leads to and may 
lead to operators as s t it  like operators. We do this by replacing the generic s t it  part of a s t it  expression 
with either or <K» and read the expressions as follows:
Definition 39 Substituting a expression fo r  s t it  in a s t it  expression yields statements o f the form [a : A] 
and [a : A] which are read, respectively, as a  has a choice which will lead to A and a  has a choice which 
may lead to A.
The readings suggested above give no indication of which s t it  family that the leads to operators belong 
to and give no indication as to what the agent’s choice really is. At this point we address the s t it  family 
question by taking a pragmatic approach and this is that agents have a choice which will or may lead to A
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at some instant following the agent’s choice. The actuality of an agent’s choice is resolved by one or more 
related coach hypotheses.
The rules discussed below help to describe expectations and requirements of system behaviour and the 
properties of our and 0~» operators. These rules allow us to characterise the system and operators in a 
modal framework.
5.1.4 The other-agent extension
In the standard, single agent, versions of many of the rules considered in this characterisation there are a 
number of sentences which may admit multiple agents. The standard modal axiom C, for example, states 
that, and using ^  in place of s t i t ,  [a : A] A [a : B] d  [a : A A B] and we consider multi agent 
extensions of this. The standard single agent / multiple sentence statement becomes a multiple agent /  single 
sentence statement. Casting C  in this mould replacing the sentences, A and B with agents a  and ft and 
introducing a single sentence gives C a g e n t • C a g e n t ,  then, states that [or A] A \fi A] d  [a\\p  A].
These agent extensions need to be considered in the parallel case, as above, and the serial case. C a g e n t , in 
serial form states that [ a  : A] A [{3 : A] D  [ a \ P  : A]. Jumping ahead briefly, where C a g e n t  holds it
appears to indicate that a  and P ' s  actions are not mutually exclusive. Such agent extensions of standard rules 
pose a problem, it is unreasonable to expect that a system should validate a rule like C a g e n t  without context 
and where required we provide illustrative examples.
This completes the preliminary discussion and we now consider a number of modal rules.
5.2 Influence with modal rules and axioms
We listed some standard modal rules and axioms in section 2.6.6 and in this partial characterisation we 
examine a number of these rules and axioms with and <>-» operators substituted for generic s t it  operators.
This is intended to give an outline of how closely our influence operators follow standard s t i t . The other 
agent extension is used where appropriate and we consider whether or not observations will allow us to carry 
standard rules into the domain of other agent actions.
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5.2.1 Negative necessitation, N
We first consider the negative necessitation rule. The import of this is that an agent should not be able to 
influence T. Since T is a constant we should expect the rule in equation 5.1 to be valid.
N. T] (5.1)
We assume that a counterexample holds, N. [a : T] and that a  has some choice K  available to it that 
has influence over T. For this to be the case we would need to observe positive evidence where a /K  T 
and our evidence requirements demand that we observe at least one instance of a/->K ± . However, since
T is a constant we will never see a/->K ± . A coaching agent collecting observations may see data like
that of table 5.1 where the X denoting the lack of negative influence indicates that a /K  has no influence over 
T.
Table 5.1: Evidence for a /K  T
Evidence P:C ratio Conclusionny uuulvulu • •Positive- Negative- Counter-
a /K  T n X 0 0 No influence
The impossibility of generating a counterexample indicates that N  is valid. Note, also, that because of 
the impossibility of generating a counterexample, a necessary requirement for elevating a hypothesis, it is 
neither necessary nor possible to move to the <>-» operator.
5.2.2 Rule of necessitation, RN
For coaching agents to operate meaningfully the system must support some form of inference. This is 
represented in modal logic by RN, the rule of necessitation. RN  and the distribution axiom, known as K  
after Saul Kripke, together are widely accepted as being the most basic properties of a modal system (see
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Chellas [30, page 6 ]). Chellas [30, page 245] represents RN  as shown in equation 5.2.
RN. —— (5.2)
□A
Casting this in our influence framework gives equation 5.3.
[or : A]
RN. -----     (5.3)
RN serves as an indicator of individual ability and may be interpreted as a trigger for what we term elevating 
a hypothesis. Recalling the notion of influence domains and gateways, illustrated in figure 3.2, we make the 
following observation:
Observation 15 Suppose a hypothesis that an agent, a, has influence over a proposition, A. I f  the observed 
evidence supports the hypothesis but also has a significant counter evidence component, then a coaching 
agent may generate further hypotheses that other agents play a part in the cases where [or : A]. The 
coaching agent will “elevate ” this hypothesis into the next behaviour domain by generating other agent 
hypotheses which support its observations.
If an agent has a complete individual influence to bring about A , let us call this an innate influence, 
then following that agent’s making the appropriate choice then A will hold and we would observe positive 
and negative evidence and no counter evidence. If an agent lacks innate influence but is able to bring about 
A either in conjunction with another agent or following some action by another agent then we will observe 
positive and negative evidence with some counter evidence. If an agent has no influence then we would 
observe no positive evidence, some negative evidence and some counter evidence. These scenarios are for 
noiseless single agent environments. Staying in a noiseless, single agent environment then a counterexample 
to [a  ^ : A] d  A  would be the second example above, where an agent’s influence is contingent. Possible 
observed evidence for RN  is illustrated in table 5.2.
Counterexamples to RN  with the operator fall into two classes, one which satisfies the 0-> operator 
and allows a coaching agent to elevate a hypothesis and one which falsifies both the and operators
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Table 5.2: Evidence and RN
, Evidence ■ P:C ratio ConclusionPositive- Negative- Counter-
(5.2a): example
a /K  A n /  0 oo a /K  ^  A
(5.2b): example, counterexample to
a / K ^ A  n /  p n /p a /K O ^  A
allowing a coach to discard a hypothesis. Falsification of the operator occurs when the counter evidence 
tally is significantly greater than the positive evidence tally. This level will be heavily dependent on the 
agent’s context and we suggest that this be addressed by ranking hypotheses and discarding the weakest in 
the ranked list.
RN  is sufficiently strong for us to build on it and go from necessitation to inference placing us in a 
position where we may begin considering other agent constructs.
5.2.3 Rule of inference RR
RR provides a simple rule which allows coaching agents to infer results from sequences or combinations of 
observations across two agents or actions. This is sufficient for coaching operation described in chapter 6  
and the the experiments of chapter 7. Here we consider two propositions as a conjunction. RR is a general 
rule and we apply an other agent extension to refine RR to deal specifically with serial or parallel other agent 
choices.
RR. , (* ABi r C r  (5.4)(□A A nB) -» □ C
Our interpretation or RN  carries a two implicit requirements, the first of these is the assumption that 
a specific agent choice leads to A holding. This assumption of choice is based on our notion of condensed 
binary choice, definition 37 so that all “other choices” are grouped together. The second requirement is
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that the propositions under consideration are not constant. This is one of the foundations of our theory of 
influence and means that we will have observed at least one instance of the negation of the proposition under 
consideration following one of the agent’s other choices. Returning, briefly, to RN, when we write fQr 
we are saying that some choice bycr leads to A being true and that given that choice by a  we may infer that 
A  holds.
Bringing the standard RR of equation 5.4 into our influence setting we rewrite it as equation 5.5.
([or^-»: A] A [or^>: B]) -> [a ^ » :  C]
(A A B) -> C
This states that if a ’s influence brings about A and a ’s influence brings about B implies that a ’s influence 
brings about C  then, given the assumptions immediately above, we may infer that A A B implies C.
Our concern is to show that RR holds for three cases where (A A B) —> C, that of a single agent, that of 
two agents acting in series and that of two agents acting in parallel. Before considering RR we make some 
assumptions about the environment. These are that:
(i) A and B are independent propositions.
(ii) C occurs spontaneously when A and B hold.
(iii) For C to occur then either A and B must be brought about at the same instant or A must already hold 
when B is brought about. This represents parallel and serial action.
(iv) Agents may execute only one choice at an instant.
(v) A and B are persistent with lifespan of at least one cycle.
This list of assumptions provides for a limited set of circumstances for testing RR and we, later, briefly 
discuss a more general setting. Item (iii) imposes an ordering requirement for the serial case, this is simply 
as an illustrative convenience. The variable lifespan for A and B, item (v) introduces an element of noise. 
Note that in the noiseless case this lifespan is for as long as a proposition is required. Item (iv) means that
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for a single agent the conjunction of actions must be serial and (v) allows for a single agent, a, to bring 
about A.
We restate equation 5.5 to reflect the implicit single agent ordering requirement of item (iii):
(A ;fl)->  [ a ^ :  C] K J
Equation 5.6 states that in order to be able to bring about A then a  must already have brought about A 
before bringing about B and this ordering follows the requirements discussed in section 4.7. In line with the 
implicitly prescriptive nature of hypotheses we associate an agent choice with each proposition giving two 
hypotheses; a /K  ^  A  and a /L  B
Table 5.3: Evidence and single agent RR in a noise free setting
TT , • Evidence „ ^  ^  , .Hypothesis ^ ------------ P:C ratio ConclusionPositive- Negative- Counter-
a /K  ^  A n / 0 oo a /K  A
a/L^-» B P / 0 oo a /L  B
a /K  ^  C <1 / r q / r a/K<y^> C
a /L  C s / t s /t or/LO^> C
[a/K; a /L ) ^  C u / 0 oo {a/K; a /L )
{ a / K ; a / L ) ^ A u / 0 oo {a/K; a /L ) ^  A
{a /K \a /L }^> B u / 0 oo { a / K ; a / L ) ^ B
{a/L; a /K ) C V / w v/w {a/L; a/K)<y~> C
In the noiseless case of table 5.3 we see that there are n instances of a /K  bringing about A and p  
instances of a /L  bringing about B. Because the environment is noiseless there is no counter evidence 
for these cases and the single agent hypotheses are satisfied. We may also observe cases of a /K  and a /L  
bringing about C. The latter is necessary because that is the action that, in conjunction with A holding, brings 
about C. This is a noise free environment but C may hold before a /K  so instances of C following a /K  will 
be observed. In both of these cases there will be counter evidence indicating that the single agent hypothesis 
does not satisfy the requirements for bringing about C and causing the coach to elevate these hypotheses by 
seeking other agent influence. The other agent, in this case, is the same a  but there is a requirement that
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it sequence its choices. Considering A, B and C as subjects of serial hypotheses on {a/K; a /L ) we may 
observe u instances (with u <= n and u <= p) of serial action bringing about A, B and C. The evidence 
levels (in this noise free environment) will be the same for each since (by items (ii) and (iii)) which gives 
three hypotheses with different results and the same evidence levels. We can immediately discard the serial 
action hypotheses for A  and B as we already have satisfied single agent hypotheses for these propositions 
and there is no point in seeking complex explanations for cases that have been dealt with, this leaves us 
with a single hypothesis which satisfies equation 5.6 in a noise free setting. The out of order hypothesis, 
{a/L; a/K }  C, will present some positive evidence but negative evidence will be greater leading to a may 
lead to conclusion with weak evidence.
RN  allows for the elevation of a hypothesis into a two agent domain and RR allows this extension so 
that a coaching agent may generate two agent hypotheses.
In a noisy setting, one where other agents may have actions that counter a 's  abilities, we would expect 
to see counter evidence in each case. The differentiation between hypotheses must then be on evidence 
strength rather than the difference between perfect and imperfect evidence and possible observations are 
listed in table 5.4 which starts from the same leads to hypotheses as table 5.3. Here we would see the P : C
Table 5.4: Evidence and single agent RR in a noisy setting
Hypothesis
Evidence
■ P:C ratio ConclusionPositive- Negative- Counter-
a /K  A n / P n /p a/KO^> A
a /L  B q / r q /r a /L < y B
a / K ^ C s / t s /t a/K<y*j> C
a /L  C u / V u/v a /L O ^  C
{a/K; a /L ) C w / X w /x {a/K;a/L}<y^> C
{a/K; a /L ) A y / z y /z {a/K; a/L}<y~» A
{a/K; a/L} B a / b a/b {ia /K ;a /L } < y B
{a/L; a/K }  C c / d c/d {a/L; a / K } C
ratios for a /K  A and a /L  B being relatively good compared with those of a /K  ^  C and a /L  ^  C. 
Once again we may discard {a/K ;a/L} A and {a/K ;a/L} B. The weaker hypotheses indicate that
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there is some influence and the relative strength will cause the coaching agent to elevate the hypotheses to a 
set of other agent hypotheses.
Bringing in the other agent extension we may replace one of the instances of a  with another agent. This 
other agent may be another instance of an a  class agent or another agent that has an appropriate equivalent 
choice. The independence of A and B and implicit sequencing of actions in the single agent case make 
the serial other agent version of RR a simple substitution. Item (iii) in our list of conditions states that 
simultaneous action by two different agents will bring about C. This may be thought of a statement of the 
physics of this agent world and if we did not have this condition then this simultaneous action would not 
lead to C in the agent world and there would be no evidence or extremely weak evidence supporting such a 
hypothesis.
5.2.4 The convergence axiom, C
Chellas [30, page 20] lists this principle as:
(□A A □£) —» n(A A B) (5.7)
If an agent were to see to it that A holds and that B holds at an instant and its choice of action is the 
coincidental result of its having two independently reasoned goals then it does so without intending to see 
to it that A and B hold jointly. Neglecting the agent’s intent, however, it would be difficult to deny that the 
agent does see to it that A and B do hold jointly and that the principle stated in equation 5.8 is supported. 
A noteworthy point here is that our operators are constrained to an agent and choice pair, here we say that 
a /K  A and a /K  ^  B and the implication is that it is the same choice, K, that brings about both A and B. 
We consider that equation 5.8 holds and attempt to generate counterexamples.
C. [ a ^ :  A ] A [ a ^ :  B] -> [ a ^ : A A B ]  (5.8)
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Table 5.5: Evidence supporting C
EvidenceHypothesis — ——------Positive- Negative- Counter- - P'.C ratio Conclusion
(5.5a): ^  noiseless setting
a /K  A n / 0 oo a / K ^ A
a / K  B n / 0 oo a / K ^ B
a / K  ^  A A B n / 0 oo a / K  A A B
(5.5b): <k >^ noisy setting
a / K ^ A  n / P n/p a/KO^> A
a /K  B q / r q /r a/K<y^> B
a /K  A A B s S t s /t a/KQr^> A  A B
Considering the noiseless case and assume that a /K  ^  A  and a /K  B both hold and considering 
them separately we may see evidence like that presented in table 5.5a. Because the result of a /K  is A  and 
B regardless of the agent’s intention then the positive evidence count will be the same in each case. We 
introduce another hypothesis, a hypothesis that a /K  A A B. For this hypothesis to fail then there must 
be at least one instance of counter evidence where either a /K  -A  A B. or a /K  ^  A  A -iB. This would 
mean that the positive evidence count for a /K  A A B. would differ from that of a /K  ^  A  and a /K  B 
which is not possible given the behaviour of a /K  described above.
The noisy case, illustrated in table 5.5b, is not so clear. We do not have the lack of influence over B that 
will allow us to generate a counterexample to falsify C. Because of the noise we are unable to guarantee 
that evidence tallies for a /K  A  and a /K  ^  B will be the same though we may expect them to be of the 
same magnitude.
5 2 5 C'-'agen t
This is an other agent extension, as outlined in section 5.1.4, to the standard C axiom represents scenarios 
where a number of agents with similar abilities exercise their abilities either in parallel or in series. This 
gives two versions, equation 5.9 says that if a  can see to it that A and if /3 can see to it that A  then a  and yS
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acting simultaneously can see to it that A holds. Equation 5.10 says that if a  can see to it that A  and if p  can 
see to it that A  then a  and /3 acting serially can see to it that A  holds.
C \\a g en t. [a • A]\\\p : A] -> [a\p : A] (5.9)
Cogent- [a ^ : A] A D? : A] -> [a;P : A] (5.10)
C -,agent is a potentially dangerous property. Consider agent actions which are mutually exclusive, either a  or 
P may bring about A. We consider the parallel action case first, if a  and ft simultaneously act so as to bring 
about A then A will hold but it will do so as a result of a's action or P's action and not as a result of both 
actions. We assume that both agents have different abilities, that is that they execute different choices but 
these choices are functionally equivalent as far as A is concerned. If, say, a /K  ^  A  and p /L  A and -A  
holds then when agents act simultaneously both will perceive that A holds after their action. Inspecting the
Table 5.6: Evidence and parallel C a g e n t
Hypothesis Evidence ■ P:C ratio ConclusionPositive- Negative- Counter-
a /K  A n /  p n /p a / K < y A
P / L ^ A q /  r q/r P/LO^t A
{a/K\\p/L} ^  A s /  t s /t {a/K\\p/L}0^> A
data of table 5.6 we see evidence for Cagent. Even in a single cell world where agents are always collocated 
the number of instances of a /K  A and p /L  A will be greater than those of {a/K\\p/L} ^  A. Assuming 
an even distribution of noise the P : C ratios n /p  and q /r  will be greater then s /t  and ranking these as per the 
discussion in section 5.1 makes the single agent hypotheses appear to be more influential than the parallel 
action hypothesis. Returning to agents, we have two hypotheses for each -  a single agent hypothesis that 
indicates an ability to bring about A and an other agent hypothesis indicating the same. We discussed the 
notion of gateways between domains of influence in section 3.2 and illustrate the single and two agent case in 
figure 5.1. The single agent action is contained in the single agent influence domain which is, by extension,
133
Two agent influence
a
Single agent influence
Figure 5.1: Single agent and other agent hypothesis domains
contained in the two agent influence domain. After ranking the simpler single agent hypotheses are seen to 
carry more influence and offer a better account of a  and P's individual ability to influence A  than the two 
agent hypothesis.
If  a  andp  operate sequentially then coaching agents will see much more evidence of influence for single 
agent action than of serial action. Given a /K  A  immediately followed by p /L  ^  A  the latter action will, 
except when noise intervenes, show no influence as A  already holds and no change will be evident following
P / L .
Whilst we do not falsify Cagent we see that the foundations of our influence theory - observations of 
agent behaviour -  do not lead to circumstances where Cagent may be considered as valid.
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5.2.6 Whatever is necessary is the case, M
Chellas [30, page 20] lists this principle as:
M. n(A A B) —> (nA a  dB) (5.11)
M  claims that if  an agent is responsible for seeing to A A B then it is responsible for seeing to A individually 
and seeing to B individually.
M. A A B] ([a A] A [or~>: £]) (5.12)
This is an objectionable claim and as a counter model we show that it is possible for the left hand side to 
hold when one of the two expressions on the right hand side is falsified. We assume that a /K  has influence 
over A and has no influence over B which remains tme.
Table 5.7: Counterexample to M
EvidenceHypothesis positive_ Negative_ Counter- P.C  ratio Conclusion
(5.7a): counterexample, noiseless
a /K  A n / 0 oo a /K  A
a /K  ^  B n X 0 oo No influence
a / K ^ A A B  n / 0 oo a / K  A A 5
(5.7b): counterexample, noisy
a / K  A n / P n/p a/K<>^ A
a /K  B q X r q /r No influence
a /K  A A B  s  / t s /t a/KO^* A A B
Table 5.7a illustrates the noiseless data case modelling Since each line of the table is drawn from 
the same data set, the cases where a /K  has been observed we may make some statements about the evidence 
tallies. If a /K  has been observed n times and a /K  A then the positive evidence column for this line of 
the table will be n. Because B is constant every observation of A will also be an observation of B and since
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the a /K  data set has n elements the positive evidence count for a /K  ^  B will also be n. By extension 
the positive evidence count for a /K  ^  A A B will also be n. Our only concern with negative evidence is 
that there be at least one occurrence and that this occurrence be associated with a/->K. We see a tick in 
the negative evidence columns for a /K  ^  A  and a /K  A  A B, this indicates an unspecified number of 
occurrences but there is at least one in each case. The negative evidence count for a /K  ^  B is zero. With 
this evidence we see that a /K  ^  A  holds and that a /K  ^  B  is falsified. We may generate the negative 
evidence for a /K  ^  A A B from the negative evidence from the rows above. We have evidence of at least 
one instance of -A  and because B is constant this means that there is at least one instance of -i(A A B) 
which provides negative evidence for a /K  A  A B indicating that the statement holds. The left hand 
side of equation 5.12 holds, the first expression on the right hand side also holds but the second is falsified 
providing a counterexample.
Moving to the evidence of table 5.7b we consider equation 5.12 in a noisy data environment. Despite 
the potential masking and uncertainty introduced by noise the fact that B is constant will not be obscured 
and it may be treated in the same manner as T in our consideration of N. We see a 3 in the negative evidence 
column for a /K  ^  A  A B indicating lack of influence and this falsifies the second expression on the right 
hand side of equation 5.12.
5.2.7 Syllogism, S
Chellas [30, page 271] lists this principle of syllogism as:
(A -> B) -> ((B —> C) -> (A -> C)) (5.13)
Casting this against our notion of influence gives:
(a /K  ^  A) ((A C) -> (a / K C)) (5.14)
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This rule requires careful consideration as it has bearings on coaching agents abilities to infer cause and 
effect and to divine necessary preconditions for actions. There are two ways that propositions may be 
linked; they may be inextricably linked so that the value of B mirrors that of A or they may be linked by 
transition so that a change from ->A  to A causes B to hold.
Since A and B may have different truth values this is not a case of equivalent propositions, which are 
handled by RE, it is a case of sometimes subtle interaction between elements of the agent world. If an agent 
is carrying a bucket and we take A as meaning bucket empty and consider B as no fire burning. For this 
reading of B to be of note then it must have been the result of a change in the environment so there is an 
implicit transition of -A  to A involved in the proposition C. Both propositions are independent at the start 
of a cycle and the link between A and B is strong. We attempt to falsify this in table 5.8 by illustrating a 
scenario where an agent drives a transition from -iA to A and where this happens coincidentally with ->C 
For a counterexample to hold we would expect to see evidence values supporting figure 5.2(b), q /r  »  s/t.
Table 5.8: Evidence and S
Hypothesis
Evidence P.C ratio ConclusionPositive- Negative- Counter-
a /K  A n / P n /p a/KO^> A
a/->K B q / r q /r o' / b
a / K ^ B s / t s/ t a / K O ^ B
However, if A and B are relates as described above then coaching agents will observe evidence supporting 
figure 5.2(a) with s/ t  and n/p  supporting their relevant hypotheses and, assuming that no other action in a's 
choice partition influences A in the same way as K, q/ r  will be small relative to the evidence supporting 
other hypotheses. The P: C ratios for the first and third hypotheses in table 5.8 will be supportive because 
there are no other agents involved in this influence, a  is self contained provided that -A  holds at the start of 
a cycle.
137
a/K a/K
(a) A d  C  (b ) A J C
Figure 5.2: Evidence for influence (a) and lack of influence (b) in a noisy environment
This leads to a dilemma, a coach may have two hypotheses with the same set of precepts. Which does 
it seed? This is discussed in chapter 6  and S supports simply seeding the more influential hypothesis and 
this is intuitively correct as both hypotheses involve the same agent choice.
5.2.8 Tautology, T
Chellas [30, page 6 ] lists T  as:
□ A -> A  (5.15)
T  states that if something is necessary then that something is the case. If a  sees to it that A holds then A 
must hold.
T. [ a ^ : A \ D A  (5.16)
If a / K  ^  A holds then we will be presented with evidence like that of the top hypothesis line of table 
5.9. This has positive evidence, negative evidence and no counter evidence. From our earlier discussion on 
evidence we know that if counter evidence is presented along with positive and negative evidence then it
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Table 5.9: Example and counterexamples for T
Hypothesis Evidence ■ P.C ratio ConclusionPositive- Negative- Counter-
a / K ^ A n / 0 ? a / K  A
a / K ^ A P / q ? Other influence
a / K ^ A n X 0 ? No influence
is indicative of another influencing factor. The actor specification in equation 5.16 will then be incomplete 
falsifying the expression. This is illustrated in the second hypothesis of table 5.9. It may also be that A is 
constant and that a  has no influence. Were this the case then there would be no counterexamples with ->A 
following a / K  and there would be no negative evidence and equation 5.16 would be falsified. For 5.16 to 
hold it must be that case that A follows [a : A].
5.2.9 What is necessarily so is necessarily necessarily so, 4
4 presents difficulties, Horty and Belnap [67] indicate that it makes a considerable claim about agency, an 
agent that sees to it that A  holds also sees to it that it sees to it that A  holds. Chellas lists this as:
4. n A ^ n n A  (5.17)
Some modal accounts of action deny 4, for example those of Brown [26] and Chellas [29], but this 
is a necessary aspect of our approach as it places a condition of independence on agents, a ’s choice may 
be influenced by f i ’s actions but {S has no control over a ’s choice. Recall that we consider agents as choice 
partitions overlaid on a discrete branching time background. 4 implies that the partitioning of histories at 
a moment is fully under the control of the agent choosing at that moment. In a branching time framework 
4 is supported by the fundamental assumption that the choices available to an agent at a moment may be 
represented by the partitioning of histories through that moment.
4. [or : A] —» [a ^ : [a ^ : A]] (5.18)
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iB
iThrowThrowm
Choice,
Figure 5.3: The choices available to a poor darts player
Recall Kenny’s example of a poor darts player (see Kenny [72]) illustrated in figure 5.3 (also shown in 
section 2.7). This presupposes a noise free environment and it is difficult to deny that for H  to hold the 
agent must select choice K\ and throw a dart. In a noisy environment the dart may hit a dart already on 
the board or bounce off of a dividing wire leading to ->H following K \ . Viewing this in our hypothesis 
evidence context we may see evidence such as that of table 5.10a. This presupposes that the agent has only
Table 5.10: Evidence and 4
EvidenceHypothesis — ——------- —----- ;------Positive- Negative- Counter- P:C ratio Conclusion
(5.10a): agent has only two choices
a /K \ H  p / q p/q a / K \0 ^  H
a /K 2 H  0 X 0 0 a /K 2 'h  H
(5.10b): agent has multiple choices
a /K  H  p / q p/q a /K O ^  H
a h K ^ H  r / s r/s -i(a/KO^> H )
a / L ^ H  t / u t/u a/L<y~> H
two actions available, one that has influence and another that does not. In this case we have no evidence that 
K2 is influential and the agent must choose K\ in order to bring about H. If the agent has more choices -
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some of which may have influence over H  -  then we may see evidence such as that of table 5.10b which 
also supposes noise. Here we will see that p /q  > r/s,  the hypothesis a/K</^> H  has stronger supporting 
evidence. If the ->K  binary choice partition contains another action, L  that influences H  then this will cause 
the evidence for a/-*K H  to strengthen and will also cause the instantiation of another hypothesis, 
a /L  ^  H. Evidence for a /K  ^  H  and a /L  H  will be greater than that for a/->K H  indicating that 
the agent has a choice in the matter and 4 holds.
5.2.10 4 agen t
4 brought considerable claims about agency and the other agent extension makes further and stronger claims.
V „ , .  [ a ^ : A ] ^ \ J 3 ^ : [ a ^ : A ] \  (5.19)
Bringing the other agent into an action gives equation 5.19 which states that /? has some influence over a  
seeing to it that A  holds.
Table 5.11: Evidence and 4agent
Hypothesis Evidence P:C ratio ConclusionPositive- Negative- Counter-
a /K  ^  A P S  q p /q a/K<jr^> A
{ / 3 / L ; a / K } ^ A r /  r r /s {/3/L ',a/K }O ^A
{(3/L\\a/K} ^  A t /  u t/u {/3/L\\a/K}0^ A
This is a rule that, obviously, may only be considered in cases where there is a joint influence require­
ment and will not be applied to cases where a coach is satisfied that a single agent has influence on A. 
4 agen t represents the nested s t i t  discussed at length by Belnap at al. [ 8 , chapter 10] and the stit representa­
tion admits both serial and parallel action readings: If we combine aspects of Hansson’s situationist logic, 
Hansson [57], with our notion of gateways introduced in section 3.2 and state that the partitioning is fully 
under an agent’s control then we may view agent action in a deontic context. Agents have different oughts 
in different sets of circumstances. Hansson indicates that what an agent ought to do depends on its context
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and in a multi-agent behaviour a  may open a gateway but it is P's choice whether or not to use that gateway. 
Returning to evidence, table 5.11 indicates what we may see. If a  has single agent influence then p /q  will 
indicate this and there will be no need for the coaching agent to consider two agent hypotheses, r/s  and t/u  
will be lower indicating that the single agent hypothesis provides a better explanation for events.
4 on its own holds and this represents agency by indicating that deterministic aspects of the future may
be mapped onto agent choices. 4agent fails, if this were to hold then it would infer that some agents had
control rather than influence over other agents.
5.2.11 Rule of equivalence R E
Chellas lists the rule of equivalence as:
A <-» B
RE. — -------   (5.20)
□A uB
Casting this into influence based view gives:
A <-> B
R E ' 7------- 77---- F------- <5-21>[or : A] <-> [or : B\
RE  says that equivalent propositions are equally necessary. This relates to several aspects of agent behaviour 
in a coached environment. We must be careful with the notion of equivalence. If two propositions are 
absolutely equivalent, that is to say that they are the same but simply carry different labels or names, then 
one would expect to see evidence tallies matching exactly even in a noisy multi agent environment. If, 
however, the equivalence is both propositions are the result of the same choice then evidence tallies may not 
match exactly. In this case a coach would observe supporting two hypotheses, one that a given action leads 
to A and another that the same action leads to B.
Let us assume two hypotheses, one that [a : A] and one that —>[or : B] for a/K.  Let us also assume
that a / K  brings about A and brings about B
142
Table 5.12: Evidence supporting RE
EvidenceHypothesis — ——-----Positive- Negative- Counter- ■ P:C ratio Conclusion
(5.12a): example
a / K ^ A  n / 0 oo a / K ^ A
->a/K ^  B p S q p /n -i(-ia/K  B)
a /K  B n S 0 oo a / K ^ B
(5.12b): example
a / K ^ A  n / P n/p a/K<0^> A
-ia /K  B q / r q /r —i(—ia/KQr^> B)
a /K  ^  B s / t s /t a/KO^> B
In the noiseless example of table 5.12a we see that the equivalence of A and B is reflected in the positive, 
negative and counter evidence tallies. Assuming that the a /K  ^  A hypothesis holds, as in the statement 
above, and that A  and B are equivalent propositions then there will be counter evidence for the ->a/K B 
hypothesis. The conclusion for the negative hypothesis, ->a /K  B, is that it does not hold.
The counter evidence which negates the -<a/K B  hypothesis moves us to a noisy environment where 
we consider a may lead to result. Here the P:C ratio for ->a/K ^  B will be significantly smaller than that 
for both a /K  A  and a /K  B. Note that n /p  and s /t  are not necessarily equal, other agents may play a 
part in observed evidence.
RE  considers equivalent propositions from the point of view of a single actor as the agent of change. 
In a multi agent environment the ability to extend a hypothesis across groups of agents, agents which are 
members of some equivalence class, will allow a coach to develop behaviours applicable to a greater number 
of actor agents.
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5.2.12 REag ent
Before considering the agent extension to RE  we address the question of agent equivalence, raised in section 
5.2.11, which allows a coach to infer that one agent’s ability to bring about A is transferable to other agents. 
Agent ability is driven by agent choice and we call similarly capable agents choice class equivalent. 
Definition 40 Given two agents, a  and ft, with choice sets Choicea and Choicep respectively we say that a  
and f3 are choice class equivalent fo r  a choice C iff C e {Choicea n  Choicep}.
Agents belonging to the same agent class will be choice class equivalent by default and the definition 
above may be extended across agent classes where these classes share common agent choices. This refine­
ment of agent class equivalence to choice class equivalence removes a degree of coarseness from coach 
reasoning.
RE agen t maps R E ’s claim of the equivalence of propositions onto the domain of agents. This is a 
necessary mapping because coaching agents deal with the world in an abstract manner which treats agent /  
action pairs as propositions.
If two agents, a  and (5 are members of the same agent class then it is trivially true that given the same 
local environment and reading seeing to it as an indicator of ability then a  seeing to it that A holds is
equivalent to j.3 seeing to it that A holds. Our hypotheses are built on agent /  action pairs and take the form
a /K  ^  A. If agents are choice class equivalent for K  then this represents an intersection of their agency 
and since agents may execute only one choice at any instant they are equivalent when constrained to choice 
equivalence.
a /K  <-» B/L
REagenf 7--------^ ------ % ------TT (5.22)[a : A] \fi : A]
This is an important rule for our system, if REagent fails then a coaching agent can not assume that a good 
behaviour exhibited by one agent of a particular choice class may be transferred successfully to another 
agent of that class.
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Table 5.13: Evidence supporting REagent
EvidenceHypothesis Positive- Negative- Counter- P:C ratio Conclusion
a /K  A n S  p n /p a/K O ^  A
/3/L~~> A <7 /  r q /r jl3/LO^  A
Given two agents, a  and /?, belonging to separate agent classes and two different actions, K  and L  for 
a  and J3 respectively, a coach may see evidence such as that of table 5.13. Both a  and present evidence of 
being able to bring about A  and in this case the coach will simply consider this an equivalent ability for each 
agent class and seed a behaviour for each class. Functionally both behaviours are equivalent, the coach is 
unable to see a difference and simply treats them as equivalent.
5.3 From characterisation to implementation
The partial characterisation presented in this chapter indicates that an evidence based approach to identifying 
agent influence will allow coaching agents to reason about chains of actions, equivalence of actions and 
equivalence of propositions in a modal context. It also indicates that the system will not support claims, 
such as those of Cagenu which may lead the system to attempt to reason through cases of mutual exclusion. 
Similarly 4agent does not hold because this would carry implications of agents being able to see to it that 
other agents bring propositions about and this is much stronger than our claims for influence. We carry these 
properties over to the following chapter where we consider how a coaching agent may use them in managing 
evidence to divine agent ability.
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Chapter 6
Coaching agents
We have developed a theory of influence, discussed two influence operators and have built a partial log­
ical characterisation of these operators. This characterisation has two purposes, these are to explore the 
behaviour of influence and to provide guidance in implementing coaching agents within a system. Horty, 
Belnap, Xu and others concentrate on an abstract theory of s t it  and ability, one that makes heavy demands 
on an agent’s reasoning resources. There is literature on reasoning by resource bounded agents, Rubin­
stein [99] and Bratman [19] for example, but these cany a reasoning component which makes them suitable 
for agents with cognitive abilities. We intend to build coaching agents in the same manner as actor agents, 
as close to fully reactive as possible and with minimal cognitive ability. Here we outline coaching agent 
operation and the synthesis of behaviours for reactive agents.
6.1 The relationship between a coach and an agent
The roots of this research lie in emergent behaviour experiments with StarLogo (see Resnick [96]) which 
moved to C and further experiments in emergent behaviour [82]. Communications, in these settings, used the 
environment as an intermediary. In exploratory work by Logie et al. [82] the environment held pheromone 
like data which agents could read and write. Communications in this instance are more complex requiring 
that agents communicate more data than a simple pheromone level. We have mentioned behaviour patches
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and history patches. Briefly and informally, a history patch is a collection of agent data gathered over one 
operating cycle. It holds the agent’s percepts before any action, the agent’s action and its percepts following 
that action. A behaviour patch contains a set of weightings which bias an agent towards a single action and 
a set of precepts where coaching agents have observed this action as being influential.
The task of driving system evolution and learning falls on coaching agents. Note that we use the terms 
evolution and learning rather loosely. By evolution we mean that an actor agent’s behaviour patterns may 
change over time but it’s underlying stochastic ability remains fixed. By learning we mean that the system’s 
performance, in terms of it maximising agent, influence improves over time. A small residual stochastic 
element in agent behaviour means that although the agents in the system may not reach optimal behaviour 
they will be able to adapt to changes in its environment. Coaching agents operate with a general hypothesis 
that agents may influence their environment and, by extension, each other. Coaching agents will analyse 
historical data with a view to locating this agent influence.
This chapter outlines how coaching agents will approach the analysis of agent behaviour history data 
and illustrates the link between hypotheses of influence, as outlined in section 4.4, and their appearance when 
represented in a branching time framework. This branching time representation will allow us to consider the 
hypotheses in terms of stit semantics leading to a notion of influence frames which acts as an intermediate 
step to our reading of nested other agent stit expressions.
Coaching agent operation is described in four steps before moving to a more general overview. The 
first step is to describe some aspects of the environment and indicate why coaching agents are necessary. 
The second step informally outlines how the coach operates and leads to the third step which explores some 
simple agent interactions so as to build the notion of an influence frame. The fourth step sees us taking this 
influence frame and characterises it more generally.
6.2 Preparing for the coaching operation
We have already outlined coaching agent operation as gathering agent history data from an environment, 
applying this data to an abstract agent representation, synthesising new agent behaviour based on these
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observed data and seeding the environment with these behaviours. We begin by stating that agent percepts 
are a true representation of their environment. Agents do not suffer from faulty or noisy data and if they 
operate in a noisy environment then their percepts will accurately represent this noise. We also state that 
the events or world states that an external observer deems “good”, our system norms, are possible, this is a 
requirement of the ought implies can deontic identity. We state as suppositions:
• Suppose that there is a class of agents that has the ability to see to it that A. Note that this is an abstract 
agent class as a result of our treating agents as abstract choice mechanisms.
• Suppose that an agent a  in that class is located so as to be able to exercise that influence.
It may be that an agent has several choices which enable it to bring about A, this is implicit in statements 
such as [a istit: A] which make no reference beyond an agent identity. Leaving such things implicit is 
potentially dangerous. Different choices may bring about A  but they may also have different preconditions 
so they can not be considered as equivalent choices when synthesising behaviours. Coaching agents will 
consider actor agents as abstract choice classes (definition 36) and this allows them to analyse influence at a 
choice level rather than at a coarser agent level. As an intermediate step we extend standard s it t  notation to 
accommodate this finer granularity by indexing s t it  operations against a particular agent choice.
Definition 41 A statement o f the form [a istitk : A] says that by choosing K  from its choice set agent a  is 
able to instantaneously bring about A. Note that K  may be a choice to refrain from acting as well as a 
choice to act.
We suppose that a coaching agent hypothesises that one agent, /?, has an influence of a ’s abilities and 
characterise the coach agent’s operation by the following four steps with is t it  representing a choice by which 
the agent immediately brings about A.
1. The coaching agent sees partial histories generated by a  which contain transitions from -A  to A.
2. The coaching agent will have a collection of partial histories where a  chooses a particular action, K  
and [a istitk : A] holds. The coach may also see histories where that action is selected and [a istitk '• A] 
does not hold.
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3. The coaching agent then examines histories for evidence of actions by other agents on histories where 
[or istitk : A] holds which are absent on histories where [a is tit: A] does not hold.
4. The coaching agent aggregates these data and attempts to build an influence frame that models 
[fi is tit: [a is titx ’ A]]
Before proceeding we expand some of the notions in the list above. Item 1 above specifies partial 
histories, because agents in this system are resource bounded and are only able to record brief histories of 
percepts and actions. Coaching agents deal with partial histories, a record of an agent’s most recent precepts, 
actions and postcepts.
Definition 42 A partial history is an arbitrarily bounded history from an agent’s situated perspective and 
contains an ordered list o f an agent’s most recent precepts, postcepts and actions.
Item 1 states that coaches are looking for histories where transitions from ->A to A occur. This does 
not necessarily imply that agent influence is present. A may spontaneously occur and just as spontaneously 
clear, an agent may record the transition causing it to appear in its history but it may not have had any 
influence on observed transition of S . Certain elements of the environment may be cyclic and while they 
may respond to agent intervention the response may be variable and depend on the timing of the agent’s 
action. Where an agent has direct and unambiguous influence over something then changes may appear to 
be consistent with an action or sequence of actions.
Definition 43 A state change in the environment, a transition from ->A to A, indicates that an agent has 
perceived the change but does not imply that an agent has had any influence on the change.
We informally introduce the notion of an influence frame as a two bounding instants. A choice at the 
earlier instant makes A possible by some choice at a later instant. This witnessing instant at the start of an 
influence frame is illustrated in figure 6.1 where a /K  at m makes A possible following some future agent 
choice m'. When a nested influence is framed, as indicated in item 3, we refer to the first agent, f  in this 
case, as the outer agent and a  in the example as the inner agent. On entry to an influence frame an agent 
may not have exercised any influence proper but it has exercised potential influence over A.
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iA
Figure 6 . 1: s h t  frame with A-potential
Definition 44 Let HA(m) be those histories fo r  which h e Ha Oii) —> m /h e v(A). A history has A-potential 
influence at moment m when HA(m) =£ 0  ^  H^A(m)
Intuitively, at this witnessing moment, w an agent acts in some way that makes A possible within what 
we term an influence frame. The witness moment also has a negative condition, since we are dealing with the 
possibility here the positive condition is that an action leads to A being necessarily possible and the negative 
condition leads to A being necessarily not possible and this is illustrated in figure 6.2. This simple notion
C^OA □OA
Figure 6.2: A moment where a  is witness to OA
has several interesting properties which we shall outline before a formal definition. The single witnessing 
moment does not mean that we are constraining the frame to a representation of the influence of a single
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entity. The choice at the witnessing moment may be that of a single agent or it may be a group of agents 
working together serially or in parallel. The choice which brings A about at the later evaluation instant 
may be made by another agent and we must be clear about which agents which we are admitting to the 
influence frame. If, in figure 6.2, the future follows h\ then there may be some instant before the evaluation 
instant where a  selects choice K  meaning that the negative condition potentially does not hold. Consider 
the presence of another agent, if that agent were to intervene and select action K  then it may independently 
bring about a state -  from the negative branch -  where A  may be brought about. To allow for this we state 
that the negative condition is only required to hold at w + 1 , instantaneously after the choice at the witness 
moment.
6.3 Characterising evidence of immediate influence
Influence manifests itself in two ways. Assume an action, K, which an agent may or may not execute. 
Assume, also, a proposition, A, relating to the agent’s world. We hypothesise that an agent, a, has influence 
on A  and that by choosing K, a  may bring it about that A holds.
The partial histories in figure 6.3 illustrate three possible outcomes of a ’s choice {->K, K) at a moment. 
We have two valuation functions, v for a ’s choice and v for a postcept of proposition, A, which we assume 
that a  may influence. Figure 6.3(a) indicates positive evidence that a choice of K by a  influences A being 
brought about. On its own this is insufficient to support any hypothesis that a ’s choice of K  has influence 
because it only partially satisfies the conditions discussed in section 4.4. Seeing instances of 6.3(a) in 
addition to instances of 6.3(c), indicates that if K  is not selected then A is not brought about, we may infer 
that a  does have some influence over A. A counterexample to influence is illustrated in figure 6.3(b) where 
action K  does not bring about A. Coaching agents may encounter some or all of these scenarios and it is 
the combination of these evidence features that will guide the coach to search for other agent influence and 
nested behaviours.
If we characterise influence in terms of an istit then we may say that [a istitk: A] (so M , m /h  f= 
[a istitk: A] V m/h). We see, also, that the valuations v and v are related:
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(a) Positive evidence
V(-nA)
(b) No influence
v(a_,K)
(c) Influence
Figure 6.3: The components of influence (a,c) and lack of influence (b) of a /K  over A
a) As a postcept we see v(A) = v ( c c k )
b) As a postcept we see v(-A) n  v(a~,K) t- 0
If -i[or istitk: A] holds then we will see one of the following possible sets of circumstances.
1) i) v(-'A) n  v{ock) =£ 0  
or
ii) v(-iA) fl v(or^) = 0  
or both.
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2) i) (v(A) fl v(czk) £ 0 ) n  (v(-A) n  v(or-,^) t- 0 ) 
ii) v(A) fl v(or^) = 0
6.3.1 Parallel influence
Suppose, also, that there is a/5 such that ->{J3 i s t i tk ' : A] and that 2-i, from the list above, holds for/5. Suppose, 
in addition, that v(A) n  v(J3k>) 0  so/5 is not prevented from having influence.
What if y(A) = v(ok) fl v(/5tf')
Pk 1
-iK K 1
K' K'
-iK K
-.K' ->K'
Figure 6.4: a  and/5’s joint ability at a single moment
Then we say [ar||/5 i s t i t K , K ' : A] but -i[ar istitK- A] and —>[/5 istitK' '■ A]
6.3.2 Serial influence
Suppose that we observe consistent evidence of a ’s having influence on A, as in figure 6.3(c) but we also 
observe both positive evidence, figure 6.3(a), and evidence of no influence, 6.3(b). We may hypothesise 
that although a  is the final actor that brings about A there is also some other influence playing a part, an 
influence outside of a's control. We assume that this other influence is some other agent, /5, and that /5’s 
earlier choices have some influence on the outcome of a ’s choices. Intuitively such serial influence is not 
simply a chaining of two instances of single agent influence. Our analysis of agent influence is based on
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choice and, consequently, agency. If P does indeed have influence over the results of a's choices then that 
will be evident only when a  exercises its choices appropriately.
We assume that ft, which acts before a  has two choices, K' and ->K', a  has two choices, K  and ->K. We 
wish to show \P;a i stitk\ k • M  which says that P / K r followed by a / K  can jointly and instantaneously see to 
it that A holds. Before proceeding let us consider the meaning of immediately in this context. Immediately 
is intuitively obvious in the single agent and joint parallel cases, actions are taken so as to bring about a 
result at the next instant. This is clearly not possible when one agent’s action follows another and actions 
occur on integral time ticks and we consider this in the following sections.
6.4 Nested stit expressions
Horty and Belnap [67] note that s t it  operations encourage nesting and in a single agent setting nesting may 
be used to analyse concepts such as refraining from acting. For example an agent refraining from is seeing 
to it that A  may be said to be seeing to it that it does not see to it that A, [a s tit: -i[ar stit: A]]. A nested s t it  
expression describes sequences where the sentence that is the final object of the statement may depend on 
a number of actions. For example, if someone wishes to check an email account then they must make sure 
that their computer is turned on. Rephrasing this with a s t it  element, in order to see to it that they check 
email a computer user must see to it that the machine is turned on. Lorini et al. [84] indicate that stit is an 
S5 modal operator and Broersen [21] notes that nested S5 operators may be replaced by logically equivalent 
non-nested formulas. Our interest in nesting lies in so-called other agent constructions and the difficulties 
that they bring as discussed in section 3.3.
We assume than an action K  by a  in some circumstances brings about A and in some circumstances 
brings about -A  and that this is dependent of P's action. When p  acts so as to bring the system into the inner 
section of the nested statement then whenever a  executes K  then A will be the result.
When the expression enters the nested braces the fact that p  has exerted its influence means that A will 
be brought about when a  chooses K. a  retains its agency and has its influence extended by gaining the
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ability to influence A as a result of y6’s action. We refer to the agents as outer and inner agents depending on 
their role in the nested statement.
In simple cases with no intermediate moments between the witnessing and final action moments the 
role of the inner agent is clear. Maintaining agency means that the inner agent must have a choice. Figure
6.5 shows a simple situation where the outer agent’s action at mw satisfies a negative condition, -A  at h\ and 
gives the inner agent a choice at m\ where it is able to select a history leading to either A or -A . A negative 
condition is necessary and a positive condition must be possible on another branch of the history tree. Figure
6 . 6  is similar in that its witness moment satisfies the negative condition requirement but the other branch is 
always positive. The inner agent, in this case, has no choice and is unable to exercise its agency so this does 
not constitute a nested s t it  as agency does not hold throughout. The notion of settledness cannot extend 
from the outer agent to the object of the nested statement as this would remove agency from the inner agent.
If there are intermediate moments between the witnessing and final actions then things become a little 
more complex. It may be possible for an inner agent to have no choice as a result of its own actions.
Figure 6.7 illustrates a case where at m\ a  has a choice, D  that leads to -A  but at the subsequent m2  a  
has no choice, both ->B and B lead to histories where A holds. This satisfies the inner agency requirement 
because the lack of choice at m2 is a result of a choice by a  and is under the domain of a's agency.
Figure 6.5: Branching time frame where an other-agent nested s t it  holds
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Figure 6 .6 :  Branching time frame where an other-agent nested s t it  does not hold
h2 h3 h4
Figure 6.7: Branching time frame where nested s t it  holds despite vacuous choice at h
Our early intuition was that the evaluation of an other agent nested influence statement has two frames, 
an outer frame defining the witnessing action and an inner frame defining the completion action. Viewing 
the agents together as a system then the system enters the inner frame when the outer agent acts in such a 
way as to instantaneously guarantee that the other agent may bring about A. There is a negative condition 
on this that if the outer agent may also act in such a way that makes it not possible for the inner agent to 
bring about A. This, however, implies that the outer agent’s influence extends along the negative branch at 
least as far as the evaluation instant and this is not correct.
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The inner frame, which is entered as a result of a choice by the outer agent at an earlier moment, has at 
least one moment where a choice can guarantee A and at least one moment where it can guarantee ->A at the 
same evaluation instant. Figure 6 . 8  indicates where a  has no agency.
Figure 6 .8 :  Branching time frame where nested s t it  does not holds because all contained choices are vacuous
6.5 An exploration of two agent interaction
The examples above outline our notion of how nested statements should appear when framed in a single, 
multi agent s t it  frame. A small program was used to generate random traces allowing us to explore two 
agent behaviour. It was assumed that the two agents were bound together but that they chose their actions 
independently. The agents were characterised as a carpenter, f3 and an apprentice, a. Each agent had five 
actions with each action having equal probability. Carpenter agents had hit, -Jiit and three other actions. 
Apprentice agents had one give action with four other actions. It was assumed that the carpenter agent 
started without a hammer and when a gives a hammer (which, as before, we refer to as a token) then it has 
persistence and /? may use it for every following hit. When a  hands a token to (5 the token becomes available 
for use in the next cycle. If the token is used to hit a nail, N, then the nail appears driven at the end of that 
agent cycle.
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A sample of data generated is shown in table 6 .1 where X  for both the a  and /? agents means other 
action, 77 is hit, G is give and A is the driven state of the nail. The top row lists the most recent events with 
earlier events are in sequence below.
Table 6.1: Behaviour histories for carpenter,/?, and apprentice, a, agents.
p a N P a N P a N P a N P a N
-.77 X -i A 77 G A -.77 X -.A X X —>A X G - A
X G -.A 77 X A X X - A -.77 X - A —.77 X - A
X X -.A -.77 X ->A X X - A —•77 G -.A X X - A
77 X -.A X X ->A X X - A X X - A X X - A
X X —A -.77 G - A X X - A X G -.A X X - A
X X - A -.77 X - A X X - A X G ->A X X - A
X X - A 77 X A —.77 X -.A X X - A -.77 X - A
X X - A X X —A -.77 X —A X G -.A -.77 X - A
X X -nA X G - A X X ->A 77 X A X X -.A
X X - A -.77 G - A 77 G ->A X G —A X X -.A
The coaching agent procedure begins by assembling agent classes, this is simply a case of the coach 
examining an agents histories and building a set of reported actions. This is done on the assumption 
that agents are autonomous and choose their actions. The coach represents these agent classes as choice 
partitions which it may superimpose on a s t i t  frame. The carpenter agent, for example, has a number of 
actions, {77, ->77,...}, the history data show that the 77 action occasionally produces A  so we naively partition 
the carpenter’s choice set into 77 and ->77. We adopt a similar aggregation approach with the apprentice 
agent (this is a simplifying approach for the early stages).
From table 6.1 a coaching agent may see the carpenter’s 77 action on single history trails as 6.9(a) and 
6.9(b).
The coach may aggregate these to give figure 6 .10 where we have labelled instants, for our convenience 
as Iw the witnessing instant, Ie the evaluation instant with two intermediate instants 7/i and la-
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Q j ’’G G a  -<3 G
(a) hit and ->G (b) hit and G
Figure 6.9: Possible histories for a joint sequential action
— e - - C - -
A- -.G
Figure 6.10: Branching time frame showing potential is t it  action
6.6 An operational overview of a coaching agent
The coaching agent’s main task is to randomly sample history data in the environment, use that data to 
generate or update hypotheses which are used to generate and seed new behaviours in the environment. We 
have hinted, in our intuitive outline of influence in section 3.2, that the coaching agent has a view of the 
environment that lies between the bounded actor agent view and a global observer’s view. We now explore
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how coaching agents operate and in doing so we add detail to the notion of the coaching agent’s intermediate 
view. The coaching agent does not have abilities to manipulate objects in the environment, its only way to 
drive change is to manage the behaviours of actor agents.
When a coach picks up a patch it examines it for evidence of change, our theory is based on influence 
and we consider change as prima facie evidence. If the history patch indicates change then the coach will 
check it against a hypothesis list which forms the core of its internal database. History patches provide two 
types of evidence, that directly related to a hypothesis and what we term collateral evidence where data may 
be used to toggle the negative condition of non related hypotheses. Direct hypotheses are indexed via agent 
class and agent action. For example, if a patch indicates that a /K  A then related hypotheses will be those 
where a /K  holds so that the patch will provide positive evidence for a hypothesis that a /K  A  and will 
provide counter evidence for other a /K  hypotheses, for example a /K  ^  B. If a matching hypothesis is not 
present then the coach generates and stores a new hypothesis. If there is an extant matching hypothesis then 
the coach will update evidence for this hypothesis. Note that a single history patch may generate multiple 
hypotheses if there is evidence of multiple changes in the precept and postcept data.
After dealing with related hypotheses the coach will then use the data as collateral evidence, hypotheses 
are based on atomic propositions
6.6.1 Computational tractability, temporal evolution and coaching agents
We have described a tree like partial order, section 2.6.3, governing temporal aspects of a standard branching 
time structure. We have also described a time framework, section 4.1, which removes the density problem 
by discretising the intervals between instants. Such an ordering is useful for representing sections of a tree 
but its forward branching remains unbounded and this embodies some of the difficulties outlined in section 
2.11. A standard branching time diagram may be thought of as a directed acyclic graph, potential cycles 
are eliminated by the relentless forward progression of time causes the repetition of world states at different 
points on the tree. Clearly this presents difficulties to coaching agents (and, indeed, to any bounded agent), 
trying to represent a complete temporal evolution of the world is going to generate large trees which will
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continue to grow as more data are acquired. Coaching agents certainly have an interest in temporal aspects 
of the world but they are more concerned with the transitions from state to state. By removing the strict 
temporal requirement from the ordering and reading transitions, informally, as from starting state X  action 
A brings about state Y  we may introduce cycles into the representation of the world.
a  holding A a, A on ground
a, A on ground
(a) Standard branching time.
holding A
a, A on ground
(b) Cyclic state graph
Figure 6.11: Repeated states in standard branching time and in a cyclic state graph
Consider a very simple world, one location, one object and one agent. The agent has two possible 
actions, pick and drop (we will view this as pick and ->pick so as to remain consistent to our earlier repre­
sentation of agent choice). In standard branching time a representation of the world continues to branch in 
an unbounded manner as in figure 6.11(a). By admitting cycles we condense the tree closing it to give the 
directed graph of figure 6.11(b). This implicitly represents the discrete branching time representation, the 
arcs in the directed graph represent an instantaneous s t it  and have an implicit time interval. This extremely 
simple case presents an extreme where admitting cycles reduces a potentially unbounded tree to a graph 
with two nodes and four arcs. A world of sufficient complexity to offer any interest is going to present a 
much more complex graph but each loop in that graph represents a potentially large reduction in resource 
usage over a long sequence of operating cycles.
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6.6.2 When a coach picks up a history patch...
Coaching agents are concerned with finding and maximising influence and our earlier discussion of hy­
potheses in section 4.4 was founded on the notion of agent /  action combinations. We carry this into the 
coaching agent’s internal data structures and adopt an action /  negation structure for mapping the results of 
agent actions.
When a coach begins it has an empty database and it moves through its environment picking up history 
patches. At this stage if these history patches do not exhibit any evidence of influence then they are of no 
interest. When a coach encounters a history patch that indicates influence it will construct a hypothesis of 
the form a /K  S i (where S i is a new world state) to describe its observation. The hypothesis specifies 
only the end state but the coaching agent’s database will, as in the informal transition reading above, hold 
the start state for each transition and this start state will be implicitly held in any behaviour specification as 
a trigger state.
We shall be considering differences between sets of percepts so we define how these are identified. 
Definition 45 Given two sets o f agent percepts S o before an action and S i after an action we define the 
change between these states Changes Q->sx as the complement o f So fl S i.
Changes0~>s i is a set of atomic propositions and does not provide a firm foundation for building hy­
potheses, it may contain elements which are changed by influences other than the one under consideration. 
We constrain our hypotheses definitions by dividing the change set so that the hypothesis target is an atomic 
proposition.
Definition 46 Given an agent, a, an action, K, a set o f precepts S o and a set ofpostcepts S i, ifChanges 0-*Si ^  
{} then we may generate a set o f hypotheses, {A e Changes 0~>sx ' a /K  ^  A}.
If there are multiple changes then this may lead to a multiple hypotheses being generated.
Definition 47 Given an atomic proposition A, an agent a  and an action K  we say that all cases where a /K  
brings about A are hypothesis equivalent.
We consider a coaching agent which gathers patches indicating that an agent, we shall use a single 
agent class for the time being, has had influence with action K, the coaching agent may build a database
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State S1
State S1
Hypothesis 1
Figure 6.12: Coach database, hypothesis instantiation
such as that of figure 6.12. The new hypothesis has a starting state, Sno, and a single next state, Sn \. The 
time based partial order of the standard branching time structure is now represented as a following action 
step.
Although the coach has gathered data indicating that a change followed an agent action and has begun 
building a world database it does not have sufficient information to consider the hypothesis as fully formed. 
The transition data gathered so far represent only positive evidence. As more history patches are gathered 
the coach examines them against extant hypothesis structures. It may be that another history patch has the 
same (or similar) starting state from where the agent chooses another action and this results in another state. 
If, following the other action, the new state differs from S l i  (in figure 6.12) in respect of the influence 
expressed in the transition from S lo to S l i  then this satisfies the negative evidence requirement and allows 
the completion of the hypothesis as in figure 6.13(a). Note that the ->K resultant states are not recorded as 
part of the a /K  hypothesis. Our hypothesis theory requires only one instance of negative evidence and that 
has been presented here so we have no further interest in the -*K branch from state S  lo.
If the new history patch has the same precepts and the agent executes a choice that is not represented 
elsewhere in the coach database and this patch shows some form of influence then it will also be used to
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State S11 State S12 State S2^
K -.K
State S1q
L i L
State S2q
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2
(a) Hypothesis 1 negative evidence (b) Hypothesis 2
Figure 6.13: Coach database, collateral negative evidence
instantiate a new hypothesis, figure 6.13(b). As far as the a /K  hypothesis family is concerned the right hand 
branch in figure 6.13(a), ->K choice at state S lo, is complete. The S lo node has two forwards branches, the 
left branch represents a /K  and the right branch represents a/->K. The next states reachable along the right 
hand branch are explored more accurately by other hypotheses so our requirement of only a single instance 
of negative evidence does not reduce the potential state space coverage of the coaching agent’s database.
So far our representation admits positive evidence and negative evidence but we have still to address 
counter evidence and evidence tallies. A hypothesis is built on the observed results of an agent’s action, 
we need only see a single branch forwards from the negation of that action but we must follow each branch 
forwards from the positive action side.
State S1.| State S13 State SI4
\
P \ S
....7 * ..........
R ^
v  /'O : ../ .
K j *
\
State S1q
Satisfied
Hypothesis 1
Figure 6.14: Coach database, multiple possible states following agent choosing K
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Figure 6.14 illustrates this, the coach has collected other history patches where the precepts match S lo 
and the agent has chosen action K  but the resulting state has not matched S 11 (note that this is in terms of 
the atomic proposition of definition 46). We could explicitly represent this, as in figure 6.14, with the tallies 
for each state represented on the arcs from a /K  at S lo. This is an unnecessary complication and dilutes the 
focus of our foundation hypothesis. Instead we aggregate the ->S l i  states and we maintain a tally of these 
—■S' 11 instances to allow its use in heuristics, such as those discussed in section 5.1, for hypothesis strength. 
This gives a database entry, for this single hypothesis, which resembles figure 6.15.
■State S1State S1 Satisfied
State S1
Hypothesis 1
Figure 6.15: Coach database, representation of a binary hypothesis
6.6.3 Managing multiple hypotheses
On the route to a single hypothesis structure we have discarded certain transitions from our growing hypoth­
esis state diagram. Given a history patch where an agent with precepts equivalent to state S lo (the states are 
numbered by their associated hypothesis) executes an L  action leading to a next state S 2i which is not hy­
pothesis equivalent (definition 47) to S 11 then this not only provides negative evidence for hypothesis 1 but 
it also allows the instantiation of a new hypothesis. The coach now has two hypotheses based on equivalent 
precepts, hypothesis 1 where a /K  ^  S \ \  and hypothesis 2 where a /L  52 i. Because these hypotheses 
have equivalent precepts they are joined by state equivalence links. This is illustrated in figure 6.16, note that 
the states S lo and 520 are database states and although they are equivalent as far as their precept content is
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State -.StateS^ Satisfied State S21 -State S1., Satisfied
f
K -iK
State equivalence links
L -L
---------- State S 1 q State S 2 q ---------------- > .
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2
Figure 6.16: Coach database, multiple hypotheses on a state equivalence chain
concerned they differ in the action attached to the precepts. The database represents hypotheses rather than 
raw world states. This may build a chain of possible routes forward from a given state and each hypothesis 
along that chain will have positive and counter evidence tallies which may be used by heuristics to gauge 
its strength. The postcept states may be linked into other state equivalence chains so as to link to reachable 
hypotheses based on the following states.
This will give a structure similar to that of figure 6.17. The forwards branching of figure 6.17 is still 
unbounded. Since the partial order on states is based on agent actions rather than on time (although time 
is implicit) we may admit loops, as discussed above, allowing us to close off certain forward branches. If, 
for example, S3i and S lo are equivalent then a /M  from S 3o leads back to a preceding state closing a loop. 
This is illustrated in figure 6.18. Since agents have a limited repertoire of actions adopting a partial order 
based on actions rather than raw time will, intuitively, bound the graph of reachable world states.
6.6.4 Generating behaviour patches, maximising agent /  action influence
As a coaching agent’s database graph structure grows chains of equivalent states will emerge. These chains 
represent a mapping from a perceived state through an agent’s available choices to a set of next states, 
the chain is simply a representation of how an agent class may influence its environment starting from a 
given state. This is illustrated in figure 6.19. Coaching agents will be able to infer the most influential
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-'State S31 Satisfied
\  T
-------.-j
-.State S41 Satisfied ;
U
State equivalence links
N
S ts ts  S 4 q
Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
"‘State S1, satisfied ; - S ta te S ^  Satisfied\  f
State S 1 q
State equivalence links
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2
Figure 6.17: Coach database, illustration of possible multiple level hypotheses
State S4.
.S tate S4.Satisfied Satisfied
S tate equivalence links
State S3.S tate SI. S tate S4,
Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
S tate S2.
.State S1. Satisfied.State S1. Satisfied
S tate equivalence links
State S1, S tate S2.b tate S3.
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2
Figure 6.18: Coach database, admission of loops to extant states
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Postcept 
state 2
AgentPreceptstate
Postcept 
state 1
Postcept 
state n
Postcept 
state n-1
Figure 6.19: State equivalence chain as an agent internal mapping
action from a given state by walking state equivalence chains comparing the strength of each hypothesis by 
its positive and counter evidence tallies. These strengths will reflect the relative influence levels observed 
for each agent choice from the given starting state. In order to maximise single agent influence coaching 
agents will generate behaviour patches with weightings which bias agents towards choices that have been 
observed as having the most influence. We have mentioned a deontic thread in this work but can we say 
that simply biasing an agent towards a particular action has a deontic content? Horty [6 6 , page 36] notes 
that standard deontic logic partitions future worlds into sets of ideal and non-ideal worlds yet we are biasing 
rather than requiring behaviour. Hansson [57] describes a situationist deontic logic which can take things 
as given, allowing an agent to make the best choice depending on its current circumstances. Girle [49, page 
175] notes that Raymond Bradley (see Bradley and Swartz [17]) has suggested that the deontic O and P 
operators may be treated as qualified necessity and possibility operators and that the qualification may be 
moral or, in this case, practical. Anderson [4] considers OA, meaning that A is obligatory, may be reduced to 
0(->A d V) where V  indicates either that a norm has been violated and that the agent faces possible sanction
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or, in our case, reduced utility. Coaching agents will use the 0(->A d  V) axiom which is a possible reading 
of obligation, they are not concerned with the mechanics of bringing a situation about but are, on the basis 
of observed evidence requiring that, agents act in a particular way.
6.6.5 Detecting evidence of serial influence, experimenting with the P : C ratio
The coaching agent must generate new behaviour which it can seed in the environment. We have some 
guidelines, from section 5.1, which allow us to evaluate hypothesis strength. We assume that the negative 
evidence component is an enabling switch, if a hypothesis has no negative evidence then it is not fully 
formed and will not be used as a seed for new behaviours. We proceed to explore how this measure and 
switch may be used to rank hypotheses on their relative strength.
The investigation was by simple experiments and the first of these set three agents and three boolean 
variables or propositions in a single location environment. Each of the agents has four available actions, only 
one of these actions will change an associated proposition and the actions have a flat probability distribution. 
Agents operate only once per simulation cycle and in a random sequence. Noise is introduced into the cycle 
with a 10% chance of each propositiony?zppmg its sense at a random point in the agent action sequence. Each 
proposition has a prior probability of 0.1 of being set true at the beginning of the simulation. Simulation 
cycles are non episodic in that the proposition values at the end of one cycle will be carried over to the 
beginning of the following cycle.
Noise will interfere with the results of agent actions but our privileged observer status affords us knowl­
edge of which actions are genuinely influential. We know that y /M  Z and(3/L Y  are good hypotheses, 
a ’s behaviour is a little more complex, its action K  copies the value of Y  onto X  so that a  has influence over 
X  but this is contingent on fi’s prior action. Our privileged world view tells us that /?/L; a /K  X  is a 
good hypothesis. Each agent has a flat behaviour probability function, each of the agent’s four actions are 
equally likely to be selected. The 10% random flip noise each cycle is very significant compared with the 
25% appropriate agent action chance that the flat probability distribution. This is a very noisy environment. 
The experimental data of table 6.2 presents a set of simple hypotheses for the scenario described above after
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Table 6.2: Serial influence investigation after 1000 cycles, no ranking
Hypothesis Evidence P*/"1 rofin P  -  C value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter- l I a.LIU
a / K ^ X 174 / 67 0.721992 107 ?
a / K  Y 186 / 55 0.771784 131 X
a / K  ^  Z 187 / 54 0.775934 133 X
a/->K ^  X 481 / 278 0.633729 203 X
a/->K ^  Y 590 / 169 0.777339 421 X
a /  —'K  Z 586 / 173 0.772069 413 X
P / L ^ X 334 / 124 0.729258 2 1 0 ?
P/ L Y 2 2 0 / 9 0.960699 2 1 1 /
p / L ^ Z 0 X 0 0 0 X
P h L ^ X 498 / 273 0.645914 225 X
P h L  ^  Y 556 / 215 0.721141 341 X
P h L  ^  Z 596 / 175 0.773022 421 X
y / M ^ X 147 V 1 0 1 0.592742 46 X
y / M  7 185 / 63 0.745968 1 2 2 X
y / M  Z 230 / 18 0.927419 2 1 2 /
y/-iM  X 508 / 244 0.675532 264 X
y /-iM  7 591 / 161 0.785904 430 X
y / -iM ^  Z 543 / 209 0.722074 334 X
1000 simulation cycles. These hypotheses are grouped by agent and are not ranked. Hypotheses that are 
known to be good -  from privileged observer knowledge of the code used in the simulation -  are marked by 
a “/ ” in the rightmost column, those that are nonsensical, that is actions and results that are not explicitly 
coded and are the result of noise or overlapping percepts, are marked with a “X” and those related to serial 
influence with a The single agent hypotheses that we know are good, P /L  Y  and y /M  ^  Z, both 
exhibit high P : C ratio values. Note that in this simulation the P : C ratio is bounded to 1 and, consequently, 
1 is a high value.
Early in the system run nonsensical negative hypotheses gathered high P: C values. For example, 
y /-iM  Y  has a P :C  ratio of 0.785904 which makes it a possibly interesting hypothesis. Recall that 
our hypotheses are based on the condensed binary choice partitioning of definition 37. This means that 
when y  executes -iM  it is simply executing another of its choices. Given that agents have a finite choice set
170
we may say that the negation of action M  implies the execution of some other action. Thus the refraining 
from M  hypothesis, y / -iM  Y, is redundant because it is addressed by some other hypotheses based 
on commission of an action. Note that an agent’s choice partition may include a null action and that, as 
Halbwachs [50] indicates, such actions are standard practice in synchronous reactive systems. The y/->M 
Y hypothesis is simply a summary of the complement of M  and Choicep.
This brings us to the difficult question of what is a good P : C ratio? Eliminating the negative hypothe­
ses, for the reasons discussed immediately above, and ranking the remaining hypotheses by their P : C ratio 
gives the data shown in table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Serial influence data after 1000 cycles, ranked by P : C ratio
Hypothesis Evidence - P:C ratio P - C  value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter-
P /L^>  Y 2 2 0 / 9 0.960699 2 1 1 /
y /M  ^  Z 230 / 18 0.927419 2 1 2 /
a / K ^ Z 187 / 54 0.775934 133 X
a / K  Y 186 / 55 0.771784 131 X
y / M^ > Y 185 / 63 0.745968 1 2 2 X
P / L ^ X 334 / 124 0.729258 2 1 0 7
a / K  X 174 / 67 0.721992 107 7
y / M ^ X 147 / 1 0 1 0.592742 46 X
P/ L  Z 0 X 0 0 0 X
By inspection, the single agent influence hypotheses that we know are good have both risen to the 
top of the table and, even in this very noisy environment, are grouped closely together. There is a larger 
gap between the top two hypotheses and the next five which exhibit a closely grouped P : C ratio. This is 
followed by another gap and two poorly scoring hypotheses. We are unable to state absolute P : C ratio 
values but from table 6.3 we may infer some simple heuristics to guide a coaching agent in selecting good 
hypotheses. After a number of cycles, we assume that the top scoring hypothesis is good. From there we 
work down the table looking for relatively large gaps in the score and use these as a guideline for partitioning 
the table.
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This relative gap heuristic allows us to identify candidates for seeding as single agent hypotheses, 
but what of the remaining hypotheses? From our privileged position we know that there are two related 
hypotheses which contribute to the serial influence that brings about X. a ’s reliance on an earlier action by 
13 introduces additional noise -  over and above that already in the system -  to a ’s influence. This, as one 
would intuitively expect, causes the P : C ratio for a / K  Y  to be rather low. Note that the gap between 
the P: C ratio for a / K  Y  and the hypothesis below it in table is relatively large compared with the 
group of hypotheses above it and below those that we already believe to be good. This allows us to infer 
another relative gap heuristic which partitions the table into three blocks, the top block contains candidates 
for seeding as simple, single agent behaviours, the middle block contains hypotheses which warrant further 
investigation and the bottom block contains hypotheses that are uninteresting.
This partitioning of the table into three blocks defined by relative P : C ratio gaps offers little, beyond the 
identification of possible components of other agent influences, to guide the coach in selecting behaviours to 
seed. The P : C ratio offers one means of assessing noise in agent behaviours, we may use the same positive 
and counter evidence tallies to measure the absolute difference between the parameters.
Using the two heuristics outlined above to remove single agent candidate hypotheses and uninteresting 
hypotheses then ordering on P - C  value gives us table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Potential serial influence candidates after 1000 cycles, ranked by P  -  C value
Hypothesis Evidence - P:C ratio P - C  value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter-
a / K ^ X 174 / 67 0.721992 107 ?
y / M  Y 185 / 63 0.745968 1 2 2 X
a / K  Y 186 / 55 0.771784 131 X
a / K ^ Z 187 / 54 0.775934 133 X
/ 3 / L ^ X 334 / 124 0.729258 2 1 0 ?
The hypotheses that we know form part of the sequential influence chain lie at the top and bottom of 
the hypothesis table. a / K  ^  X  is the delivery action for the influence. If we naively coach a  by biasing its
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chance of choosing action K  to 35% (from the 25% of the flat probability distribution) we get the data of 
table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Potential serial influence with coached a  (at 35%) after 1000 cycles, ranked by P -  C value
Hypothesis Evidence - P:C ratio P - C  value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter-
y / M ^ Y 185 / 63 0.745968 1 2 2 X
a / K  X 248 S 95 0.723032 153 ?
a / K  Y 264 S 79 0.769679 185 X
a / K ^ Z 265 / 78 0.772595 187 X
i 6 / L ^ X 332 s 126 0.724891 206 ?
Despite coaching a ’s behaviour does not show any significant change in influence and, intuitively, this 
is to be expected. /3’s earlier enabling action brings about a world state where a  may more reliably exercise 
its influence and, consequently, /3’s action is the more influential of the pair. Although a ’s influence chain 
terminating action lies near the top of the P -  C ordered hypothesis block -  indicating potential membership 
of an influence chain -  /3’s more influential enabling action lies at the bottom of the block. How, then, do we 
proceed?
6.6.6 Action preconditions, precepts and more focused hypotheses
So far, given a complete set of single agent/action hypotheses we have a heuristic which allows the iden­
tification of candidates for single agent influence and identifies uninteresting hypotheses. This leaves us 
with a set of potential candidates for serial influence behaviour but without a means for identifying the most 
interesting members of this set.
The hypotheses considered above were global hypotheses based on an agent’s influence without regard 
to the current state of its world. Such hypotheses are blunt instruments which may capture the fact that an 
agent is influential but may not capture when that agent has influence in the world. If a coach detects that a / K  
has influence and seeds behaviours that have a  executing K  without regard to its current environment then
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the coach is seeding behaviours that potentially reduce agent influence because action K  is only influential 
in certain circumstances and a blind bias towards K  may be inappropriate.
To do this we need to refine our approach to evaluating hypotheses and move away from the rather 
blunt global approach outlined above. The actor agent operation cycle, described in definition 25, involves 
the agent gathering a set of precepts, executing some action from its available set of actions then generating 
a set of postcepts. All of these data are contained in history patches which provide the coaching agent’s 
window on the world. The availability of precepts gives us a means of identifying more accurately where 
particular actions have influence.
The global hypothesis approach simply stated that a /K  has influence over X  regardless of a ’s precepts. 
We refine this by adding preconditions derived from agent precepts. The addition of these preconditions 
will increase the number of hypotheses that we have to manage but at the same time provides data about 
world state prior to an action. The experimental world is simple, having only three propositions, X, Y  and Z 
(we neglect the presence of agents as this is a single location world). Considering the simple, single agent 
influence case of y  we have a set of global hypotheses, a set of hypotheses with X  as a precept, a set of 
hypotheses with Y  as a precept and a set of hypotheses with Z as a precept. These sets may, of course, 
overlap as it is quite possible for, say, both X  and Z to be true in the agent precepts.
We start by considering the hypotheses relating to this simple influence. The data are collated in table
6 . 6  where hypothesis prefixes read GH  for a global hypothesis, XI where X  is true in the precepts, XO 
where X is false in the precepts and similarly for the other propositions Y  and Z. This formidable table 
may be immediately trimmed by applying the heuristics outlined above and since we are only, at this point, 
interested in simple, single agent hypotheses we retain only the top set of hypotheses in each precept group. 
This filters out the noise driven propositions that y  has no influence over and is in line with our privileged 
knowledge of the system.
This leaves us with table 6.7 where we see that the P : C ratio values are all very similar. This may 
be interpreted in two ways, looking at the precept grouped hypotheses the similarity between the T and 
±  values for X, Y  and Z indicate that the values of these precepts have no significant effect on y ’s ability
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Table 6.6: y / M  Z, complete set of global and precept prefixed hypotheses
Hypothesis Evidence P  -  C value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter-
Global hypotheses
GHy/ M X 151 / 75 0.668142 76 X
GHy / M Y 182 / 44 0.80531 138 X
GHy / M ^  Z 2 1 2 / 14 0.938053 198 Z
X  precept hypotheses
X l y / M  X 131 / 14 0.903448 117 X
X I y / M  ^  Y 123 / 2 2 0.848276 1 0 1 X
X l y / M  Z 136 / 9 0.937931 127 z
XOy/M X 2 0 / 61 0.246914 -41 X
XOy/M~> Y 59 / 2 2 0.728395 37 X
XOy/M Z 76 / 5 0.938272 71 z
Y  precept hypotheses
Y l y / M  X 136 / 41 0.768362 95 X
Y l y / M  Y 164 / 13 0.926554 151 X
Y l y / M  ^  Z 164 / 13 0.926554 151 z
YOy/M X 15 / 34 0.306122 -19 X
YOy/M Y 18 / 31 0.367347 -13 X
YOy/M Z 48 / 1 0.979592 47 z
Z precept hypotheses
Z l y / M  X 1 2 1 / 56 0.683616 65 X
Z l y / M  Y 145 / 32 0.819209 113 X
Z l y / M  ^  Z 167 / 1 0 0.943503 157 z
ZOy/M X 30 / 19 0.612245 1 1 X
ZOy/M  7 37 / 1 2 0.755102 25 X
ZOy/M Z 45 Z 4 0.918367 41 z
to influence Z. An alternative reading is that the given closeness in value of the P : C ratio for the global 
hypotheses we apply Occam’s razor and take the simplest option - the global hypothesis. Either of these 
leads to the same conclusion that the precepts don’t have any effect on y ’s ability to bring about Z.
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Table 6.7: y / M  Z, minimal set of global and precept prefixed hypotheses
EvidenceHypothesis — ——-----Positive- Negative- Counter- - P.C ratio P - C  value Sound
Global hypotheses
GHy / M  ^  Z 212 14 0.938053 198
X  precept hypotheses
X l y / M  136 9 0.937931 127 /
XOy/M ^  Z  76 5 0.938272 71 /
Y  precept hypotheses
Y l y / M  ^ Z  164 / 13 0.926554 151 /
YOy/M Z 48 y 1 0.979592 47 /
Z precept hypotheses
Z l y / M  ^  Z 167 / 1 0 0.943503 157 /
ZOy/M Z 45 4 0.918367 41
6.6.7 Using precept prefixed hypotheses to detect serial influence
What, then, of the serial chain which we know is good -  (3/L\ a /K  X I  Collating the evidence for the 
delivery action gives us the data of table 6 .8 . As above this is a formidable table so we begin by attempting 
to trim it to a more amenable size.
Recall that the P : C ratios for a s  influence over X, Y  and Z fell into the second group after applying 
our heuristics above. Here we see that the global hypotheses all have similar P : C ratios and we move to 
the P -  C value, GHa / K  X  has the lowest value indicating that it is the most interesting of the group 
and that this hypothesis may be contingent on something else. The coaching agent has no knowledge of the 
physics of its world and it may only infer that a ’s setting of X  is dependent on f i ’s earlier setting of Y  from 
observation.
There are two ways that we may approach this, we may either select the most interesting global hy­
pothesis and use that as a filter on the precept prefixed hypotheses or we may treat the global hypotheses as 
equals and rank all of the precept prefixed hypotheses.
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Table 6.8: Influence delivery, a / K  X, complete set of global and precept prefixed hypotheses
Hypothesis Evidence P  -  C value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter-
Global hypotheses
GHa / K  X 178 63 0.738589 115 ?
GH a / K  ^  Y 188 / 53 0.780083 135 X
GHa / K  ^  Z 191 / 50 0.792531 141 X
X  precept hypotheses
XI a / K ^ X 1 2 1 / 30 0.801324 91 ?
X Ia / K  ^  Y 126 / 25 0.834437 1 0 1 X
X l a / K ^ Z 118 / 33 0.781457 85 X
XOa / K  ^  X 57 / 33 0.633333 24 ?
XOa / K  Y 62 / 28 0.688889 34 X
XO a / K  Z 73 / 17 0.811111 56 X
Y  precept hypotheses
Y l a / K 165 / 2 0 0.891892 145 ?
Y l a / K  ^  Y 167 / 18 0.902703 149 X
Y l a / K  Z 145 / 40 0.783784 105 X
YOa/K X 13 / 43 0.232143 -30 ?
YOa/K Y 2 1 / 35 0.375 -14 X
YOa/K ^ Z 46 S 1 0 0.821429 36 X
Z  precept hypotheses
Z l a / K ^ X 143 / 47 0.752632 96 ?
Z l a / K ^  Y 147 / 43 0.773684 104 X
Z l a / K ^ Z 111 Z 13 0.931579 164 X
ZOa/K  ^  X 35 / 16 0.686275 19 ?
Z O a / K ^  Y 41 / 1 0 0.803922 31 X
Z O a / K ^ Z 14 / 37 0.27451 -23 X
6.6.8 Filtering prefixed hypotheses against one global hypothesis
In the first case we select GHa / K  X as a target because it has the lowest P -  C value, and extract all 
of the precept prefixed hypotheses for X. This gives the data of table 6.9, ordering these by P : C  ratio 
places Y l a / K  ^  X at the top of the table.
I l l
Table 6.9: Influence delivery, precept prefixed hypotheses filtered on single global hypothesis
Evidence - P:C ratio P -  C value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter-
Global hypothesis
GHa / K  ^  X  178 / 63 0.738589 115 ?
Ordered X  hypotheses
Y l a / K  X  165 / 2 0 0.891892 145 ?
X l a / K ^ X  121 S 30 0.801324 91 ?
Z l a / K ^ X  143 / 47 0.752632 96 ?
Z O a / K ^ X  35 / 16 0.686275 19 ?
XO a / K  ^ X  57 / 33 0.633333 24 ?
YOa/K ^ X  13 / 43 0.232143 -30 ?
There is a relatively large P : C ratio gap between the first hypothesis and the others in the table. This 
indicates that having proposition Y  holding before a / K  holds the most promise. The coaching agent already 
has data, in table 6.3, indicating that f i /L ^  Y  is a good hypothesis which leads to the Y  that the coach 
infers is a required precondition for a  being able to bring about X.  The coach will then generate a behaviour 
patch which increases P's bias towards selecting action L.
6.6.9 Selecting behaviour from ordered prefixed hypotheses
The second approach is to take the set of global hypotheses as is, rank the prefixed hypotheses in table 6 . 8  
by P : C ratio and select the most promising from the ranked group. These data are displayed in table 6.10.
Using the relative difference heuristic we see the first large gap between hypotheses three and four. 
Within this top group we see the effects of the system being very noisy. We know, because of our privileged 
knowledge, that the two top ranked hypotheses do not hold but the noisiness of the environment provides 
evidence that they do. The good hypothesis, that with Y  holding as a precept, is in third place but still falls 
into the interesting group. In this case the coach would seed three behaviours, one leading to Z, one leading 
to X  and one leading to Y.
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Table 6.10: Influence delivery, precept prefixed hypotheses ranked by P : C ratio
Hypothesis Evidence P */"1 rotin P - C  value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter- I .C Id-llU
Z l a / K  Z 177 / 13 0.931579 164 X
Y l a / K  ^  Y 167 / 18 0.902703 149 X
Y l a / K  ^ X 165 / 2 0 0.891892 145 ?
XI a / K ' - *  Y 126 / 25 0.834437 1 0 1 X
YOa/K  ^  Z 46 / 1 0 0.821429 36 X
XOa/K  Z 73 / 17 0.811111 56 X
ZOa/K ^  Y 41 / 1 0 0.803922 31 X
X l a / K ^ X 1 2 1 / 30 0.801324 91 ?
Y l a / K  ^ Z 145 / 40 0.783784 105 X
X l a / K ^ Z 118 / 33 0.781457 85 X
Z l a / K  ^  Y 147 / 43 0.773684 104 X
Z l a / K  ^  X 143 / 47 0.752632 96 ?
X O a / K ^ X 57 / 33 0.633333 24 9
XOa/K ^  Y 62 / 28 0.688889 34 X
ZOa/K X 35 / 16 0.686275 19 ?
YOa/K Y 2 1 / 35 0.375 -14 X
ZOa/K Z 14 / 37 0.27451 -23 X
YOa/K ^  X 13 / 43 0.232143 -30 ?
6.7 What does a coaching agent do?
In this chapter we have examined the relationship between a coaching agent and the actor agents in its 
environment. Coaching agents will aggregate observations by collecting partial history traces from actor 
agents. These traces are assembled into a database structure which links hypotheses as a directed cyclic 
graph and attaches evidence tallies to each observed transition. The coaching agent will use simple heuristics 
to partition the set of database hypotheses into potentially influential hypotheses -  which are used as a basis 
for synthesising new agent behaviours -  and uninteresting hypotheses which are recorded and updated just 
in case they become interesting at some point in the future.
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Chapter 7
Exploring influence, implementation and 
experiments
We have developed a theory of influence, described leadsto and may lead to operators and built a partial log­
ical characterisation of them. This characterisation has two purposes; to explore the behaviour of influence 
and to guide us in implementing coaching agents within a system. The previous chapter explored some of 
the theoretical machinery required by a coaching agent to allow it to interpret observations as meaningful 
indicators of agent influence. This chapter moves the theoretical machinery in to a practical system and we 
describe an experimental system. We are concerned, for the most part, with theoretical aspects of influence 
and do not cover implementation aspects in great detail although, where necessary, we discuss architectural 
points so as to outline how the agents operate and to indicate that they follow our theory very closely.
7.1 Experimenting with influence, building bridges
One of the main objectives for grounding this work in the computational domain was allow us to carry 
out experiments using our theory of influence. Our intentions are threefold, we intend to demonstrate that 
coaching agents are able to synthesise behaviours from their operations. We intend to show that different
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agent classes or types may operate in such a way as to jointly bring about something that individual classes 
are unable to achieve and that this may be represented in a directed hypothesis graph. We wish, also, to 
demonstrate that agents may use influence additively in order that a number of agents acting in series or 
parallel may bring about something that individuals are unable to do.
A series of experiments was constructed to test these possibilities and bridge building provided a setting 
where influence, an agent partially bridging a gap, may be extended to completely bridge a gap. The most 
attractive aspect of this is that agents need not necessarily see that they are aiming for a target, a gradually 
bridged gap is seen as gradually extending influence until it allows agents to reach a new part of their world.
Building a virtual bridge is a formidable undertaking and since we are not interested in the physics of 
bridge building we reduce the concept to that of a numerical accumulator. This allows us to approach a 
simulation of bridge building without the burden of replicating real world physics and without losing any of 
the constraints and limitations imposed by that real world. Consider a world with agents which may either 
add a unit to or subtract a unit from some form of accumulator. Such units may be thought of as representing 
components of a bridge extending to span a gap between lands.
Figure 7.1: Physical and numerical bridge building
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The notion of normative systems has been mentioned frequently in earlier parts of this work and here 
this notion becomes concrete in a simple system. If the definition for this world states that, for example, 42 is 
good then this will be the state that an observer sees as an indication that agents and the system have achieved 
something. The coach has no notion of 42 and operates only by maximising observed influence. When a 
coach sees a transition from 0 to 1 it sees a change from 0 to something and that represents influence. We can 
see that norms are system dependent and in complex systems they may also be location dependent with that 
location possibly being a virtual location. The observer agent “knows” system norms but coaching agents do 
not, coaching agents are only aware that incrementing an accumulator is an influential action, the observer 
sees this influential action leading to a system norm being satisfied. This observer /  coach relationship 
implicitly captures the ought implies can deontic identity. Similarly in a physical bridging environment an 
observer may know that an agent being on level B is good and a coach may view a new agent percept as 
evidence of some influence. A coach may have no notion of the spatial relationship between level A and 
level B or that it is possible for agents to bridge the gap and get from one to the other.
We noted in section 2.12 that we make no claims for methods of identifying or predicting emergent 
behaviour and this is clear from these bridging examples. The only tool that a coaching agent has is its 
observation of influence and it uses this as a constraining device on the state space search.
Bridges and accumulators differ in that the physical bridge has a spatial element. A bridge may be the 
result of an agent exercising influence but if the bridge is not in a good location then the bridge may not open 
access to a previously inaccessible part of the world. Figure 7.2, for example, shows two bridges, bridge B 1 
will eventually reach level B but the green agents are going in a direction which will not lead to a new part 
of the world.
In such cases we expect that by inspecting the directed graph structure of its database a coaching agent 
will, eventually, see that chains of events have necessary preconditions. In figure 7.2 we see that the agents 
building bridge B1 have started their bridge building at the edge of a chasm and this will lead to level B. 
The agents building bridge B2 have started their bridge fully on land and although in some cases this may
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Level B
Level A
Figure 7.2: Bridges may be built in the wrong direction
bridge a gap there will be cases where it does not and this will be reflected in evidence tallies on the directed 
graph.
The arithmetic accumulator may model a single, simple bridge and show influence being used con­
structively to extend a bridge span by increasing the value of an accumulator. This is sufficient for a single 
cell environment where the good state may be a bridge of a given length or accumulator of a certain value. In 
a multi cell environment we need some means of simulating effective and ineffective bridges. This may be 
achieved by using a variety of classes of accumulator distributed throughout the environment and, because 
this is a multi cell environment, agents may move between cells. Agents will be able to identify accumulator 
classes -  a red accumulator or a green accumulator -  and certain of these classes will be bounded. Some 
may be bounded below the observer’s target of 42 and some above. In the physical environment we would 
expect the system to learn not to build bridges facing inland and in the accumulator environment we expect 
agents to learn which accumulators are bounded and will not lead to the good state.
These scenarios are attractive for a number of reasons. The observer’s system goal states are easily 
defined and easily observed. The coaching agent’s lack of fundamental knowledge means that it is unable 
to see that agent behaviour is approaching a solution until the observer sees that it has been achieved.
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7.2 A series of experiments: looking for extended influence
Our experiments in bridge building were carried out over a series of experiments. These ranged from the 
almost trivially simple to very complex. By complexity we mean a combination of the size of the state space 
that contains a solution and number of pathways that an agent may follow through that state space. We start 
with a single cell, single agent world. We use the same agents throughout the experiments so actions that 
would cause the agent to move to another location are cast as null actions in single cell environments. One of 
the coaching agent’s abilities that we are keen to test is its ability to detect influence in noisy environments. 
We do this by running each experiment in four different configurations, with and without noise, and with 
and without coaching. Each of these runs was repeated a number of times using different random number 
generator seeds so as to generate a spread of results and reduce the chance of our happening to simply get a 
good sequence from the randomiser. Early experimental work revealed quirks of random number generator 
behaviour in a multithreaded Windows environment so our experiments use a single instance of a random 
number generator based on an algorithm described by Leva [79] to guarantee a single sequence rather than 
a number of the same sequences.
The noise free, uncoached runs are intended to test stochastic ability, that is the possibility of agents 
finding a solution behaviour by randomly walking the state space. If the agents do find a solution then this 
will give a metric for gauging the improvement that coaching brings. The noisy uncoached runs are intended 
to test stochastic ability in the presence of random disturbances. The noisy and noise free coached runs are 
intended to test our theories that influence may be used to guide state space searching and, in comparison 
with the uncoached runs, to give an idea of the degree of improvement in search effort that coaching brings.
7.3 What do we see when we see influence?
What do we treat as influence in this experiment? Here we must be cautious so as to keep preconceptions and 
assumptions related with numerical values out of the coaching operation. This is a bridge building exercise 
and not a numerical state space exploration so the coaching agents neglect the value of the accumulator.
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Recall that it is an external observer that sees good states and not the coach so the coaching agent’s lack of 
knowledge of absolute accumulator value is no hindrance.
This classification of influence may be viewed as a priori steering towards a good result and this would 
certainly be the case if the aim of the experiment was to count up to a certain value. We have mentioned, 
above, that the transition from 0  to 1 is seen as influence and that this is because it brings about a new thing 
in the environment, something that has not been seen before. If we cast the accumulator changes as forward 
or backward moves along an under construction bridge, as in table 7.1, then this reading of accumulator 
value transitions makes sense. Stripped of numerical preconceptions and assumptions these readings are
Table 7.1: Influence in a bridge building world
Observation Reading Reason
Transition from zero 
Transition to zero 
Increased value 
Decreased value
Influence 
No influence 
Influence 
No influence
Forwards move to new state 
Backwards move from previous 
Forwards move to new state 
Backwards move from previous
influence
influence
obviously not an attempt to give the system an a priori steer towards a desired result. A decrementing 
move will take the system back to an old state, something that has already been seen by the coach and is, 
consequently, a non influential action.
The 42 question or the question of an observed good state is a little more involved. In figures 7.1 and 
7.2 we represented bridges as extending from level A to level B. If agents were able to perceive and report 
the type of cell that they were occupying then a coaching agent would be able to detect that bridge acts as 
a conduit to increased influence. Before the bridge was constructed agents had not perceived level B cells 
so the bridge has enabled agent exploration of a part of the environment, part of their state space, that was 
previously unreachable. This is an interesting case where agent influence does not necessarily change the 
environment -  there always were two levels -  but increases the size of the state space potentially making 
new good states accessible. This is an instance of the gateways that we illustrated in chapter 3, figure 3.2 
(which is reproduced in this chapter as figure 7.4), aggregate agent influence opens gateways into previously
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inaccessible behaviour domains. This is something that will be explored in further work (briefly described 
in section 8.4). In a physical bridge building world there may be an implicit bounding to a bridge length. 
When agents are on a bridge their choices are limited, they may move forwards, move backwards or build 
forwards. If an agent maintains a full set of choices -  including move left and move right -  then it may fall 
off of the bridge and out of the experiment. This does not present difficulties, agents that fall off of bridges 
are lost to the system so a coaching agent will not see evidence of move left actions whilst on a bridge. This 
lack of evidence means that the coaching agent will not seed behaviour biasing agents towards falling off of 
bridges.
Our early work on influence indicated that other agent influence was observable by changes in agent 
choice partitioning. Logie et al. [83] described the effect of other agent action on agent choice partitioning 
by saying that influence was detectable where there was, when viewed in a branching time frame, a history 
available that was not available without other agent action. This was observable in parallel action cases, 
equations 3.1 and 3.2, and in the serial case of equation 3.3 (reproduced here as equations 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3).
3h.Choice™w(h) c  Choice™ (h) (7.1)
3h.Choice™w(h) Q Choice™ {h) (7.2)
3h.Choice™.s(h) Q Choice™(h) (7.3)
In the practical application domain these equations presuppose some degree of awareness of choice par­
titioning somewhere in the system. Our actor agents are extremely simple with no awareness of choice 
partitioning in their make up. Indeed, their choice partitions are fixed in our experimental system of purely 
reactive agents. How, then, do we implement them in such a way as to be amenable to coaching? We 
now briefly consider some aspects of the implementation of coaching and actor agents before considering 
experimental details more fully.
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7.4 Coaching agents - some implementation details
In chapter 6  we examined theoretical aspects of coaching agent behaviour. Here we briefly outline some 
practical aspects. The coaching agent’s main task is to randomly sample history data in the environment, 
use that data to generate or update hypotheses which are used to generate and seed new behaviours in the 
environment. Hypotheses are ranked by two criteria, the P : C ratio and the absolute P -  C value. The 
former is a strong indication of single agent ability and the latter is an indication of potential other agent 
nested abilities. Coaching agents do not have abilities to manipulate physical objects in the environment 
but can work with a special class of objects -  data and behaviour patches -  which have no effect in the 
environment and are used as a simple locale based communications channel between coaching agents and 
actor agents.
When a coach picks up an agent history patch it examines it for evidence of change and we consider 
agent driven change as prima facie evidence of influence. If the history patch indicates change then the 
coach will use it to either generate a hypothesis or, if it already has a matching hypothesis, update evidence 
data. History patches provide two types of evidence, evidence directly related to a hypothesis and what we 
term collateral evidence where data may be used to toggle the negative condition of non related hypotheses. 
For example, if a patch indicates that a /K  ^  A  then related hypotheses will be those where a /K  holds 
so that the patch will provide positive evidence for a hypothesis that a /K  ^  A  and will provide counter 
evidence for other a /K  hypotheses, for example a /K  ^  B. If a matching hypothesis is not present then 
the coach generates and stores a new hypothesis. Note that a single history patch may generate multiple 
hypotheses if there is evidence of multiple changes in the precept and postcept data.
After dealing with related hypotheses the coach will then use the data as collateral evidence to update 
counter or negative evidence for each applicable hypothesis in the database.
Intuitively the notion of coaching is that a coach sees that a particular action or set of actions is good 
in certain circumstances and generates an agent choice set which is biased towards those actions. Note that 
this is a bias and not a rule that in given circumstances an agent must execute a particular choice. Where 
the coach believes that certain choices will bring about a bad state then it may disable that choice by giving
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it a probability of 0. This represents our earlier intuitive description of Lamport’s [78] safety and liveness 
properties which stated that something bad will not happen and that something good will eventually happen.
7.5 Actor agents - some implementation details
Recall that our fundamental notion of an agent is as a partitioning mechanism overlaid on a discrete branch­
ing time frame and that influence is where agent choice partitions the future. Recall, also, that our actor 
agents are purely reactive and have no notion of their abilities or choice partitioning. We intend to have 
coaching agents synthesise new behaviours for these simple, reactive actors and have the actors use these 
behaviours appropriately. How can we make these three seemingly incompatible properties and require­
ments work together?
In section 6.6.7 we discussed percept prefixed hypotheses. The notion was that given an agent class 
and a particular set of precepts then a given action has been observed as the most influential. In chapter 1.1.5 
we noted that agents had fixed abilities and were individually unable to acquire new behaviours. Combining 
these fixed abilities with precept prefixed hypotheses allows us to consider actor agents as a mapping of 
precepts on to preferred behaviour patterns. This may be represented by the agent architecture illustrated in 
figure 7.3 where an agent consists of a collection of behaviours -  each having a preferred action -  selected 
by some precept filtering mechanism. Conceptually actor agents are a collection of finite state machines 
each with a weighted stochastic transition selection mechanism.
The agent, illustrated in figure 7.3, has six choices available to it, Choices = {K, L, M, N, O, P). Each 
of these choices represent some action by that agent, this may be an individual action, an action in concert 
with other agents or a null action. The set of choices remains constant throughout an agent’s life, it cannot 
acquire new choices and it cannot discard any of its current set of choices. The agent’s choice set is overlaid 
by a set of weightings with each weighting assigning a preference for a single choice. Choice set 0, in figure
7.3, gives each of the elements of Choices an equal weighting, this is the agent’s default state and it has no 
individual behaviour characteristics, each of its actions has an equal chance of being chosen. When the actor
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Figure 7.3: Agent internals - behaviour stack holding three behaviours
agent is operating it simply generates a random number, checks this against the weightings in the choice set 
and executes the appropriate choice.
If a coaching agent generates a new behaviour then this is packaged along with a precept template as 
a behaviour patch and dropped in the agent environment. The agent architecture of figure 7.3 has a single 
choice set attached to each percept slot. It would not make sense for an individual agent to hold multiple 
behaviours for a single precept trigger. We do expect that in complex worlds different classes of agents will 
emerge, classes that will select different actions for the same set of precepts and this is briefly discussed in 
section 8.4.2.
When an agent picks up a behaviour patch it uses the percept template as an identifying tag, if the 
agent has an older behaviour patch which uses the same tag then the newer choice weightings will replace 
the extant set. If the agent does not have a matching tag then it simply adds the new choice weighting set 
to its behaviour stack. For a given set of percepts an agent will select a behaviour template that has been 
generated by a coach and this will increase the likelihood that the actor will execute the coach selected 
action. We use the term biases quite deliberately, action selection is still a stochastic operation. In figure
7.3, choice set 1 has a probability of 0.5 for action K  and choice set 2 has a probability of 0.8 for action
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M. In both cases there is still a probability of the agent selecting an action from the complement set of the 
preferred action. This element of chance is deliberately included so as to cause some dither in the system 
preventing it from settling into locale specific behaviours -  local minima and local maxima. Where there is 
no percept template match the agent simply selects a behaviour using a default behaviour template with a 
flat preference weighting.
This agent architecture is simply an extension of a standard perceive-select-act reactive agent. Instead 
of mapping percepts on to an action it maps them on to a biased action selection. By altering the bias 
settings for each behaviour set we are able to coach the agent and alter its behaviour without compromising 
its simple reactive structure or leading it along the path towards cognitive agency.
7.6 Bridge building, a single agent - single location simulation
A first experiment was carried out in a simple, single cell world If the agent’s actions were fully deterministic 
then the simulation would be a trivial investigation of cause and effect. We introduce noise into the system in 
a similar manner to that of the noise of earlier experiments. There is a chance that noise may be introduced 
at a random point in the cycle and if it is it will increment or decrement the accumulator by a small amount 
and will not decrement it below zero. The agent’s action cycle (neglecting behaviour and history patch 
management) is in three steps, precepts, action and postcepts and noise may occur at any gap in this cycle 
meaning that noise may occur before or after agent action. Our expectations at this point are limited, on 
uncoached runs we may see evidence of simple stochastic ability. On coached runs we expect to see the 
coaching agent detect influence, as described in table 7.1, and seed appropriate behaviours so as to encourage 
actors to exercise this influence.
7.6.1 Single agent, single cell results
The first step was to run a raw uncoached agent in a noise free environment to get an idea of its stochastic 
ability and the requirements for a random state space search. Being uncoached the actor agent’s behaviour
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weightings remained flat throughout. The actor agent has seven actions which are defined, for the conve­
nience of human observers, as:
#define NULL_ACTI0N_1 0
#define DECREMENT 1
#define NULL_ACTI0N_2 2
#define NULL_ACTI0N_3 3
#define NULL_ACTI0N_4 4
#define INCREMENT 5
#define NULL_ACTI0N_5 6
Because this is a single cell setting there are five null actions, when the experiment moves to a multi cell 
domain then four of these will be replaced by move actions leaving one null. If an uncoached agent were 
left running in a noiseless environment then one would expect any accumulator to, on average, stay at or 
close to zero. If the distribution of actions is relatively flat then the number of increment calls will be 
roughly equal to the number of decrement calls and the null actions may be neglected. This experiment was 
Table 7.2: Results: single agent, single cell, no noise and no coaching
Cycles Seed 1 Seed 2 Seed 3 Seed 4
1 0 0 3 2 4 2
1 0 0 0 30 4 2 0 6
1 0 0 0 0 65 13 39 27
carried out using four different seeds for the random number generator and the accumulator values tallied 
at 100, 1000 and 1000 cycles. The results, shown in table 7.2, are as expected. Even if the increment and 
decrement operations were perfectly balanced the fact that the accumulator will not decrement below zero 
should give a small advantage to the increment operation and the granularity of the choice (based on integer 
variables) means that the randomness of choice is not perfect. An average value of 36 after 10000 cycles
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is not unreasonable. Randomly behaving agents with a flat choice distribution operating in an environment 
that slightly favours incrementing will cause the value stored in an accumulator to rise at a very slow rate.
Noise was introduced and the procedure was repeated using the same random number seeds in each 
case. Note that even though the seeds are the same this does not mean that the agent’s choice sequence is 
identical to that of the noise free setting. The same random number generator is now being given additional 
noise generating duties so the sequences generated by the same seeds are now spread across a number of 
tasks. The noise was introduced at a single randomly chosen point in the agent cycle. Instead of a clean 
precepts, action, postcepts cycle we now have potential noise, precepts, potential noise, action, potential 
noise, postcepts, potential noise cycle. In practice, noise is only introduced at one place in each cycle. 
At each noise insertion point there is a fifteen percent chance that the system will actually be noisy -  this 
level was selected randomly and chosen to be close to the agent’s chance of a particular choice using a flat 
weighting -  once again this is a large noise component. Noise takes the form of a random shift of ±3 units 
-  this was, again, selected randomly -  with the accumulator having a lower bound of zero. The data for 
Table 7.3: Results: single agent, single cell, with noise and no coaching
Cycles Seed 1 Seed 2 Seed 3 Seed 4
1 0 0 0 7 9 37
1 0 0 0 57 1 1 49 34
1 0 0 0 0 47 28 83 36
an uncoached agent in a noisy environment are shown in table 7.3. Noise appears to bring a degree of non 
linearity into the simulation. This is most, and surprisingly so, obvious for the fourth set of results. The 
average accumulator value after 10000 cycles is 48, greater than that of the noise free examples but the 
obvious non linear progression indicates that these values are more volatile and that detecting influence in 
such a setting will be more difficult.
Coaching was introduced on the basis of table 7.1 so that increasing accumulator values are seen as 
influential in that they are new states of the world.
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Table 7.4: Results: single agent, single cell, noise free with coaching
Cycles Seed 1 Seed 2 Seed 3 Seed 4
1 0 0 1 0 9 1 2 16
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 109 141 93
1 0 0 0 0 1037 999 1048 963
Coaching in these single cell settings is what we term hands off coaching. When a coaching agent 
synthesises a behaviour it does so once only, there is no continual monitoring and updating of a synthe­
sised behaviour to strengthen it on repeated evidence of influence. Hands on coaching, described below, 
continually modifies behaviours giving a buffered positive feedback loop to prevent saturation by a single 
choice.
7.6.2 Examining what agents are doing
Looking beyond the tabular data to examine agent log messages in a single agent coached run. These 
indicate what agents see or do at various points in their operation cycle and by examining them we we see 
the steps involved in the synthesis and distribution of a new behaviour.
Agent Bingo cycle 2: No new behaviours.
Agent Bingo cycle 2: Precepts gathered.
Agent Bingo cycle 2: No coached behaviours, selecting default behaviour.
Agent Bingo cycle 2: Increment action.
The agent cycle begins with a check for new behaviours, there are none here so it continues to gather its 
precepts and will select an action uses its default flat behaviour weighting, this time it selects an increment 
action.
Accumulator ® incremented, value is now: 1.
Accumulator Q cycle 2 no noise.
Agent Bingo cycle 2: Postcepts gathered.
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The accumulator is incremented and the agent gathers its postcepts. Note that the accumulator value is 
displayed here for convenience and that coaching agents use only transition data.
Agent Bingo cycle 2: History patch start — >
This patch tag = Bingo:2
Precepts - Ac: yes. AcClass: 1 zero.
Action =5.
Postcepts - Ac: yes. AcClass: 1 not zero.
Agent Bingo cycle 2: History patch end <—
The history patch is now in the environment and may be collected by a coaching agent.
Coach (cycle 2): Patch showing influence picked up.
Accumulator Q cycle 2 value = 1
The coaching agent collects the history patch and detects that it exhibits influence because of the increased 
accumulator value.
Patch generator - synthesised new behaviour (flat) #Q.
Patch generator - positive tweak for behaviour ®.
Patch generator - dropped behaviour Q.
A new patch is synthesised and a positive tweak is applied to increase the weighting of the increment action. 
This behaviour is placed in the environment for an actor agent to collect.
Agent Bingo cycle 4: New behaviour added.
Agent Bingo cycle 4: Precepts gathered.
Accumulator Q cycle 4 no noise.
Agent Bingo cycle 4: No applicable behaviours, selecting default behaviour.
The actor agent collects and installs the new behaviour at the start of the following cycle. This patch was 
generated on a zero to not zero transition so it’s precept requirements are that an accumulator be present and
that that accumulator be zero. In this case the accumulator is non zero, the agent’s precepts do not match 
the patch trigger precepts so the agent defaults to a flat behaviour weighting.
Agent Bingo cycle 15: New behaviour added.
Agent Bingo cycle 15: Precepts gathered.
Agent Bingo cycle 15: Selecting coached behaviour #1.
Agent Bingo cycle 15: NULL action #2.
Agent Bingo cycle 15: Postcepts gathered.
Later in the simulation the coaching agent generates a new behaviour with a different set of precepts which 
indicate that it is suitable for a non zero accumulator. This is added to the agent’s behaviour slot 1 (zero 
based) and this behaviour’s weighting, which has a bias towards the increment action, is consistently selected 
in following cycles. In this hands off coaching setting the bias is simply an additional 10% chance of the 
increment action being selected. Despite this small additional weighting the results produced by the agent, 
shown in table 7.5, are significantly better than those of uncoached agents as shown in table 7.3.
Table 7.5: Results: single agent, single cell, noisy with coaching
Cycles Seed 1 Seed 2 Seed 3 Seed 4
1 0 0 2 18 15 44
1 0 0 0 128 1 0 2 148 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 981 923 1115 899
7.6.3 Single agent, single cell observations
Coaching, in its simple hands off format, synthesised behaviours with a 10% greater chance of an action, 
on which the associated hypothesis is based, being selected for a given set of precepts. This is only a small 
bias, even when compared with the flat probability of the remaining choices, yet the results of the system 
behaviour are dramatically improved. However, this is a very simple example and the improved behaviour is 
what was intuitively expected. All that we may say of this is that in a simple system with a simple definition
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of influence it is possible to improve agent performance by biasing its behaviour so that it executes influential 
actions. We make the system slightly more complex by making it a heterogeneous system where one agent 
depends on another agent to enable its ability to influence the environment.
7.7 Bridge building, a two agent - single location simulation
The first simulation was an exercise in state space exploration, the coach was simply searching observations 
for evidence of change wholly driven by a single agent. This provided no opportunity for investigating serial 
influence which is one of the main motivations of this work. In the first experiment the actor agent was able 
to increment or decrement (as far as zero) any accumulator in its current location and, consequently, had 
full control over those parts of the environment that it can influence. In order to bring sequential influence 
to the simple single cell location we introduce a second agent type and modify the behaviour of the extant 
actor, which we shall call a. The new actor, ft, can only initialise an accumulator, this means incrementing 
it from zero to 1. If an accumulator is already non zero then this agent’s increment action will have no 
effect, a  can now only increment a non zero accumulator and is, consequently, reliant on ft to bring about 
a situation which allows it to exercise its influence giving a nested other agent construct. Adding agent 
type annotations to table 7.1 gives table 7.6 which characterises influence in this new setting. The abilities
Table 7.6: Influence in a two agent bridge building world
. Observation Reading Reason Notes
Transition from zero 
Transition to zero 
Increased value 
Decreased value
Influence 
No influence 
Influence 
No influence
Forwards to new state 
Backwards from previous influence 
Forwards to new state 
Backwards from previous influence
a  agents only 
a  and j.3 agents 
P agents only 
a  and f3 agents
that were contained in the single agent of the earlier experiment are now spread across two agents and this 
simple chance significantly complicates the world. From our privileged system builder’s view we know that 
the only guaranteed way to build a bridge is for an a  class agent to lay the foundation stone and for a yS class 
agent to continue building on that foundation. Noise in the environment means that, occasionally, a class
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agent will try to build where an a  class agent has not laid a foundation and this will succeed. Similarly, 
an a  class agent may try to lay a foundation on an extant bridge and environmental noise will cause this 
to succeed -  maybe even carrying the bridge to a point where the observer sees it as good. Noise will 
play a major part in coaching agent observations. The single agent experiment had one action which was 
unambiguously influential and this influence continued with repetition.
In this version of the experiment we have two agents which must cooperate to bring about an increase 
in accumulator value beyond 1. The a  class agent may either increment the accumulator from zero to one or 
decrement the accumulator. This is not a repeatedly influential action so, barring consistent noise, its results 
will not aggregate over time as for the increment action of the single agent example. In this case -  and the 
requirement for this is obvious when looking ahead to the multi agent, multi location version -  we need to 
increase the chance of the agent selecting an appropriate action when it needs to execute that action rather 
then increase the overall chance of that action. We move from hands off coaching to hands on coaching 
where coaching agents continually monitor behaviours and reinforce then to further strengthen observed 
influential behaviours.
The two agent experiments bring a different set of circumstances, enabling actions are, intuitively, the 
more influential of a pair. They correspond to the gateways discussed earlier and there may be a limited 
opportunity for executing such enabling actions. Here we a run the simulation without coaching, with one 
time hands off coaching and with continuous hands on coaching where the bias for a particular action is 
gradually increased as a coach repeatedly observes evidence of that action’s influence. When coaching is 
used, we run each simulation a number of times preserving the coached agent’s state across runs. This will 
indicate the effect of coaching on agents which have already acquired coach generated behaviours. This 
state preservation is simply accomplished by resetting the accumulator and allowing the agents to continue 
with their coached behaviours. We expect the agents to generate joint behaviour in the first of a chain of 
runs. When the accumulator has been reset then we expect the agents to quickly execute their joint, coached 
behaviour since they no longer need to go through the discovery phase of their operation.
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7.7.1 Two agent, single cell results
Here we see that there is not a linear progression of accumulator values as in the generally similar single 
agent case. This is to be expected as when the accumulator becomes non zero the a  class agent is bi­
ased towards decrementing. The maximum reached on a randomly chosen 10000 cycle run was 13 so the 
accumulator values in these uncoached, noise free runs stays close to zero.
Table 7.7: Results: two agent, single cell, noise free with no coaching
Cycles Seed 1 Seed 2 Seed 3 Seed 4
1 0 0 2 6 0 0
1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Table 7.8: Results: two agent, single cell, noisy with no coaching
Cycles Seed 1 Seed 2 Seed 3 Seed 4
1 0 0 1 6 16 23
1 0 0 0 7 0 43 1 2
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 24 3 4
We now change our tack slightly and begin investigating the dependency between agents rather than 
simple, single agent ability. Rather than different sequences of actions we are more interested in the re­
peatability of coached behaviours -  especially for one time enabling actions. We continue with one seed 
value for the random number generator and repeat the sequences with agent state being maintained between 
accumulator resets.
Recalling section 3.2 and, in particular, the discussion of figure 3.2 (which, for convenience, is repro­
duced here as figure 7.4) we outlined the notion of gateways between agent action domains.
Intuitively the a  class agent opens the gateway for /? class agents by tipping an accumulator off of its 
zero state to a non zero that is will respond to f f s  increment actions. The earlier hands off coaching certainly 
increased the probability of an or class agent action appropriately and this is an increased probability of an
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Figure 7.4: Gateways between single and multi agent influence domains (from chapter 3)
open gate but there is still a chance that the gate will not open when required. The hands on approach 
should allow a coaching agent to see which actions are influential and gradually tweak these so as to allow 
us to greatly increase the bias towards a particular action for a given set of percepts. Such a great increase 
may not be wise in a hands off coaching arrangement, noise may give the impression of an action having 
influence and if this verisimilar evidence leads to a large bias towards a particular action then the system’s 
performance may be compromised.
Table 7.9: Results: two agent, single cell, noise free with coaching, 1000 cycles
Coaching Sequence 1 Sequence 2 Sequence 3 Sequence 4 Sequence 5
Hands off 47 51 31 26 1
Hands on 340 881 8 6 6 854 887
Table 7.9 presents results from a series of 1000 cycle runs in a noise free setting using both hands on 
and hands off coaching. The hands off results show a significant improvement over the uncoached 1000
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cycle values of table 7.7 indicating a further significant improvement over the hands off data. Introducing 
noise into the system gives the results displayed in table 7.10.
Table 7.10: Results: two agent, single cell, noisy with coaching, 1000 cycles
Coaching Sequence 1 Sequence 2 Sequence 3 Sequence 4 Sequence 5
Hands off 77 75 15 67 45
Hands on 636 655 629 629 682
Focusing, now, of the hands on coaching approach we view coach data as raw hypotheses and trigger 
precepts, these are presented in table 7.11. This table has three parts, the top part indicates the patches that 
the coach has dropped into the environment. The centre section shows the top six patches when ordered 
by P :C  ratio and the bottom section shows the top six patches ordered by P -  C value. Hypotheses are 
written as agent/choicelD ^  Accumulator : transitionlD. The percepts column has three numbers, the 
first is a boolean indicator of the presence of an accumulator and the second is a boolean accumulator is zero 
indicator.
7.7.2 Two agent, single cell observations
The results indicate that the hands on coaching method is much better at maximising agent influence in a 
noisy environment. Both of the systems complete the first two sequences with broadly similar results but the 
invariance of behaviour weightings based on verisimilar evidence eventually causes a degradation of system 
performance. The hands on coaching gradually increases the bias towards actions that are consistently 
observed to have influence and this has a self reinforcing effect by reducing the probability of actions which 
are inconsistently influential. Behaviour tweaking in this instance is positive, influential behaviours are 
strengthened. Non influential behaviours may, equally, be weakened and this is something which we shall 
address when discussing further work based on this theory of influence. This set of simple experiments takes 
us one step closer to a multi cell simulation where the reduced density of accumulators combined with the
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Table 7.11: Patch generator data: two agent, single cell, noisy, hands-on coaching
ID Precepts Hypothesis PCR PMC
Dropped patches
1 1 0 j8 /5 'n* AC1 : 3 0.91133 3006
1 2 1 0 or/5 AC1 : 3  0.755633 295
3 1 1 P/3  AC1 : 1 0.0299401 -157
2 1 1 a /5  AC1 : 1 0.0140562 -484
Patch database, PCR ordering
1 1 0 /3/5 'n* AC1 : 3 0.91133 3006
1 2 1 0 or/5 ^  AC1 : 3 0.755633 295
13 1 0 or/4 ^  AC1 : 3 0.746627 329
9 1 0 or/ 6  ^  AC1 : 3 0.720497 497
5 1 0 a /3  AC1 : 3 0.717201 298
1 1 1 0 a /0  ^  AC 1 :3 0.713396 274
Patch database, PMC ordering
1 1 0 P/5  ^  AC 1 :3 0.91133 3006
9 1 0 a /6  ^  AC1 : 3 0.720497 497
13 1 0 or/4 AC1 : 3 0.746627 329
5 1 0 a /3  AC1 : 3 0.717201 298
1 2 1 0 a /5  AC1 : 3 0.755633 295
1 1 1 0 a / O ^ A C l  : 3 0.713396 274
agent’s ability to move (replacing most of the null actions in earlier simulations) will enormously increase 
the size of the state space.
7.8 Bridge building, a multi agent multiple cell simulation
The single cell, two agent world has a formidable state space but this is constrained by the agent’s other 
choices - those not directly affecting the accumulator - not doing anything. In the multiple location envi­
ronment agents are able to move from location to location and this causes the state space to expand further 
still providing more of a challenge for the coach to find appropriate behaviours. The single cell environ­
ment was expanded to a three by three cell torus. This is, for the most part, simply a scaled version of the
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single cell worlds discussed above. Cells may contain a number of agents but only one coach. If a coach 
attempts to move into a cell occupied by another coach then that move is blocked and the coach remains 
in its current cell. During each run the cells are driven at random in a round-robin manner, every cell will 
operate once per cycle in a randomly selected slot. The single agent experiments had agents and coaches 
operating sequentially with agents on a random round robin schedule. This is carried over to the multiple 
cell world where if there are a number of agents in a cell then they operate on a random round robin and will 
then be followed by any coaching agent in that cell. All agents are able to move horizontally and vertically 
but coach operation is slightly different, coaching agents will execute a full coaching cycle and then a move 
cycle rather than a single cycle where moving is one available option. This seemingly expedient move is 
simply to increase coaching agent’s coverage of a world and is in line with our notion that coaching agents 
operate at a privileged level. A cell may only contain a single coach, if a coach attempts to move into a 
cell that is already occupied by another coach then the attempted move fails and the coach remains in its 
current cell (not moving is also an option for coach selected moves). Moving from a single cell to multiple 
cell setting increases the size of the state space enormously. In the single cell setting agents had a number 
of equivalent null actions, these are now proper actions which may move an agent away from a cell where 
it exerts influence. In a multi cell world, if there is only one cell where an agent may exert influence then 
successive moves may take the agent further away from that cell progressively reducing its chances of exer­
cising its influence. In a single cell a succession of null actions do not alter the agent’s chance of being able 
to exert influence in its next cycle. The single cell world may be classed as episodic and the multi cell world 
as a non episodic environment as per Russell and Norvig’s [101] descriptions as were presented in section 
2 .2 .2 .
Our expectations are that coaching agents will, by reinforcing influential actions, guide the agents in 
such a manner that they are likely to maximise their influence in a given environment.
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7.8.1 Multi agent multiple cell results
The environment was first explored to build an idea of how much influence raw agents have in noisy and 
noise free environments. This was repeated with increasing numbers of agents to gain some insight into 
whether or not a simple mob handed approach with a  and /? agents duplicated in numbers sufficient to make 
each of the cells seem like a single cell environment.
Table 7.12: Results: 3x3 world, two agents, no coaching
Cycles Accumulator 1 Accumulator 2 Accumulator 3
Noise free
1 0 0 0 4 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Noisy
1 0 0 5 6 1 0
1 0 0 0 7 4 3
1 0 0 0 0 2 1 37 13
1 0 0 0 0 0 147 2 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 4 0
The next step was to test both varieties of coaching in noisy and noise free settings.
7.8.2 Multi agent multiple cell observations
We may infer from tables 7.12, 7.13 and 7.14 that uncoached, randomly acting agents have no influence and 
that the results presented are similar to those of tables 7.9 and 7.10 where two agents were bounded by a 
single cell. Simply increasing the number of agents seems to lessen their overall influence and, in the noisy 
environment, dampen the effects of random accumulator noise.
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Table 7.13: Results: 3x3 world, four agents, no coaching
Cycles Accumulator 1 Accumulator 2 Accumulator 3
Noise free
100 0 3 0
1000 1 0 0
10000 2 0 0
100000 1 0 0
1000000 0 0 0
Noisy
100 0 0 7
1000 6 16 29
10000 3 36 17
100000 17 3 26
1000000 126 0 17
Table 7.14: Results: 3x3 world, two agents (or and /?), no coaching
Cycles Accumulator 1 Accumulator 2 Accumulator 3
Noise free
100 3 0 4
1000 3 0 1
10000 3 1 1
100000 0 2 0
Noisy
100 3 3 2
1000 1 2 8
10000 2 5 4
100000 0 2 2
When coaching was introduced we see weak evidence of agent influence with hands-off coaching and 
much stronger evidence of influence with hands on coaching in both noise free and noisy settings, tables 
7.15 and 7.15 respectively.
Turning to analysis of the agent’s stacks of acquired up behaviours after the noisy environment run of 
table 7.16 we see:
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Table 7.15: Results: 3x3 world, two agents (a  and/?), noise free
Cycles Accumulator 1 Accumulator 2 Accumulator 3
Hands off coaching
100 1 5 0
1000 13 6 2
10000 1 27 4
100000 44 22 1
Hands on coaching
100 19 1 1
1000 449 261 1
10000 2526 3085 2382
100000 3010 28775 27870
Table 7.16: Results: 3x3 world, two agents (a  and jB), noisy
Cycles Accumulator 1 Accumulator 2 Accumulator 3
Hands off coaching
100 11 4 9
1000 5 4 23
10000 83 92 33
100000 14 317 43
Hands on coaching
100 5 0 6
1000 199 208 345
10000 2810 2137 2880
100000 28137 29141 27955
Agent Bingo(alpha) Behaviour dump start.
0) ID = 1 Trigger = 11 Weighting = [57, 114, 171, 228, 285, 942, 1000]
1) ID = 8 Trigger = 10 Weighting = [7, 14, 21, 28, 985, 992, 1000] 
Agent Bingo Behaviour dump end.
Agent Fleegle(beta) Behaviour dump start.
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0) ID = 0 Trigger = 10 Weighting = [7, 14, 21, 28, 35, 992, 1000]
Agent Fleegle Behaviour dump end.
These behaviour stacks have a number of interesting features, behaviour ID 1 captures the a  class 
agent’s ability to tip the accumulator from a zero state even in a very noisy setting. The bias weightings -  
with block sizes of 57 -  indicate that this behaviour did not receive a full complement of reinforcing tweaks 
indicating that coaching agents did not observe many instances of this behaviour. This behaviour’s core 
hypothesis has, as expected, a low tag number indicating that it was observed very early in the run. Its non 
zero value indicates that this was not the first influence that the coaching agent observed yet it managed to 
capture a ’s ability in the presence of heavy noise. The noisiness of the environment is evident in behaviour 8 
which erroneously attributes influence to a  class agents, the block size of its behaviour distribution indicates 
that this was a frequently observed event. Behaviour 0 correctly identifies (3 class agent ability, this is not 
such an interesting result because of the frequency of such actions.
The coaching agent maintains a behaviour patch stack separately from the hypothesis database. This is 
updated in tandem with the hypothesis database so that behaviours are reinforced as stronger evidence for 
them emerges. When the coaching agent droops new behaviours it uses the hypothesis database, with its 
evidence data, to select the behaviours to seed and simply copies them into the environment. The hypotheses 
where agents genuinely have influence have risen above the noise induced influence and a ’s influential 
behaviour -  which occurs very rarely -  is still seeded because it is the most influential hypothesis for a given 
set of trigger precepts. This is the best explanation that the coaching agent has for that influence and is the 
one that it seeds.
7.9 Revisiting nested other agent stit statements
In section 6.6 we discussed operational aspects of coaching agents and, in particular, the structure of its 
database. Recall that the database is a series of hypothesis buckets which represent perceived states in a 
manner which replicates the hypothesis tree of our theory with the addition of cyclic links. Each of these 
state buckets contains a set of hypotheses which have links to other buckets representing achieved states
206
Table 7.17: Patch generator data: two agent, multiple cell, noisy, hands-on coaching
ID Precepts Hypothesis PCR PMC
Dropped patches
0 10 P/5  AC 1 :3 0.884134 13122
8 10 a /4  AC1 : 3 0.627907 11
1 11 a /5  ^  AC 1 :1 0.00050045 -9981
Patch database, PCR ordering
0 10 P/5  AC1 : 3 0.884134 13122
8 10 a /4  ^  AC1 : 3 0.627907 11
6 10 a /6  AC1 : 3 0.580645 5
9 10 a /2  ^  AC1 : 3 0.555556 4
10 10 a /0  AC1 : 3 0.53125 2
3 10 a /3  AC1 : 3 0.0597125 -10780
Patch database, PMC ordering
0 10 P/5  AC1 : 3 0.884134 13122
8 10 a /4  AC1 : 3 0.627907 11
6 10 a /6  AC1 : 3 0.580645 5
9 10 a /2  ^  AC1 : 3 0.555556 4
10 10 a /0  AC1 : 3 0.53125 2
7 10 P / l ^ A C l  : 3 0.00885609 -1331
and a set of evidence data. The final act of coaching agents is to log their database structure before closing 
down. Casting the data of table 7.17 into this format gives us the structure of figure 7.5. Does this capture a 
nested other agent sequence? Recall that in section 7.7 we stated that the two agents have different abilities, 
a  agents can only increment an accumulator from zero to one We see that from database bucket 0 which 
holds the state equivalence chain for 11 percepts which indicate that the accumulator is zero, the strongest 
path through the database structure to state bucket 1, where the accumulator is non-zero, which admits a  and 
P agents is a /5  followed by p/5 , both indicated by heavier lines in figure 7.5. The first a /5  takes the system 
from state 11 to state 10 and subsequent p /5  actions increase influence. Although the environment was noisy 
the only transition with observed agent involvement that takes the system from a zero accumulator state to a 
non zero accumulator state is a /5 . All of thep  agent driven transitions -  ignoring the question of noise from
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Figure 7.5: Database structure generated by a simple experiment
the moment -  take the system from a non-zero accumulator state to a non-zero accumulator state. Granted, 
this is a very simple system and the coaching agent’s concept of influence may be construed as favouring this 
result. It is, however, a very noisy environment and the coaching agent’s notion of influence was deliberately 
made simple so as to allow for manual data inspection. Even with a simplistic view of the world the only 
agent driven path from a state where the accumulator is zero is identified. Combining this with the loop 
at bucket 1 we see that there is a path through the database records where a  can influence a transition to 
bucket 1 where yS may repeatedly exercise its influence. This structure captures a situation where nested 
other agent influence is displayed and we feel that it is fair to say that [a  influences: \fl influences: A]] and 
that an influence operator provides a viable reading for s t it  which admits other agent nesting with no system 
overhead and without compromising individual agency. Influence nested in such a way is not absolute in the 
sense that a strict s t it  is but this absolute nature is present if both agents choose to act appropriately.
In earlier investigations leading to this work we considered the notion of agents influencing other agents 
in such a way as to lead to complex behaviours. We envisaged a tiered structure, figure 7.6, with simple, 
single agent behaviours at the bottom and with increasingly complex behaviours on top. Our question then 
was what was required to jump the gaps between behaviour levels and initially we dubbed this as some form
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of magic which we hoped to observe and characterise in such a way as to alloy synthesis of new behaviours. 
The initial hypothesis was that this magic was data mining and this is an avenue that was explored. In later
Complex influence
Magic?
Simple influence
Figure 7.6: Complexity and magic
stages of the research it became evident that the progression was not really a progression of levels as in 
figure 7.6 and was more accurately depicted as a partitioning of a world state space, as in figure 7.4 with 
the magic being the opening of gateways to other areas. This is captured in the hypothesis and database 
structure. Our future investigations will confirm if this is adequate for richer environments or if we need to 
have data mining of the hypothesis structure to synthesise more complex behaviours.
7.10 Reviewing experimental results
The experiments described above illustrated a progression of complexity from trivial to complex. Whilst the 
settings may have been simple the introduction of noise made the job of coaching agents significantly more 
difficult, particularly in later experiments where one agent class carried out a gateway action by potentially 
masking gateway actions. Similarly, the choice of what constitutes influence may appear as if it is intended 
to deliberately steer the agents towards a goal. This is not the case, the choice of what constitutes influence
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is intended to guide agents towards exploring their state space, new values are influential and previously 
seen values are not. The choice of what does and what does not constitute influence is accumulator value 
agnostic.
The single agent, single cell experiments behaved as expected in noise free settings. These single cell 
noise free experiments are, perhaps, thought of as test runs to verify that the experimental software operated 
as expected. Because of the single cell nature of the world actions which would have caused an agent to 
move away from an accumulator are treated as null actions. The same experiments with noise introduced 
produced rather better than expected results with coached agents performing almost as well as they did in a 
noise free setting.
The two agent single cell location introduced a complication in that it required sequencing of actions, 
this is the notional gateway action introduced in chapter 3. The two agent single cell simulation also saw 
the introduction of the notions of “hands off” and “hands on” coaching. This indicated that the hands 
on approach, where the coaching agent continually monitors actor agent influence, allows the system to 
overcome the effects of noise which may manifest itself as apparent influence.
Moving to multi cell simulations we see that world becoming more complex with a significant increase 
in state space size and the introduction of dependencies, a  class agents can only increment accumulators with 
a zero value and class agents can only increment non zero accumulators. Agents can now move from cell 
to cell, this replaces some of the agent’s null actions leaving only one null in its choice set. This reduced the 
impact of noise on non influential actions slightly because null actions in the presence of an accumulator may 
be replaced by actions moving an agent away from an accumulator. This slight “weakening” of the effects 
of noise was counteracted by the increased complexity of the environment. The density of accumulators was 
greatly reduced with a concomitant reduction of the probability of coaching agents observing the gateway 
action where an a  class agent increments a zeroed accumulator. Without coaching agents were, essentially, 
ineffective and hands off coaching did not provide any great improvement. Hands on coaching, in this 
setting, provided impressive results with the system identifying the gateway action, illustrated in figure 7.5, 
and developing agent behaviour patterns that seemed well suited to achieving the observer’s goals.
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This is a strong result which potentially gives a starting point for further research into the allocation 
of behaviours amongst agents. Intuitively, if a /? class agent had two increment actions, one for zero ac­
cumulators and one for non zero accumulators, then the system performance may have been poorer. One 
possible approach would be a two stage coaching process, a hands off stage allowing for the identification 
of influential actions, an agent classification where certain agent actions are suppressed leaving the influen­
tial actions (with some others) followed by a hands on coaching stage. One of the early questions in this 
research was the difference between what ought to be done and what agents ought to do and this seems to 
point to that question and offers a niche -  albeit with simple agents in a simple environment -  which may 
provide insights in future exploration.
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Chapter 8
Discussion and further work
There are a number of threads that run through this work, the deontic identity that ought implies can, Milner’s 
statement that the behaviour of a system is just what is observed and Chellas’s observation that it would be 
bizarre to deny the sense of nested s t it . All three of these are drawn together by the notion of influence, 
ought implies can and Milner’s statement may be grouped by our working with observations. If a system 
does not have the raw, stochastic ability to bring about A then we will not observe it bringing about A 
and it would be senseless for an observer to expect it to bring about A. Milner’s statement and Chellas’s 
observation may be grouped because by observation we may see patterns of behaviour where one agent’s 
choices have some effect on another agent’s behaviour. Chellas’s observation and the deontic identity may 
be grouped because when a coaching agent observes instances of one agent influencing another it attempts 
to maximise that influence.
Ought implies can requires that a proposition or state be accessible and this is where we laid the 
foundations of our notion of agent influence. We outlined the notion of accessibility in section 3.2 where 
we introduced the idea of viewing a system’s state space as a set of influence domains. These domains 
extend from single agent influence to an arbitrary degree of complexity where only multiple agents may 
have influence, this was illustrated in figure 3.2. Our investigation led us to note some of the difficulties that 
standard s t it  semantics present when dealing with other agent constructs. There are alternative readings
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for s t it  which address these difficulties but these these also bring significant overheads which compromise 
their usability with very simple agents. We have introduced the notion of influence as an alternative to 
these readings and have indicated how our view of influence differs from others, notably the work of Ferber 
et al. and their notion of centrally aggregated influence. We have developed a theory of influence and 
have offered a partial logical characterisation of our influence operators to indicate that they are similar to 
s t it  operators. We have carried out simple experiments to indicate that the notion of influence is viable in 
practical applications. This leaves us in the position where we are able to discuss what has been achieved so 
far, indicate where our theory of influence may be useful and outline where we intend to work so as carry 
our influence theories further.
This leads us to a point where we can discuss approaches to coaching. So far we have simply considered 
the process of detecting agent influence and have not really said much about what to do with it -  other than 
attempt to increase it -  when we have detected it. The series of experiments above provide some clear 
examples of what we term “hands off” and “hands on” coaching. The hands off approach is simply where 
a coach detects influence, seeds a behaviour which increases the probability of this influence occurring 
for a given set of precepts -  in this case it was an arbitrary 10% increase -  and leaves it at that. The 
hands on approach is where a coach detects influence, seeds a behaviour as in the hands off approach but 
continues to monitor that behaviour and increases the bias when it detects future instances of its having 
influence. Consider the gateways between influence domains, if two agents meet then ideally they should 
immediately act in such a way that allows one or both of them to create or pass through a gateway to the 
next influence domain. An arbitrarily small increase in the chance of each agent selecting the correct action 
from a potentially large set of actions is clearly not good, something approaching certainty would be much 
better here. Certainty of action is something which we deliberately steer away from, our entire approach to 
synthesising new behaviours is founded on our ability to observe them and if agent behaviour becomes fixed 
then the chance of randomly generated new behaviours disappears. This is where our view of the ought 
implies can identity differs from the more standard point of view.
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Ought implies can represents stochastic ability and this simply says that a system is somehow capable 
of, for example, bringing about A. Our coaching agent’s analysis of influence is an attempt to turn the 
“can” from a stochastic ability to a set of behaviours that not only guarantees A, but which can also be 
associated with an agent or set of agents. Returning to our leads to and may lead to operators, the “can” in 
our system is represented by links between coach database buckets and the “ought” is the combination of 
detected influence and agent behaviour weighting. We conclude by making some observations based on this 
work, outlining what we see as its limitations, outlining where this work will be carried in the future and by 
making some tentative suggestions for applications of our notion of influence.
8.1 Observations
The initial exploration and set of simple experiments, described in chapter 3, provided encouraging results. 
Agents are certainly able to “carry” an undischarged influence through a noisy environment. They may do 
this by, for example, holding a token or tool of some sort and not using it until appropriate. We were able 
to “track” such instances and by aggregating observed histories build a representation of the world which 
identified where an undischarged influence was “created”. We followed this exploration by transferring our 
attention to a practical setting and deliberately introduced noise into our experiments. The final experiment, 
although set in a simple environment, provided encouraging results. Despite noise and the very small inci­
dence of a /5  we were clearly able to identify a chain of events leading to an influence extending, bridging 
like behaviour. The detection of influence and the representation of serial influence, with one agent’s ability 
being contingent on another was due, in part, to the simplicity of the system. However, the noise content 
of the experiments makes the results of chapter 7 look impressive given the masking effect that the injected 
noise will have had on agent influence.
Our partial characterisation indicates that, in common with s t it , influence supports modal operators. 
More importantly the characterisation indicates that our theory of influence may be extended into domains 
requiring complex sequences of agent actions. The failed characterisations are equally important, the other 
agent extension indicated that our notion of influence rejects cases where agent actions may be mutually
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exclusive. These results bode well for further investigation to build a more solid understanding of exactly
how a coach may manipulate evidence of uncertain ability without generating unrealistic conclusions.
8.2 Summary of contributions
The contributions of this work were listed briefly in section 1.2 and we revisit this list so as to illustrate how
the contributions fitted together to build a coherent system.
The notion of influence allowed the development of a theory intended to overcome some of the shortcom­
ings of s t it  semantics. This was approached with a particular view to managing multi agent ability 
where overall ability is dependent on aggregate or sequential agent actions.
The notion of extended influence provided a foundation allowing the notion of single agent influence to 
be extended into scenarios involving a number of agents. This extension into the domain of multiple 
agent actions does not compromise individual agency and allows the notions to be applied to simple, 
reactive agents without requiring any extra societal overhead.
The notion of gateway actions allowed the characterisation of this approach as a state space search. This 
provided insights into agent behaviour and, in particular, the ought implies can deontic identity.
The notion of strict s t it O  provided a means of differentiating this influence based approach from standard 
s t it ( )  allowing the development of new operators which would allow for a logical characterisation.
The modal leads to and may lead to operators which pave the way for the treatment of the notion of in­
fluence in a similar manner to standard stit expressions.
The partial logical characterisation of leads to and may lead to operators supported their use in infer­
ences of agent influence allowing the development of a practical system to illustrate the use of in­
fluence in a nested behaviour setting.
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The binary representation of agent choice allowed the representation of hypotheses of agent influence in 
a simple and computationally tractable manner which allowed the representation of the evolution of 
an agent world.
The application of discrete time to the standard branching time fram ework allowed the computational 
problems associated with the unbounded nature of branching time to be addresses.
8.3 Limitations of this work
We have taken a simplistic view of agent influence in this work. We have tended to focus on an agent’s ability 
to change its environment. We have also examined only simple agent and action combinations, coaching 
agent hypotheses are predicated on the selection of a single action from an agent’s set of actions. This was, 
as we mentioned in section 7.9, a deliberate choice to allow for manual data inspection. Our next step is 
to gradually introduce complexity into the system, perhaps having accumulators change state after a certain 
point and then respond to a different set of actions. Gradual enrichment of the environment will lead us to 
an understanding of subtleties of agent interaction which will place us in a position to introduce automated 
data mining and apply the influence concept to complex systems.
8.4 Future work
This work has examined influence in a very narrow setting, that of agents with well defined choice partitions 
and a limited number of available actions. This has allowed us to observe that influence is a measurable and 
manageable feature of agent systems. An obvious next step is to carry the theory and experimental work into 
more complex domains, domains where complexity becomes the major obscuring factor rather than noise. 
In order to do this we will need to extent our research into supporting techniques and research areas and 
some of these are listed below.
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8.4.1 Further characterisation
s t it  has been the subject of extensive research and has generated a large amount of literature. We offer 
influence as a potential alternative allowing the extension of s t it  semantics into the other agent domain but 
do so guardedly. Our work on characterising influence needs to be extended so that we may identify where 
s t it  and influence truly differ and focus investigation on these areas. We have sufficient characterisation to 
allow simple systems, this will need to be extended so that we may investigate systems where aggregate 
behaviours are nested within each other leading to very complex behaviours.
8.4.2 Heuristics for behaviour selection
The relative gap heuristics which we adopted, outlined in section 6.6.5, were based on the ratio and absolute 
difference between positive evidence and counter evidence tallies for a given hypothesis. These heuristics 
reflected observations and are viable in the setting of the simulations presented in this work. The appropri­
ateness here comes from the fact that the experiments were carried out on a completely synthetic system 
and that as the builders of this system we understand the salient points of its behaviour. In more complex 
systems or systems that are not the synthetic product to a single entity then the salient points of system 
behaviour may not be known. In such cases the relative gap heuristics may be rather too blunt an instrument 
which will be unable to identify subtler aspects of system behaviour. Relative ordering of hypotheses may, 
for example, be taken into account along with gaps.
In complex worlds it may be that from a given state there are a number of influential actions. We 
noted, in section 7.5, that actor agents will hold one set of choice partition weightings for each precept set. 
In complex environments we expect that agents belonging to the same base class will eventually turn into 
different classes of coached agents, each using its abilities to different ends. At present we have an intuitive 
idea of how this will work but need to investigate the notion further. Of particular interest is whether or not 
coaching agents should specialise in coaching particular classes of coached agents or if individual coaching 
agents should hold what are, essentially, competing hypotheses founded on the same set of precepts.
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Our approach deals with agents in the abstract by treating them as choice partitioning mechanisms. 
The size of a choice partition may provide a heuristic for evaluating other agent hypotheses on the intuition 
that if, for example, yS/L influences a ’s ability at some other choice then the size of j3’s choice partition 
may be used in the coach database structure to gauge the strength of evidence for joint action. The gap 
heuristics may be dynamic, over longer runs a coach will see what actions have influence in certain sets of 
circumstances and may be able to treat the agent as a dynamically sized choice partitioning mechanism.
8.4.3 Potential use of data mining
We have alluded, at the end of the previous chapter, to the possible advantages of data mining in this research 
and have investigated applications of data mining in this setting, Logie et al. [83]. At this stage of our 
research we were happy to see that mining techniques were viable we are not data mining specialists and 
because of this we relied on simpler tools in the experiments of chapter 7. In simple environments where 
agents are guided by a small number of norms then simply examining the coaching database structure may 
be sufficient for identifying joint behaviours. If the system has multiple norms or involves multiply nested 
behaviours then tracing becomes more complex. Longer time periods between bounding events may allow 
a greater number of possible conclusions making identification a more demanding proposition. We believe 
that this may form a pattern that is fractal in nature and this is something that we intend to investigate in 
more complex systems with the assistance of data mining techniques.
Larger systems will have a number of coaches and this suggests some form of distributed data mining 
(DDM). Distributed data mining typically, Kargupta et al. [70] note, involves generating a global model 
and this runs counter to our multi agent approach which precludes centralisation. DDM generally allows 
for either multiple mining entities on a single repository or multiple entities mining remote, independent 
repositories. Our system does not really fit into either of these categories. It certainly has a single data 
repository, the data are distributed throughout the environment, but the data carries implicit location data 
and the mining agents are unable to see the entire data repository. Moreover the implicit location data, its 
dynamic nature and our agent model, following Kulkami et al. [76], forces the miners to process data “on
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the fly” but leaving the environment unchanged so that other mining agents potentially following different 
paths will see consistent data trails.
An approach being considered is dynamic stream mining, Coaching agents are effectively following 
a stream of patch data and as the system approaches optimal behaviour the contents of agent data patches 
will change to reflect improvements, this is the dynamic nature of the data suggested above. Cohen [32] 
describe a system for mining a continuous dynamic data stream using an incremental single pass algorithm. 
The bounding events for “good” behaviours may be treated as periodic elements in the data stream that a 
coach is following and the rate of changes in the events between these bounds may give an indication that 
the agents in the system are approaching optimal behaviour.
Klusch [74] notes that that cooperation among distributed data mining processes may allow effective 
mining even without centralised control making this approach attractive in a multi agent setting.
8.4.4 Temporal considerations
Our treatment of the time aspect of agent action has been simplistic. Time clearly plays an important part in 
agent interactions and this is especially so in time critical sequences. Recent work by Tulenheimo [115] on a 
logic of time division £.td indicates the need for investigation into suitable interpretation of time division for 
structures like trees. Our simplistic approach, with an implicit handling of time due to our characterisation 
of actions as being instantaneous, is adequate for the environments that we have described. If time plays a 
more prominent role, perhaps due to the results of an agent’s action being delayed, then we will need some 
mechanism for factoring this into hypotheses. An approach that works with tree structures may be viable 
and may possibly be implemented by adding properties to links in the coaching agent’s database structure.
8.4.5 More complex environments
Agents in our system are very simple and this simplicity means that they have no explicit communications 
system. This may be adequate for agents located in the same physical or virtual location but this precludes 
the investigation of influence in environments where agents are located in separate but connected environ­
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ments - mobile web agents for example. Communications between agents in such settings is necessary. The 
difficulty here is having some communications system or language that allows coaching agents to interpret 
communications in a way that is similar to its view of the world. Our work is centred on social rather 
than individual agency and this is something that Singh [108] notes is lacking in some approaches to agent 
communication languages. Erdur and Seylan [39] describe an agent communication language where belief 
and intention may be managed. This may be extended so as to include potential ability so that agents may 
communicate information which allows the synthesis of joint abilities.
8.5 Possible applications
The experiments described were simple but despite this simplicity they posed problems because of the 
deliberately introduced noisiness of the experimental environments. This allowed us to investigate the notion 
of influence in something approaching a “real life” setting with noise and uncertainty. These will, typically, 
be areas where an agent of some sort has an ability but that the “dimensions” of that ability are unknown. 
Our experimental coaching agents know a priori of agent choice sets but this need not necessarily be the 
case. An image of agent ability may be built as observations are gathered and -  by comparison of achievable 
states -  the true nature of an agent’s ability. We tentatively offer suggestions for potential application of our 
notion of influence. Some of these areas, which have arisen from discussion during this research, are listed 
below.
8.5.1 Pharmaceutical trials
Drug trials are complex undertakings, the environment is noisy, there are many influential factors in addition 
to the product under investigation. Yardimci [126] notes that so-called “soft computing” technologies have 
been applied widely in medicine. Our notion of influence may be thought of as a soft computing approach. 
Our approach is based on observation and does not have the same agent behaviour systems -  mutation and 
crossbreeding -  of genetic and evolutionary approaches. Our experiments were, despite their simplicity, 
challenging because of the noisiness of the experimental environment. This makes our technique useful
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for identifying influence in noisy and uncertain environments and it may be a useful adjunct to statistical 
analysis of pharmaceutical trials where the goal is to identify influential treatments.
8.5.2 Personnel management
In this work we dealt with a hard partitioning of choices. Agents were assumed to have a “hard set” of 
behaviours and hypotheses were based on an agent/choice pair. This need not necessarily be the case, an 
agent’s choices may be a fuzzy set and the agent’s choice mechanism need not be fully understood. Person­
nel management implies that the agents are human, notoriously complex cognitive agents. Such agents -  
despite their cognitive abilities -  may be no more aware of their choice sets than our simple reactive agents. 
In many cases human agents “just do what seems right” without explicit consideration. The application of 
soft computing to business and management problems seems to be a relatively young area of research which 
has a small but growing body of literature, the approach of observing the influence of “agents” appears to 
be a novel application of computing in this area.
8.5.3 Investigation of emergent behaviour
Emergent behaviour is one of the topics discussed in this work. We stated, in section 2.12, that we make no 
claims for new insights into the this phenomenon. Our approach does, however, guide state space searches 
and may be viewed as an accelerator for emergent behaviour in simulation experiments. In conjunction 
with a developing logical characterisation of influence we may be able to gain insights into the mechanisms 
of systems exhibiting such features. Li et al. [81] note that in agent systems emergent behaviour may be 
deduced from the sets of actions that agents may perform but that this becomes difficult and unpredictable 
where agents have many choices. Our approach may constrain searches for such behaviours making poten­
tially predictive analysis of complex systems potentially feasible. Li et al. also mention that the logic of 
systems should be simple in order for it to exhibit emergent behaviour. If this were the case then hybrid sys­
tems using emergent behaviour would not be possible, we feel that continued work on the characterisation 
of influence may provide insights into emergent behaviour.
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Agent systems are attractive for exploration in hazardous environments, NASA has a prospective mis­
sion to explore asteroid belts using small autonomous craft. Rouff et al. [98] describe research on what is 
called an ANTS (Autonomous Nano-Technology Swarm) mission and note that this has led to a need for 
formal methods for swarm based systems. One of the problems with swarm systems is that testing may be 
extremely difficult because the system’s multi agent nature means that testing is, essentially, a state space 
search and the state space may grow exponentially with the number of agents. Identifying gateway actions, 
as outlined in section 3.2, may provide a tool for constraining the state space allowing larger systems to be 
tested and verified.
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Appendix 1 -  proofs and lemmas
Proofs and lemmas for chapter 3 
Backwards monotony
Definition 48 Backwards monotony, from Belnap et al. [8, page 272]: w\ < W2 and m\ = ^ 2 m2 implies 
mi = m2
The witness identity lemma
Definition 49 The witness identity lemma, from Belnap et a l [8, page 272] after Chellas [31]: Suppose 
that Qi implies Q2 , that m, w 1 and W2 are moments and that ai and 0 2  are agents, possibly identical or 
possibly distinct. Suppose, further, that wi is a witness to [a\ stit: Q{\ at m and that W2  is a witness to to 
[of2 stit: <2 2 ] atm. Then W2 < w\.
The second witness identity lemma
Definition 50 The second witness identity lemma, from Belnap et al. [8, page 272]: I fw  is the witness to to 
[a stit: Q] at m\ and if  m\ = “ m2 then w is also the witness to [a stit: Q] at m2 -  which is therefore settled 
true at m2 .
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Proof of the impossibility of [a stit: [J3 stit: A]]
From [8 , page 274].
(a) Assume that [a stit: \J3 stit: A]] is settled true at m\ with w as a witness and m2  as a counter satisfying 
the negative condition so that:
(b) \fi stit: A] is not settled true at m2.
By independence of agents there must be an m3 such that both:
(c) mi =£ m3 
and:
(d) m3 =£ m2
By (a), (c), and the second witness identity lemma it must be that:
(e) w is a witness to [a stit: [J3 stit: A]] at m3. By (a) and (c) we must, by the positive condition, have:
(f) \fi stit: A] settled true at m3 -  let w\ be the witness for this. From (e), (f), and the witness identity 
lemma, we infer:
(g) wi < w.
So (d) and (g) imply by backward monotony that:
(h) m3 m2. But then the second witness identity lemma with (f) and (f) gives that [fi stit: A] must be 
settled true at m2  which contradicts (b) and completes the proof.
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Appendix 2 -  History traces for chapter 3
Each state, represented as in figure 8.1, contains a complete representation of the simple agent world. Each 
state has an ID number below the bottom, left cell. ID numbers are sequenced so that larger numbers indicate 
later states. Each cell contains data on its contents, a  and{$ indicate that these agents are present in the cell.
State
ID Action 
Figure 8.1: History trace key
P's ability is dependent on a's having given it a one use token and as a convenience this is indicated by an 
asterisk. Where p  is “enabled” it is represented as /?*. Where A holds in a cell this is written as A, if A does 
not hold then it will not be written in that cell. Note that A may appear and clear spontaneously.
Agent actions are indicated below the bottom right cell. These actions are the actions that led to that 
state. The available actions re N, S , E  and W  for move directions. Actions are always listed a  first then p  
although they occur simultaneously. G, for a  only, indicates a's attempt to give a token and U, for (3 only 
indicates P's attempt to use a token. Note that p  may still select action U when not in possession of a token. 
For example, in figure 8.2 state 17, the GE indicates that at state 12 a  attempted a give action and p  moved 
east, these actions led to state 17.
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Figure 8.2: Two agent history 1: -iA brought about in three ways
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Figure 8.3: Two agent history 2: -iA brought about and -iA not brought about
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Appendix 3 -  tables
Table 8.1: Potential serial influence with coached a,  global hypotheses ranked by P - C  value
Hypothesis Evidence - P:C ratio P - C  value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter-
G H / S / L Y 253 / 1 1 0.958333 242 /
GHJ3/L X 366 / 162 0.693182 204 ?
GHy /M  ^  Z 2 1 2 Z 14 0.938053 198 /
G H a /K  ^  Z 191 / 50 0.792531 141 X
GHy/M  ^  Y 182 / 44 0.80531 138 X
G H a /K  Y 188 / 53 0.780083 135 X
G H a /K  X 178 / 63 0.738589 115 ?
G Hy/M  ^ X 151 / 75 0.668142 76 X
GH/3/L Z 0 X 0 0 0 X
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Table 8.2: Potential serial influence with coached a, X  prefixed hypotheses ranked by P - C  value
Hypothesis Evidence - P:C ratio P - C  value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter-
X i p / L  Y 157 / 6 0.96319 151 /
X l y / M  ^  Z 136 / 9 0.937931 127 /
X l y / M  X 131 / 14 0.903448 117 X
Xl f i /L  ^  X 139 / 24 0.852761 115 7
X l y / M  ^  Y 123 / 2 2 0.848276 1 0 1 X
X l a / K ^  Y 126 / 25 0.834437 1 0 1 X
X0J3/L ^  Y 96 / 5 0.950495 91 /
X l a / K  X 1 2 1 / 30 0.801324 91 ?
X l a / K ^ Z 118 / 33 0.781457 85 X
X i p / L ^ Z 123 / 40 0.754601 83 X
XOy/M ^  Z 76 / 5 0.938272 71 /
X0J3/L Z 80 / 2 1 0.792079 59 X
XOa/K Z 73 / 17 0.811111 56 X
XOy/M Y 59 / 2 2 0.728395 37 X
XOa/K Y 62 / 28 0.688889 34 X
X O a / K ^ X 57 / 33 0.633333 24 7
XOy/M X 2 0 / 61 0.246914 -41 X
X0/3/L X 24 ✓ 77 0.237624 -53 7
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Table 8.3: Potential serial influence with coached a, Y prefixed hypotheses ranked by P - C  value
Hypothesis Evidence r o f i n P - C  value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter- l ,U  IciliAJ
Y1J3/L Y 205 / 7 0.966981 198 /
Y l y / M  Y 164 / 13 0.926554 151 X
Y l y / M  ^ Z 164 / 13 0.926554 151 /
Y l a / K  Y 167 / 18 0.902703 149 X
Y l a / K  ^ X 165 / 2 0 0.891892 145 ?
Y1/3/L Z 163 / 49 0.768868 114 X
Y l a / K 145 / 40 0.783784 105 X
Y l y / M  ^  X 136 / 41 0.768362 95 X
Y lp /L  ^  X 142 / 70 0.669811 72 ?
YOy/M ^  Z 48 / 1 0.979592 47 s
Y0/3/L Y 48 / 4 0.923077 44 s
Y O a / K ^ Z 46 / 1 0 0.821429 36 X
Y0J3/L ^  Z 40 / 1 2 0.769231 28 X
Y O p / L ^ X 2 1 / 31 0.403846 - 1 0 ?
YOy/M ^  Y 18 / 31 0.367347 -13 X
YOa/K ^  Y 2 1 / 35 0.375 -14 X
YOy/M ^ X 15 / 34 0.306122 -19 X
Y O a / K ^ X 13 / 43 0.232143 -30 ?
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Table 8.4: Potential serial influence with coached a, Z  prefixed hypotheses ranked by P - C  value
Hypothesis Evidence - P:C ratio P - C  value SoundPositive- Negative- Counter-
Z1J3/L Y 198 / 8 0.961165 190 /
Z l / 3 / L ^ Z 186 / 2 0 0.902913 166 X
Z l a / K  Z 177 / 13 0.931579 164 X
Z l y / M  Z 167 / 1 0 0.943503 157 /
Z l y / M  ^  Y 145 / 32 0.819209 113 X
Z l a / K  Y 147 / 43 0.773684 104 X
Z l a / K  ^ X 143 / 47 0.752632 96 ?
Z l y / M  X 1 2 1 / 56 0.683616 65 X
Z0/3/L Y 55 / 3 0.948276 52 /
ZOy/M ^  Z 45 / 4 0.918367 41 /
Z l / 3 / L ^ X 123 / 83 0.597087 40 ?
ZOa/K Y 41 / 1 0 0.803922 31 X
ZOy/M ^  Y 37 / 1 2 0.755102 25 X
Z O / 3 / L ^ X 40 / 18 0.689655 2 2 ?
ZOa/K X 35 / 16 0.686275 19 ?
ZOy/M X 30 / 19 0.612245 1 1 X
Z0/3/L ^  Z 17 / 41 0.293103 -24 X
ZOa/K  Z 14 / 37 0.27451 -23 X
231
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